Convoy QP 13 was an Arctic convoy of the PQ–QP series that ran during the Second World War. It was the thirteenth of the numbered series of return convoys of merchant ships westbound from the Arctic ports of Arkhangelsk and Murmansk to Britain, Iceland and North America. Greater ship losses from the increased number of aircraft and U-boats sent to Norway had caused some senior British naval officers to advocate the suspension of convoys for the summer but this was rejected by the political leaderships in Britain, the US and the USSR. The German transfer of cruisers and battleships to Norway during the year created opportunities for the Germans to adopt combined arms tactics that had contributed to increased ship losses during the year.
The planned a combined ship and U-boat operation in conjunction with the bombers and torpedo-bombers of , despite inter-service disagreements. The operation was named (Operation Knight's Move) in which the big ships at Trondheim would transfer to Narvik for a joint attack on Convoy PQ 17 the reciprocal convoy to Convoy QP 13. British code breaking led to the German plan becoming known and the convoy escorts being ordered to rush westwards to join the distant escorts as the merchant ships to disperse to make a harder target for the German battleship and cruiser flotilla. Knight's Move was cancelled because of the destruction of much of the convoy by aircraft and U-boats.
Convoy QP 13 was able to escape the fate of the inbound convoy, as there was less point in sinking empty ships, despite several aircraft and U-boat sightings. As the convoy neared Iceland, the Admiralty unexpectedly split the convoy, the British ships to go direct to Loch Ewe in Scotland and the remainder, mainly US ships, to continue to Reykjavík. After three days without a navigational fix by celestial or solar observation in such poor weather an iceberg was mistaken for landfall and the convoy turned onto a course thought to be between the Icelandic coast and a new minefield. The leading escort blew up on a mine followed by four merchant ships sunk and two damaged, for a loss of 173 men killed. Both damaged ships were later written off, a total loss of 38,306 GRT. The surviving ships reached Reykjavík on 7 July.
Background Lend-lease
The Soviet leaders needed to replace the colossal losses of military equipment lost after the German invasion, especially when Soviet war industries were being moved out of the war zone and emphasised tank and aircraft deliveries. Machine tools, steel and aluminium was needed to replace indigenous resources lost in the invasion. The pressure on the civilian sector of the economy needed to be limited by food deliveries. The Soviets wanted to concentrate the resources that remained on items that the Soviet war economy had the greatest comparative advantage over the German economy. Aluminium imports allowed aircraft production to a far greater extent than would have been possible using local sources and tank production was emphasised at the expense of lorries and food supplies were squeezed by reliance on what could be obtained from lend–lease. At the Moscow Conference, it was acknowledged that 1.5 million tons of shipping was needed to transport the supplies of the First Protocol and that Soviet sources could provide less than 10 per cent of the carrying capacity.
The British and Americans accepted that the onus was on them to find most of the shipping, despite their commitments in other theatres. The Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, made a promise to send a convoy to the Arctic ports of the USSR every ten days and to deliver a month from July 1942 to January 1943, followed by and another more than already promised. In November, the US president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, ordered Admiral Emory Land of the US Maritime Commission and then the head of the War Shipping Administration that deliveries to Russia should only be limited by 'insurmountable difficulties'. The first convoy was due at Murmansk around 12 October and the next convoy was to depart Iceland on 22 October. A motley of British, Allied and neutral shipping loaded with military stores and raw materials for the Soviet war effort would be assembled at Hvalfjörður in Iceland, convenient for ships from both sides of the Atlantic.
From Operation Dervish to Convoy PQ 11, the supplies to the USSR were mostly British, in British ships defended by the Royal Navy. A fighter force that could defend Murmansk was delivered that protected the Arctic ports and railways into the hinterland. Before September 1941 the British had dispatched 450 aircraft, of rubber, 3,000,000 pairs of boots and stocks of tin, aluminium, jute, lead and wool. In September representatives from Britain and the United States travelled to Moscow to study Soviet requirements and their ability to meet them. The representatives of the three countries drew up a protocol in October 1941 to last until June 1942. British supplied aircraft and tanks reinforced the Russian defences of Leningrad and Moscow from December 1941. The tanks and aircraft did not save Moscow but were important in the Soviet counter-offensive. The was by then reduced to 600 operational aircraft on the Eastern Front, to an extent a consequence of being sent to the Mediterranean against the British. Tanks and aircraft supplied by the British helped the Soviet counter-offensive force push the Germans further back than might have been possible. In January and February 1941, deliveries of tanks and aircraft allowed the Russians to have a margin of safety should the Germans attempt to counter-attack.
Signals intelligence
Ultra
The British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based at Bletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers and traffic analysts. By June 1941, the German Enigma machine Home Waters () settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed but German ships and the U-boats in Arctic waters continued with the older Home from 1942, Dolphin to the British). By mid-1941, British Y-stations were able to receive and read W/T transmissions and give advance warning of operations. In 1941, naval Headache personnel with receivers to eavesdrop on wireless transmissions were embarked on warships.
