The Land Forces (), also called the Congolese army, are the land warfare component and the largest branch of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC).
The current Congolese army has its origins in the Force Publique that was active in the Belgian Congo, which was renamed the Congolese National Army (Armée nationale congolaise, ANC) when the country gained independence from Belgium in 1960. During the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko, it was renamed the Armed Forces of Zaire (Forces Armées Zaïroises, FAZ) in 1971 with the country's name change from Congo to Zaire. Under Mobutu's leadership the FAZ was used to put down various rebellions but was deliberately kept weak to prevent any possible coup, resulting in its collapse in the face of Laurent Kabila's AFDL rebel movement during the First Congo War (1996–1997). After Kabila's overthrow of Mobutu the former FAZ troops and various rebels that supported him were in no condition to fight the invasion by Rwandan-backed militant groups during the Second Congo War (1998–2003) and largely collapsed.
The peace agreement signed in 2002 initiated the process of uniting former rebel groups and the previous government forces into a national army, the Land Forces of the FARDC. Several waves of integration have turned the Land Forces into a collection of unprofessional and poorly organized former rebels. The army continues to have rampant corruption, indiscipline, and low and infrequent pay, which has led to troops committing numerous crimes against civilians. In 2009, a long-term reform plan was adopted for the creation of a smaller, professional, and modernized force, but it was abandoned in 2015. During the integration and reform process, the army remained engaged with dozens of armed groups throughout the country, most notably in the eastern province of North Kivu, near the border with Rwanda. Since the resurgence of M23 in 2022, the army has also had border clashes with the Rwandan Defence Force.
History First army integration The land forces were made up of about 14-18 integrated brigades, of fighters from all the former warring factions which have gone through an brassage integration process (see next paragraph), and a not-publicly known number of non-integrated brigades which remained solely made up from single factions (the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)'s Armee National Congolaise, the ex-government former Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), the ex-RCD KML, the ex-Movement for the Liberation of Congo, the armed groups of the Ituri conflict (the Mouvement des Révolutionnaires Congolais (MRC), Forces de Résistance Patriotique d'Ituri (FRPI) and the Front Nationaliste Intégrationniste (FNI)) and the Mai-Mai).
In August 2003, in accordance with the power-sharing deals that ended the Second Congo War, leaders were appointed for the new unified Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), and General Sylvain Buki, the former military commander of the RCD, became chief of staff of the land forces. Belgium convened a series of conferences with military officers from November 2003 to January 2004, where it was decided to create a national army as a merger of former belligerents, instead of as a professional force.Clement, Caty (2009). Security Sector Reform in the DRC: Forward to the Past. Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments. p. 92 It appears that about the same time that Presidential Decree 03/042 of 18 December 2003 established the National Commission for Demobilisation and Reinsertion (CONADER), '..all ex-combatants were officially declared as FARDC soldiers and the then FARDC brigades [were to] rest deployed until the order to leave for brassage. Foreign donors were reluctant to train former rebels, but some of them believed that insecurity in the DRC prevented all other political or economic development. During 2005 the security sector reform received additional support.Clement, Caty (2009). Security Sector Reform in the DRC: Forward to the Past. Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments. p. 93
The reform plan adopted in 2005 envisaged the formation of eighteen integrated brigades through the brassage process as its first of three stages.International Crisis Group, Security Sector Reform in the Congo, Africa Report No. 104, 13 February 2006, 17–18 The process consists firstly of regroupment, where fighters are disarmed. Then they are sent to orientation centres, run by CONADER, where fighters take the choice of either returning to civilian society or remaining in the armed forces. Combatants who choose demobilization receive an initial cash payment of US $110. Those who choose to stay within the FARDC are then transferred to one of six integration centres for a 45-day training course, which aims to build integrated formations out of factional fighters previously heavily divided along ethnic, political and regional lines. The centres are spread out around the country at Kitona, Kamina, Kisangani, Rumangabo and Nyaleke (within the Virunga National Park) in Nord-Kivu, and Luberizi (on the border with Burundi) in South Kivu. The process has suffered severe difficulties due to construction delays, administration errors, and the amount of travel former combatants have to do, as the three stages' centres are widely separated.
The training of the first three brigades was conducted by Belgium, Angola, and South Africa. The first step was to end loyalties to previous armed groups and to build up the allegiance to the Congolese state. The foreign personnel also instructed Congolese trainers to accelerate the training process, improved living conditions, and provided equipment. Following the first eighteen integrated brigades, the second goal is the formation of a ready reaction force of two to three brigades, and finally, by 2010 when MONUC is anticipated to have withdrawn, the creation of a Main Defence Force of three divisions.
