The Basic Laws of Israel () are fourteen quasi-constitutional laws of the State of Israel. While some of them can only be changed by a majority or supermajority vote in the Knesset,For example, section 4 of the Knesset Basic Law can only be changed with the agreement of 61 out of 120 Knesset members, while section 9a of the same Basic Law provides that it may only be invoked "by virtue of a special law adopted by 80 [out of 120 Knesset members]" with varying requirements for different Basic Laws and sections, many can be altered through a majority vote,For example, the amendment to Basic Law: The Judiciary altering the reasonableness standard passed with a bare majority of 64-0 before it was struck down by the Supreme Court of Israel in 2024. and new Basic Laws can be enacted by a majority vote likewise.For example, Basic Law: Torah Study was enacted in 2026 by a vote of 63 to 52. The most recent Basic Law is Basic Law: Torah Study, enacted on 13 July 2026.
The Basic Laws were intended to be draft chapters of a future Israeli constitution, which, although promised in 1948, has been postponed since 1950; they act as a de facto constitution until their future incorporation into a formal, unitary, written constitution. Israel is one of six countries (along with New Zealand, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Canada, and the United Kingdom) that operate entirely or in part according to an uncodified constitution consisting of both material constitutional law (based upon cases and precedents), common law, and the provisions of these formal statutes.
The Basic Laws deal with the formation and role of the principal institutions of the state, including the legislature, control of state lands, ceremonial and actual executive, economic policy, military, status of Jerusalem, judiciary, state comptroller rights and freedoms, policy on referendums, status of a nation-state, and Torah study, and with their relations between the state's authorities. The Basic Laws on Human Dignity and Liberty and on Freedom of Occupation protect civil rights in Israel, although some of these rights were earlier protected at common law by the Supreme Court of Israel. The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty enjoys super-legal status, giving the Supreme Court the authority to disqualify any law contradicting it, as well as protection from Emergency Regulations.
A Basic Law enacted in 2018, "Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People", stated in chapter 1C that "the realization of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is exclusive to the Jewish People." This law was criticized by some ethnic groups in Israel, including by some Israeli Druze. It was upheld in 2021 by the Supreme Court of Israel. In 2024, the Supreme Court of Israel struck down an amendment to Basic Law: The Judiciary for the first time,Movement for Quality Government v. Knesset, HCJ 5658/23 (2024) ("A majority of the Court (8 of 15 justices) further held that Amendment No. 3 to Basic Law: The Judiciary represented an extreme deviation from the Knesset’s constituent authority that left no alternative but to declare the amendment void.") in addition to ruling that it had jurisdiction to conduct judicial review of Basic Laws enacted by the Knesset.Movement for Quality Government v. Knesset, HCJ 5658/23 (2024) ("On January 1, 2024, a majority of the Court (12 of 15 justices) held that the Court held the authority to conduct judicial review of Basic Laws and to intervene in exceptional, extreme cases in which the Knesset deviated from its constituent authority.") However, the question of whether the Supreme Court may invalidate an entire Basic Law as opposed to amendments to it remains unanswered.
Background
The State of Israel has an uncodified constitution. Instead of a formal written constitution, and in accordance with the Harari Decision () of 13 June 1950 adopted by the Israeli Constituent Assembly (the First Knesset), the State of Israel has enacted several Basic Laws of Israel dealing with government arrangements and with human rights. The Israeli Supreme Court president Aharon Barak ruled that the Basic Laws should be considered the state's constitution, and that became the common approach throughout his tenure (1995–2006). Opponents of this approach included Barak's colleague, Supreme Court Justice Mishael Cheshin.
According to Israel's Declaration of Independence of 14 May 1948, a constituent assembly should have prepared a constitution by 1 October 1948. The delay and the eventual decision on 13 June 1950 to legislate a constitution chapter by chapter, resulted primarily from the inability of different groups in Israeli society to agree on the purpose of the state, on the state's identity, and on a long-term vision. Another factor was the opposition of David Ben-GurionOrit Rozin "Forming a Collective Identity: The Debate over the Proposed Constitution, 1948–1950", Journal of Israeli History 26 (2), 2007, p. 251. (Prime Minister 1948–1954 and 1955–1963), who thought that a formal written constitution would allow the Israeli Supreme Court to overrule his socialist policies. Furthermore, Ben Gurion aimed to shift towards a majoritarian election system, and adopting a constitution would have entrenched the existing proportional representation system.
Various bodies in Israel have called for the enactment of a formal constitution as a single document, and have submitted ideas and drafts for consideration. These calls increased during the 2023 anti-judicial reform protests, when multiple opposition figures and civil society organizations proposed the codification of the Basic Laws into a formal constitution.
