An Icelandic Constitutional Council (Stjórnlagaráð) for the purpose of reviewing the Constitution of the Republic was appointed by a resolution of Althingi, the Icelandic parliament, on 24 March 2011. Elections were held to create a Constitutional Assembly (Stjórnlagaþing) body, but given some electoral flaws, had been ruled null and void by the Supreme Court of Iceland on 25 January 2011, leading the parliament to place most of the winning candidates into a Constitutional Council with similar mission. The question of whether the text of the proposed constitution should form a base for a future constitution was put to a non-binding referendum, where it won the approval of 67% of voters. However, the government's term finished before the reform bill could be passed, and following governments have not acted upon it.

Background

The present Constitution of Iceland was adopted in 1944. Critics of the constitution allege that it 'was drawn up in haste with minimal adjustment of the 1874 constitution as part of Iceland's declaration of independence from Nazi-occupied Denmark'.Thorvaldur Gylfason, 'Democracy on Ice: A Post-mortem of the Icelandic Constitution', Open Democracy: Free Thinking for the World, 19 June 2013. http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/thorvaldur-gylfason/democracy-on-ice-post-mortem-of-icelandic-constitution . Furthermore, critics alleged that 2008–11 Icelandic financial crisis exposed the weaknesses of this document, originally intended to be provisional. Following the Kitchenware Revolution, the 2009 Icelandic parliamentary election brought to power a coalition government of the Social Democratic Alliance and the Left-Green Movement. This government undertook to create a new constitution, for the first time in Iceland's history reviewing broad areas of the constitution.

The 2009 and 2010 National Assemblies

In 2009, private individuals and civil society groups organised a National Assembly of 1500 people—1200 chosen at random from the national registry and 300 chosen as representatives of companies, institutions and other groups—to discuss the core values on which Icelandic governance should proceed.

The 2009 National Assembly was followed in November 2010 by a government-organised assembly of 950 randomly selected citizens. The citizens chosen randomly were representative of Iceland's gender, geographic, and age makeup. A Constitutional Committee appointed by the Parliament compiled a two-volume report on the opinions generated by the 2010 National Assembly and presented the main conclusions at a press conference following the assembly. It was stated that 97% of the participants thought the format of the meeting was good, 95% thought the meeting went well and 75% considered the execution of the meeting to be exemplary. About 93% of the participants believed that the results of the meeting would benefit the Constituent Assembly in its work on a new constitution. In addition, They reported that the values that the participants considered the most important to base the constitution on were: Equality, human rights, democracy, honesty, justice, respect, freedom and responsibility. The assembly also concluded that the new constitution 'ought to contain certain key provisions concerning, e.g., electoral reform and the ownership of natural resources, for a long time two of the most contentious political issues in Iceland'.

Appointing the Constitutional Assembly

Act on a Constitutional Assembly The government passed the Act on a Constitutional Assembly no. 90/2010, legislating a special Constitutional Assembly to revise the Icelandic Constitution of the Republic. The Assembly was to comprise 25 delegates elected by direct personal election. The Assembly had to convene by 15 February 2011 and finish its work no later than 15 April 2011. The revised constitution was to be voted on by the Althingi and then put to a referendum.

The remit was:

The Constitutional Assembly was also empowered to address additional matters beyond "reviewing the Constitution of the Republic".

Election

An election was held for the assembly on 27 November 2010 using STV-PR under the Weighted Inclusive Gregory Method. 522 people stood in the election, more than double the most optimistic estimates.http://www.icelandreview.com/icelandreview/daily_news/?cat_id=16568&ew_0_a_id=369131 ; Thorvaldur Gylfason, 'Democracy on Ice: A Post-mortem of the Icelandic Constitution', Open Democracy: Free Thinking for the World, 19 June 2013. http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/thorvaldur-gylfason/democracy-on-ice-post-mortem-of-icelandic-constitution .

The voter turnout was 36%. 15 men and 10 women were elected, fulfilling the quota of 40% women required.Had fewer women been elected, up to six women closest to being elected under the regular method would have been declared elected to fulfill the quota: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/silja-b/you-say-you-want-a-consti_b_790359.html. The elected candidates were:

