The SS Division "Hitlerjugend" or 12th SS Panzer Division "Hitlerjugend" () was a German armoured division of the Waffen-SS during World War II.Official designation in German language as to "Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv" in Freiburg im Breisgau, stores of the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS.

The division was founded in 1943; it drew the majority of its junior enlisted men from members of the Hitler Youth, while the senior NCOs and officers were from other Waffen-SS divisions. Most of the enlisted men were teenagers, starting from the ages of 16 or even 15.

The division was sent to Normandy in response to the Allied invasion of France in June 1944. It was put immediately into combat on 7 June 1944 as part of the German defensive operations at Caen against British and Canadian forces. In the retreat from Normandy it suffered great casualties during the Battle of the Falaise Pocket.

In December 1944, the division was committed against the US Army in the Ardennes offensive. After the operation's failure, which became known as the Battle of the Bulge, the division was sent to Hungary to participate in fighting around Budapest. The division eventually retreated into Austria and surrendered to the 7th US Army on 8 May 1945.

The division committed several war crimes while en route to and during the early battles of the Allied Normandy landings, including the Ascq and Normandy massacres, and several massacres, arsons and rapes in the cities of Plomion, Tavaux, Bouillon, Godinne, Hun, Rivere, Warnant and Namur. ,After the war several members of the division, including its former commander Kurt Meyer, were convicted of war crimes.

Formation and training

The idea for the Waffen-SS division was first proposed by Artur Axmann, the leader of the Hitler Youth, to Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler in early 1943. The plan for a division made up of Hitler Youth members born in 1926 was passed on to Adolf Hitler for his approval. Hitler approved the plan in February and SS-Gruppenführer Gottlob Berger was ordered to recruit the personnel. SS-Oberführer Fritz Witt of 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) was appointed the divisional commander. Personnel from the LSSAH provided the regimental, battalion and most of the company commanders for the division.Reynolds 2008 pp10–11

About 2,000 personnel were transferred from the LSSAH and in September 1943, the division had over 16,000 recruits on its roster, undergoing training in Beverloo Camp in Leopoldsburg, Belgium. The indoctrination was often brutal; while in Allied captivity, an SS man from the division recalled: "In the Waffen-SS you couldn't do anything if an Unterfuhrer hit you during the training. The purpose of the training is to make you just as they are; it's pure sadism".

In March 1944 the 12th SS was attached to the I SS Panzer Corps and transferred to Caen in Normandy.Reynolds 2008 p16 At the beginning of June, the division had over 150 tanks.

Ascq massacre

The division committed its first massacre while en route to Normandy. The division executed 86 French men on 1 April 1944 in Ascq, France, in a reprisal against the civilian population after the railway they were on was sabotaged. The commander of the convoy, SS-Obersturmführer Walter Hauck, ordered troops to search and arrest all male members of the houses on both sides of the track. Altogether, 70 men were shot beside the railway line and another 16 killed in the village. In 1949, Hauck was put on trial in Lille, France, and was sentenced to death. His sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment. He was freed in 1957 after a further sentence reduction.

Normandy

On 6 June 1944, the division, along with the 21st Panzer Division, were the closest Panzer divisions to the landing beaches but they were unable to move until ordered by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, armed forces high command). Initially placed under LXXXI Infantry Corps It was only ordered to the front at 14:30 hours on 6 June, over twelve hours after the first reports of the landings. Prior to this Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt had ordered over half of the division (the 25th and 26th Panzergrenadier regiments) to deal with a parachute landing on the coast near Lisieux which was found to be dummies dropped by Operation Titanic specifically to confuse and draw off German forces.Barbier, p. 113. It was placed under the 1st SS Panzer Corps and ordered to Carpiquet to the west of Caen, about 50 miles away.Thomas Richard Mccallum "The 12th SS Panzer division "Hitlerjugend": A history" p51-64

The division's advance to the areas near the British–Canadian landing beaches of Sword and Juno proceeded slowly due to Allied air attacks slowing them to 4 miles per hour preventing their intervention in the first day of the landings. The first units of the 12th SS reached their assembly area near Evrecy at 22:00 hours on 6 June but the Panther tank battalion ran out of fuel east of the Orne River.Milner, p. 129. According to Marc Milner, "[t]his was just the first example of sloppy staff work and command and control that characterized 12th SS Division's experience in the beachhead battles".Milner, p. 130.

At 10:00 hours on 7 June, the 25th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment, along with 50 Panzer IV tanks of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment, arrived and moved into position north-west of Caen.Stacey 1960 p130 Supported by a battalion of artillery (3rd Battalion, 12th SS Panzer Regiment), this battle group was ordered to stop the Canadian advance and drive through to the coast, a few kilometres away.Stacey 1960 p137Haller 1996 When the 9th Canadian Brigade was spotted moving across their front, Meyer ordered an attack. The Canadians were forced back two miles and the III Battalion took Buron, the other Battalions made similar gains. At that point Allied artillery intervened - both field artillery and gunfire from battleships at sea - and the German advance slowed and stopped.