The Israeli Declaration of Independence stated that a formal constitution would be formulated and adopted no later than 1 October 1948. The deadline set in the declaration of independence proved unrealistic in light of the war between the new state and its Arab neighbors. General elections eventually took place on 25 January 1949 in order to elect a Constituent Assembly which would approve the new state's constitution.
The Constituent Assembly convened in February 1949. It held several discussions about the constitution without reaching an agreement. After only four meetings, on 16 February 1949 it adopted the Transition Law, by which means it became the "First Knesset". Because the Constituent Assembly did not prepare a constitution for Israel, the Knesset is the heir of the Assembly for the purpose of fulfilling this function.
The Basic Laws do not cover all constitutional issues, and there is no deadline set for the completion of the process of merging them into one comprehensive constitution. There is no clear rule determining the precedence of Basic Laws over regular legislation, and in many cases, such issues are left to interpretation by the judicial system.
The "Constitutional Revolution" and the development of judicial review
The Israeli constitution prior to 1992 In 1950 the First Knesset came to what was called the Harari Decision. Rather than draft a full constitution immediately, they would postpone the work, charging the Knesset's Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee with drafting the document piecemeal. Each chapter would be called a Basic Law, and when all had been written they would be compiled into a complete constitution. Basic laws functioning as a constitution.
Between 1958 and 1988 the Knesset passed nine Basic Laws, all of which pertained to the institutions of state.
The power of judicial review is not addressed in Basic Law: The Judiciary, or elsewhere in Israel’s Basic Laws.Basic Law: The Judiciary (1984). Basic law. The judiciary mfa.gov.il Prior to 1992, the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, rejected multiple opportunities to claim the power of judicial review. Just after Israel’s founding, in the 1948 Ziv case the Court ruled against interpreting Israel’s Declaration of Independence as the nation’s constitutional document, and in 1970, the Court reaffirmed this principle in the Rogozinsky case.Suzi Navot, The Constitution of Israel: A Contextual Analysis, Constitutional Systems of The World (Oxford, United Kingdom ; Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2014), 13 – 14Ziv v. Gubernick, P.D. 1 85 (HCJ 1948)Rogozinsky v. State of Israel, IsrSC 26(1) 129, 1971 (CA 1971). In Rogozinsky, the Court went so far as to explicitly deny itself the right to judicial review of ordinary Knesset legislation.Navot, Suzi. The Constitution of Israel: A Contextual Analysis. Constitutional Systems of The World. Oxford, United Kingdom ; Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2014, 17
However, near the same time as the Rogozinsky case, the Court began to indicate a different posture with regard to judicial review of entrenched Basic Laws. At the time, the only provision in the Basic Laws that was entrenched was section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset, which required “general, national, direct, equal, secret, and proportional elections” for the Knesset, and required an absolute majority of 61 MKs to amend. In its 1969 Bergman decision, the Supreme Court implicitly assumed the power of substantive judicial review, invalidating a public financing law that denied public funds to political parties not represented in the previous Knesset on the grounds that the law violated section 4.Bergman v. Minister of Finance, IsrSC 23(1) 963 (HCJ 1969). The Court grounded its power to strike down the law in the fact that the Knesset had failed to pass it with the absolute majority required, in the process upholding the principle of entrenchment in Israeli constitutional law.Navot, “The Migration of Proportionality: From Human Rights to the Principle of Equality in Elections—The Case of Israel,” 4. While this created only a procedural requirement that the Knesset had to meet to enact the law—namely reaching an absolute majority when passing a law in conflict with it—it also demonstrated the Court’s willingness to determine whether Knesset legislation met the substantive requirements of Basic Laws.
However, the Court explicitly refused to endorse the principle of judicial review of all Knesset legislation, explicitly stating that it did not intend for the Bergman decision to address that point.Navot, Suzi. The Constitution of Israel: A Contextual Analysis. Constitutional Systems of The World. Oxford, United Kingdom ; Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2014, 7. It further reinforced this stance in its 1974 Negev decision, clarifying that the Court lacked the power of judicial review in cases where the standard for potential review was an unentrenched ordinary law or Basic Law.Navot, Suzi. The Constitution of Israel: A Contextual Analysis. Constitutional Systems of The World. Oxford, United Kingdom ; Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2014, 22.'Negev' - Automobile Service Stations Ltd v. State of Israel Ltd, IsrSC 28(1) 640 (HCJ 1974).
The Constitutional Revolution of 1992–1995 In 1992 the Knesset passed the first two Basic Laws that related to human rights and to the basis of the Supreme Court's recently declared powers of judicial review. These are "Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty" and "Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation". Both Basic Laws contain clauses prohibiting the violation of the rights they enumerate, “except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required.” This limitations clause is contained in section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom and section 4 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.“Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty” (1992), sec. 8, https://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/1992/Pages/Basic%20Law-%20Human%20Dignity%20and%20Liberty-.aspxBasic Law: Freedom of Occupation” (1994), sec. 4 mfa.gov.il