In February 2008, the current reform plan was described as:Retrieved 1 November 2008 "The short term, 2008–2010, will see the setting in place of a Rapid Reaction Force; the medium term, 2008–2015, with a Covering Force; and finally the long term, 2015–2020, with a Principal Defence Force." He added that the reform plan rests on a programme of synergy based on the four pillars of dissuasion, production, reconstruction and excellence. "The Rapid Reaction Force is expected to focus on dissuasion, through a Rapid Reaction Force of 12 battalions, capable of aiding MONUC to secure the east of the country and to realise constitutional missions," Defence Minister Chikez Diemu said.
There was disagreement between the Congolese leaders, who wanted a large integrated army of 100,000 to 125,000 soldiers, and their foreign partners who believed a smaller, more professional, and better-paid force of 60,000 to 70,000 would be more effective. The latter was adopted in the strategic plan for army reform that was passed by President Joseph Kabila in May 2009.Clement, Caty (2009). Security Sector Reform in the DRC: Forward to the Past. Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments. p. 96 Advisors from the European Union's mission, EUSEC RD Congo, were appointed to Congolese institutions (including the defense ministry, the FARDC general staff, the army headquarters, CONADER, and the joint operations center) to coordinate the foreign assistance for the army integration and the demobilization of combatants. President Kabila made a formal request for assistance on 26 April 2005 to Javier Solana, the head of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, and EUSEC was launched in June 2005.
Amid the other difficulties in building new armed forces for the DRC, in early 2007 the integration and training process was distorted as the DRC government under Kabila attempted to use it to gain more control over the dissident general Laurent Nkunda. A hastily negotiated verbal agreement in Rwanda saw three government FAC brigades integrated with Nkunda's former ANC 81st and 83rd Brigades in what was called mixage. Mixage brought multiple factions into composite brigades, but without the 45-day retraining provided by brassage, and it seems that actually, the process was limited to exchanging battalions between the FAC and Nkunda brigades in North Kivu, without further integration. Due to Nkunda's troops having greater cohesion, Nkunda effectively gained control of all five brigades - not what the DRC central government had been hoping!Henri Boshoff, The DDR Process in the DRC: a never-ending story, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2 July 2007 However, after Nkunda used the mixage brigades to fight the FDLR, strains arose between the FARDC and Nkunda-loyalist troops within the brigades and they fell apart in the last days of August 2007. The International Crisis Group says that 'by 30 August Nkunda's troops had left the mixed brigades and controlled a large part of the Masisi and Rutshuru territories' (of North Kivu).International Crisis Group, Bringing Peace to North Kivu, Africa Report No.133, 31 October 2007, p.13
Both formally integrated brigades and the non-integrated units continue to conduct arbitrary arrests, rapes, robbery, and other crimesAmnesty International, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army], 25 January 2007, AI Index: AFR 62/001/2007 and these human rights violations are "regularly" committed by both officers and members of the rank and file. Members of the Army also often strike deals to gain access to resources with the militias they are meant to be fighting.
Corruption in the army was described as "wide-ranging". It was common for commanders to inflate their units with 'ghost soldiers' to pocket the extra money from their pay, and in 2006 it was estimated that half of the US$8 million that the government spent every month on paying soldiers was being stolen. Also because of embezzlement, soldiers were paid infrequently and often received less than their official pay of $10 per month.
As of 2006–07, the Land Forces of the FARDC had a central staff of 1,500–2,500 personnel, 14 integrated brigades with 43,800–49,000 personnel, and 64,300 non-integrated personnel in the military regions, for a total of around 110,000. The various brigades and other formations and units numbered at least 100,000 troops. The status of these brigades has been described as "pretty chaotic." A 2007 disarmament and repatriation study said "army units that have not yet gone through the process of brassage are usually much smaller than what they ought to be. Some non-integrated brigades have only 500 men (and are thus nothing more than a small battalion) whereas some battalions may not even have the size of a normal company (over 100 men)."Hans Romkena De Vennhoop Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament and Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the DRC , Multi Country Demobilization and Recovery Program, April 2007, p.32 Integrated brigades had a strength of up to 5,000.
Ongoing conflicts Instability in Eastern Congo