They failed to break through the Canadians around Buron, a kilometre to the north. Meyer countermanded the divisional commander's order on his own initiative, his flanks were exposed and enemy armoured units were appearing, feeling that objective unrealistic and hoped merely to stop the flow of Canadian units inland until the situation could be stabilized.Stacey 1960 p137, Stacey notes that Meyer's own notes were not explicit on this point.

The attack by the division was supposed to have been supported by the 21st Panzer Division but they could not disengage from fighting the British 3rd Infantry Division and were still at Couvre.Haller, 1996 Casualties of the 25th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment amounted to about 300 men and 15 tanks from the 12th SS Panzer Regiment were destroyed.Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, p. 67. Late on 7 June, the 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment under command of SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Wilhelm Mohnke arrived on the battlefield. Meyer had pushed back one part of the Canadian advance but to the west, the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade had occupied a group of small villages three kilometres into the German line. The 26th Panzergrenadier Regiment crossed behind Meyer's regiment and took post to the west. The 1st Battalion launched an attack towards Norrey-en-Bessin, defended by the Regina Rifles, 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 3rd Canadian Division. Their orders were to overrun the Canadians and force a deep wedge between them and the British to the west. No reconnaissance of the Canadian positions was done and the infantry met intense defensive fire from firmly established positions.Stacey 1960

Rommel ordered the 1st SS Panzer Corps (Hitlerjugend, Panzer Lehr and 21st Panzer divisions) to attack between Caen and Bayeux, though the other divisions were not ready for a coordinated attack; 21st was still engaged, Panzerlehr was not formed up after travelling to the front. This left the 12th to carry out a more limited operation and within the division Mohnke ’s battlegroup was low on fuel and Meyer’s battlegroup were not recovered from the previous day.

The attack at 03:30 hours on 8 June had little initial success. The various companies in the attacking battalion failed to coordinate effectively and suffered many casualties. Facing Canadian artillery and the supporting heavy machine guns of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, the 1st Battalion of the 12th SS was forced to fall back. Despite their losses, the Regina Rifles stood their ground. The Hitlerjugend division was criticized for performing inadequately in the opening days of the Normandy campaign, with the Canadian Brigadier, Harry Foster, later noting that "no use was made of the fact that the Reginas' flanks were exposed; instead, the enemy flung himself straight against the strongest points and utterly failed to exploit the undoubted weakness of his opponent's position".Stacey 1960 p 279 On the Canadian right, the 2nd Battalion attacked the Royal Winnipeg Rifles defending the village of Putot-en-Bessin at 06:30 hours. The battalion managed to break into the village and surround several companies, pushing the Winnipeg Rifles out of the village by 13:00 hours and inflicting 256 casualties – of which 175 were taken prisoner. Later that day, a counter-attack by the Canadian Scottish Regiment, with artillery, tank and tank-destroyer support, re-took Putot with the SS giving up the struggle for the village and withdrawing around midnight. Oliver Haller concluded that "It is evident that the 12th SS was not capable of conducting successful offensive operations against prepared positions in Normandy. Artillery and anti-tank guns were the key to victory, and the Allies possessed large numbers of these effective weapons. All of the German assaults were checked and defeated in detail. The 3rd Canadian Division had won a decisive victory".Haller, 1996.

Following the failures,the division was placed under Panzer Group West (Geyr von Schweppenburg) who was believed to be more able than 1st SS Panzer Corps' Sepp

Dietrich . Panzer Group West order the division onto the defence while it planned a new offensive for evening of 10 June. This was frustated by the Allies own offensive intended to sweep west of Caen and take ground to the south. This struck the centre of Panzer Lehr Division. That day Panzer Group West's HQ was attacked destroying the command organisation and all plans for counteroffensive postponed, the division passed back to 1st SS Panzer Corps control.

The 3rd Canadian Division ceased major combat operations until July, with only one day of major operations, on 11 June, at the Battle of Le Mesnil-Patry. This saw the 12th SS inflict many casualties on the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada and the 1st Hussars (6th Armoured Regiment) which lost 51 Sherman tanks.Martin, Charles Cromwell Battle Diary

Also on 11 June the No. 46 (Royal Marine) Commando supported by 10th Armoured Regiment cleared woods at Cairon and Rosel before attacking Le Hamel (defended by a company of 26th PGR) and Rots (just to the north of Carpiquet). The town was held - but not yet cleared - by dusk. The official historian of Le Régiment de la Chaudière, which followed them into the town, described the aftermath of the "ferocious battle" including hand-to-hand fighting and "a German and a Canadian tank have engaged each other to destruction and are still smouldering, and from each blackened turret hangs the charred corpse of a machine gunner".