The rival German (, Observation Service) of the (MND, Naval Intelligence Service) had broken several Admiralty codes and cyphers by 1939, which were used to help ships elude British forces and provide opportunities for surprise attacks. From June to August 1940, six British submarines were sunk in the Skaggerak using information gleaned from British wireless signals. In 1941, read signals from the Commander in Chief Western Approaches informing convoys of areas patrolled by U-boats, enabling the submarines to move into "safe" zones.
Arctic Ocean
Between Greenland and Norway are some of the most stormy waters of the world's oceans, of water under gales of snow, sleet and hail. The cold Arctic water was met by the Gulf Stream, warm water from the Gulf of Mexico, which became the North Atlantic Drift. Arriving at the south-west of England the drift moves between Scotland and Iceland; north of Norway the drift splits. One stream bears north of Bear Island to Svalbard and a southern stream follows the coast of Murmansk into the Barents Sea. The mingling of cold Arctic water and warmer water of higher salinity generates thick banks of fog for convoys to hide in but the waters drastically reduced the effectiveness of ASDIC as U-boats moved in waters of differing temperatures and density.
In winter, polar ice can form as far south as off the North Cape and in summer it can recede to Svalbard. The area is in perpetual darkness in winter and permanent daylight in the summer and can make air reconnaissance almost impossible. Around the North Cape and in the Barents Sea the sea temperature rarely rises about and a man in the water will die unless rescued immediately. The cold water and air makes spray freeze on the superstructure of ships, which has to be removed quickly to avoid the ship becoming top-heavy. Conditions in U-boats were, if anything, worse the boats having to submerge in warmer water to rid the superstructure of ice. Crewmen on watch were exposed to the elements, oil lost its viscosity and nuts froze and sheared off bolts. Heaters in the hull were too demanding of current and could not be run continuously.
Prelude
German naval forces in Norway were commanded by Hermann Böhm, the . Two U-boats were based in Norway in July 1941, four in September, five in December and two in January 1942, seven in February, nine in March and one in April, 23 boats in all, a number maintained for the rest of the year. Hitler contemplated establishing a unified command but decided against it. The German battleship arrived at Trondheim on 16 January, the first ship of a general move of surface ships to Norway. British convoys to Russia had received little attention in 1941, since they averaged only eight ships each and the long Arctic winter nights negated even the limited reconnaissance effort that was available. On 20 February, the cruisers and arrived at Trondheim, followed in March by the cruisers and . The transfer of more U-boats to Norway in 1942 along with the ships allowed the to contemplate more ambitious operations against Arctic convoys.
In May, despite the increased number of aircraft available to V, Marine Group Command Nord was sceptical of the ability to find the British distant escorts, despite the better weather at this time of year, because of the area of sea to be covered. Knowledge of the British dispositions was necessary if the big German ships were to be risked against a convoy. Otto Schniewind, the (Fleet Commander) stressed to Raeder that June was the best month for an operation with its longer hours of daylight and the expectation that the Allies would make a special effort to get supplies to the USSR. SKL and Hubert Schmundt, the agreed that the Allied effort should be met with equal determination. When the next convoy operation, the reciprocal Convoy PQ 17–Convoy QP 13 was found, Marine Group Command Nord wanted the ships at Trondheim to transfer to Narvik for a joint attack on Convoy PQ 17, as U-boats followed the convoy.
In (Operation Knight's Move) the ships would race to the convoy, attack and withdraw before the distant escort and the Home Fleet could intervene. Tirpitz and would deal with the close escorts and the other ships would attack the convoy, disabled ships being left for the U-boats to sink later. Success would justify the fuel consumed and the danger of Allied submarines was judged to be no more than that of torpedo attack by destroyers. Hitler was told of the plan on 5 June and ordered that planning was to continue. On 8 June, SKL and Marine Group Command Nord accepted the plan but the command arrangements were as convoluted as ever and V disagreed with its aircraft being diverted to reconnaissance.
5
In mid-1941, (Air Fleet 5) had been re-organised for Operation Barbarossa with (Air Region Norway) headquartered in Oslo. (Air Commander Stavanger) the centre and north of Norway, (Fighter Leader Norway) commanded the fighter force and ( [colonel] Andreas Nielsen) in the far north had airfields at Kirkenes and Banak. The Air Fleet had 180 aircraft, sixty of which were reserved for operations on the Karelian Front against the Red Army.
The distance from Banak to Arkhangelsk was and had only ten Junkers Ju 88 bombers of Kampfgeschwader 30, thirty Junkers Ju 87 dive-bombers ten Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters of Jagdgeschwader 77, five Messerschmitt Bf 110 heavy fighters of Zerstörergeschwader 76, ten reconnaissance aircraft and an anti-aircraft battalion. Sixty aircraft were far from adequate in such a climate and terrain where