CandidateProfessionFirst preference votesTotal votesÞorvaldur GylfasonUniversity Professor of Economics7,19228,807Salvör NordalDirector of the University of Iceland Ethics Institute2,84219,727Ómar Þorfinnur RagnarssonMedia Presenter2,44024,411Andrés MagnússonPhysician2,17513,518Pétur GunnlaugssonLawyer and Radio Presenter1,9895,727Þorkell HelgasonMathematician1,93012,729Ari TeitssonFarmer1,68610,713Illugi JökulssonJournalist1,59323,707Freyja HaraldsdóttirManager1,08915,404Silja Bára ÓmarsdóttirLecturer in International Politics1,05413,613Örn Bárður JónssonPastor80611,180Eiríkur Bergmann EinarssonReader of Political Science75313,106Dögg HarðardóttirManager of the Division of Architecture at Reykjavik Art Museum6745,038Vilhjálmur ÞorsteinssonChairman of CCP Games6728,251Þórhildur ÞorleifsdóttirTheatre Director58411,156Pawel BartoszekMathematician5846,532Arnfríður GuðmundsdóttirUniversity Professor5317,276Erlingur SigurdarsonFormer Museum Director and Teacher52610,245Inga Lind KarlsdóttirMedia Presenter and University Student4937,774Katrín OddsdóttirLawyer4798,984Guðmundur GunnarssonTrade Union Chairman43210,922Katrín FjelstedPhysician41811,154Ástrós GunnlaugsdóttirPolitical Scientist and University Student3967,153Gísli TryggvasonConsumer Spokesperson3489,659Lýður ÁrnasonFilmmaker and Physician3477,853Source:

Election declared null and void by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court of Iceland ruled the election to the Constitutional Assembly null and void with a decision on 25 January 2011. Six Supreme Court Justices examined complaints about the election process. The Justices were: Garðar Gíslason, Árni Kolbeinsson, Gunnlaugur Claessen, Jón Steinar Gunnlaugsson, Páll Hreinsson and Viðar Már Matthíasson.

The Supreme Court of Iceland received complaints from Óðinn Sigþórsson, Skafti Harðarson and Þorgrímur S. Þorgrímsson. The complaints regarded various faults of the election process, according to the complainants. The Supreme Court of Iceland found five separate faults on the election process, thereof it considered two of them serious faults. The ballot papers had bar-codes printed in consecutive numerical order; this was considered a serious fault of the election process and deemed an infringement of laws mandating a secret ballot, which the Court considered "a fundamental provision of the Icelandic Constitution concerning public elections".Part VI.1 of the decision of the Supreme Court of Iceland 25 January 2011 Cardboard dividers had been used in place of election booths, in breach of Icelandic law requiring the use of closed booths for the electorate to cast their vote. The use of cardboard dividers was considered a fault of the election process, "the fact it was possible to glance a voter's ballot paper, which took some time to fill out if all options were exercised, is likely to restrict the right of the voter to exercise his vote freely if someone, whom he is dependent upon, could observe him or if the voter had reason to suspect that this could happen".Part VI.2 of the decision of the Supreme Court of Iceland 25 January 2011 The legal requirement that ballot papers should be folded, before being cast, was not followed. According to the Supreme Court, this rule was intended to "secure the right of the voter to cast his ballot in secret".Part VI.3 of the decision of the Supreme Court of Iceland 25 January 2011 A majority of the Supreme Court considered this a fault of the election process. Supreme Court Justices Garðar Gíslason and Viðar Már Matthíasson were of a different opinion in regards to this, and did not consider the process unlawful. According to the Supreme Court, the ballot boxes did not conform to Icelandic law, since it was not possible to secure them with a lock. Furthermore, the Supreme Court considered the ballot boxes "of a make so that it was possible without much effort to disassemble them and access ballot papers. The make and quality of the ballot boxes was thus conductive to reduce the security and secrecy of the election".Part VI.4 of the decision of the Supreme Court of Iceland 25 January 2011 This was considered a fault of the election process. According to the Supreme Court, the legislative Acts concerning elections mandated that the National Electoral Commission had to draft persons to observe the electoral process. The Supreme Court stated that since there had been doubt as to how to interpret 13–15% of the votes during the election, such observers had been of special importance to guard the rights of the candidates. The Supreme Court considered this a serious fault of the election process.Part VI.5 of the decision of the Supreme Court of Iceland 25 January 2011

The Supreme Court referred to the fact that it was the role of the legislature to establish clear and unambiguous rules for the conduct of public elections which take into account the circumstances resulting from their special nature. It was however not lawful for the government to deviate from the clear provisions of the laws concerning elections, because of the number of candidates or because of new procedures thought suitable for electronic tallying of votes.

The Court further pointed to case law supporting its decision. There was precedent for declaring elections null and void when the election process was in breach of law and suited to violate election secrecy. For example, elections in Helgafellssveit regarding the unification of municipalities had been declared null and void because the ballot paper was of such a make that it was possible to see writing though it, even though it was folded. In its reasoning in that case the Supreme Court said: The ballot paper does thus not ensure, that the election is secret in accordance to Article 17 of Act no. 8/1986, which is among fundamental provisions in Icelandic law concerning public elections, pursuant to Article 87. and Article 91. of Act no. 80/1987 and Article 31. of the Icelandic Constitution. A fault in this regard is by its very nature conductive to influence the outcome of electionsDecision of the Icelandic Supreme Court 8 December 1994 in case no. 425/1994

Another precedent was the election to a Municipal Commission in Geithellnahreppur 25 June 1978, declared null and void because of faults in election secrecy. The ballot papers were of such a make that it was possible to see writing through them when folded. The Supreme Court stated: