The Spanish Army of the Peninsular War refers to the Spanish military units that fought against the French Imperial Army during a period which coincided with what is also termed the Spanish War of Independence (). In June 1808, the Spanish Army numbered 136,824 men and officers (including 30,527 militiamen assigned to provincial battalions).. This figure also includes General La Romana's 15,000-man Division of the North,Gates (1986), p. 479. then garrisoned in Denmark.By contrast, French troops in Spain, including the 48,204 which entered the country June–August 1808, that is, after the outbreak of the war, numbered 165,103. (Oman, 1902). By 1 February the following year, that figure had increased to 288,551 French troops, of whom 193,978 were "Présents sous les armes" (Present at Arms). (Oman, 1903).
In 1808, the first year of the armed conflict against the French Army, at least two hundred new Spanish infantry regiments were created, most of which consisted of only one battalion.Esdaile, Charles J. (1988). The Spanish Army in the Peninsular War, p. 95. Manchester University Press. Google Books. Retrieved 4 February 2023. These regular troops and local militias which, in the case of Catalonia, ran to several thousand well-organised miquelets, or somatenes, who had already proved their worth in the Catalan revolt of 1640 and in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), were supplemented throughout the country by the guerrilla and were a constant source of harassment to the French army and its lines of communication. So much so that, between the new year and the middle of February 1809, General St. Cyr calculated that his troops had used up 2,000,000 cartridges in petty skirmishes with the miqueletes between Tarragona and Barcelona..
In several battles, such as the Battle of Salamanca, the Spanish Army fought side-by-side with their allies of the Anglo-Portuguese Army, led by General Wellesley (who would not become the Duke of Wellington until after the Peninsular War was over).
Background
In volume 1 of his A History of the Peninsular War, 1807-1809 (1902), British military historian Charles Oman responds to many of the contemporary criticisms by Wellington and others regarding "the state and character of the Spanish army" as follows: "Only when we know its difficulties can we judge with fairness of its conduct, or decide upon its merits and shortcomings"..
In the spring of 1808, Charles IV's land forces consisted of 131,000 men, of whom 101,000 were regulars and 30,000 militia embodied in the regular army. Due to the Anglo-Spanish War (1796–1808), these militias had been under arms since 1804 in the greater part of the garrisons of the seaports of Spain, to protect them against possible descents of English expeditions.. Of the regular army, 15,000 men, the picked regiments of the army under Marquis of La Romana, were in Denmark at Napoleon's request. As Oman points out, "There remained therefore only 86,000 regulars within the kingdom. A very cursory glance down the Spanish army-list of 1808 is sufficient to show that this force was far from being in a satisfactory condition for either offensive or defensive operations"..
Of these, there were ten foreign corps numbering some 13,000 men, including the six regiments of Swiss mercenaries—over 10,000 bayonets—and three Irish regiments: Hibernia, Irlanda, and Ultonia which, in 1808, had only 1,900 men under arms, instead of the 5,000 which they should have produced.. However, Spain's history of using foreign troops was evidenced by the long list of foreign surnames among the leading figures of the day: Blake, the two O'Donnells,Although Oman refers two O'Donnells, there were in fact three brothers who fought during the Peninsular War: Henry O'Donnell, 1st Count of la Bisbal; Joseph O'Donnell and Charles O'Donnell. Lacy, Sarsfield, O'Neill, O'Daly, Mahony, O'Donahue. As Oman points out, "none of them showed much strategical skill, yet their constant readiness to fight, which no series of defeats could tame, contrasts very well with the spiritless behaviour of a good many of the Spanish generals. No officer of Irish blood was ever found among the cowards, and hardly one among the traitors (O'Farrill and General Kindelan)".. Other foreign-born or second-generation Spanish military commanders serving in Spain included Reding, Worster, Caldagues, Bassecourt, Coupigny, Rouvroy de Saint Simon, Schepeler, and Carlos de Witte. While many of those of Irish descent were Jacobite exiles, those of French descent were Royalists.
Treaty of Fontainebleau Under the terms of the Treaty of Fontainebleau, which divided the Kingdom of Portugal and all Portuguese dominions between France and Spain, Spain agreed to augment, by three Spanish columns (numbering 25,500 men), the 28,000 troops General Junot was already leading through Spain to invade Portugal. Crossing into Spain on 12 October 1807, Junot started a difficult march through the country, finally entering Portugal on 19 November.
The three Spanish columns were as follows: General Carrafa's 9,500 men were to assemble at Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo and cooperate with Junot's main force. General Francisco Solano's column of 9,500 soldiers, which was to advance from Badajoz to capture Elvas and its fortress, invaded Portugal on 2 December 1807. General Taranco's 6,500 troops occupied Porto on 13 December. The general died the following January, and on 6 June 1808, when news of the rebellion in Spain reached Porto, the new commander of the garrison, General Belestá, arrested the French governor, General Quesnel,Foy, Maximilien (1829). History of the War in the Peninsula, Under Napoleon: To which is Prefixed a View of the Political and Military State of the Four Belligerent Powers, Volume 2, pp. 432–433. Treuttel and Würtz, Treuttel, jun. and Richter. Google Books. Retrieved 15 September 2013. and his 30-man dragoon escort and joined the armies fighting the French.
Spring 1808 In the spring of 1808, Spain's army consisted of 131,000 men, of whom 101,000 were regulars and 30,000 militia. Most of the militias formed part of the garrisons of the country's seaports, which at that early stage of the conflict had needed to be protected against English expeditions.
However, since Bonaparte had requested a strong division for use in the north of Europe, not all of the regular troops were stationed in Spain, and the Marquis of La Romana had been sent to the Baltic at the head of the Division of the North, numbering with 15,000 men, the picked regiments of the army, leaving only 86,000 regulars in Spain,. made up of thirty-five regiments of troops of the line, of three battalions each, and twelve single-battalion regiments of light infantry, and if all of these had been up to the proper establishment of 840 men, the total would have amounted to 98,000 bayonets. By way of example, many of the corps in the interior of Spain were grossly under-manned: e.g. the regiment of Estremadura had only 770 men between its three battalions, that of Cordova 793, and the regiment of Navarre 822, that is, only around 250 men to the battalion instead of the proper 840..
As for the militia, these totalled forty-three battalions, which were named after the towns in which they had been raised —Badajoz, Lugo, Alcazar, and so forth. In general, their ranks were much fuller than those of the regular regiments—only two of these battalions had fewer than 550 bayonets..
British aid After being shattered in the initially successful 1808 French invasion, from thereon the Spanish Army was heavily dependent on aid from Britain to sustain its war effort. Part of this came in the form of cash subsidies to pay soldiers' wages, which averaged just over £1 million per year from 1808 to 1814; however this amount was relatively small, as even Portugal's larger £1.5 million annual subsidy was only large enough to pay about 57% of the soldiers of the Portuguese army (the costs for the other 43% was raised by Lisbon), itself about a third the size of the Spanish one throughout the war. More important were direct shipments of equipment, dispatched in 13,500 individual voyages in 400 convoys during the six-year period (including supplies for Portugal).Roger Knight, "Britain against Napoleon: The Organization of Victory, 1793-1815", Penguin UK: January 27, 2015, p. 425-426 Between May 1808 and May 1809 alone, British shipments to the Spanish Army included 200,277 muskets, 155 artillery pieces, 39,000 set of accoutrements, 61,391 swords, 79,000 polearms, 40,000 tents, 92,100 uniforms (with shoes and hats), and half a million yards of linen and wool, along with £1.4 million in cash. Aid continued to flow through the rest of 1809 and 1810. By 1811 official British policy was to provide for the arms, clothing, and other equipment for 47% of the Spanish Army, 42,000 troops out of an army of 90,000 (excluding guerillas, who also got aid on a more haphazard basis).Rene Chartrand and Bill Younghusband, "Spanish Army of the Napoleonic Wars: 1808-1812", Osprey: 1999, p. 6-7 After declining in 1810-1811, from 1812 Britain significantly stepped up material aid to Spain, with 100,000 muskets (compared to 40,000 in 1811) and tens of thousands of swords sent from April 1812 to March 1813, plus uniforms and camp equipage for 100,000 men, plus artillery and miscellaneous goods like cavalry saddles. By 1814, the Spanish Army had increased to 154,000 men (again, excluding guerrillas), of whom the British were responsible for the requirements of 50,000 or 32% of the army. Outfitting the rest fell to Spain itself, which continued to manufacture weapons, clothing, and other relevant items.Rene Chartrand and Bill Younghusband, "Spanish Army of the Napoleonic Wars: 1812-1815", Osprey: 1999, p. 4-5
May – November 1808
The jubilation following General Castaños' mid-July victory at Bailén was short-lived, and the following month General Merlin's sacking of Bilbao, on 16 August 1808,Napier, William Francis Patrick and Mathieu Dumas (1828). Histoire de la guerre dans la Péninsule et dans le midi de la France, depuis l'année 1807 jusqu'a l'année 1814, Volume I, p. 287. Treuttel et Würtz. Google Books. Retrieved 31 August 2013. caused much popular discontent throughout the country, which was aimed specifically at the Juntas and the generals.
A war council was convened on 5 September, attended by Generals Cuesta; Castaños; Llamas; Lapeña; the Duque del Infantado, representing Blake; and another officer (unknown) representing Palafox. Cuesta, as the senior general, attempted to persuade Castaños to join him in leading a military government separated from the Juntas, but Castaños refused. Then, having tried, to no avail, to persuade his colleagues to name him commander-in-chief, Cuesta stormed out of the meeting. Having taken matters into his own hands, he would later be arrested and relieved of his command, only to have it restored shortly afterwards.Rodriguez, Jose Manuel and Arsenio Garcia Fuentes. "Biography: Gregorio García de la Cuesta". Translated by Caroline Miley for the Napoleon Series. Retrieved 6 August 2013.
On 10 November, the Junta Central published its manifesto, dated 28 October 1808, in which, among other declarations, it declared its intention of maintaining a force of 500,000 troops, together with 50,000 cavalry.. Rodríquez García, Francisco (1865). Crónica del Senoría de Vizcaya, pp. 92–95. Google Books. Retrieved 6 August 2013.
According to the manifesto, the existing diverse regiments and corps of the Spanish Army would be organised into four large corps, presided over by a Junta Central de Guerra (Central War Board), to be headed by Castaños, as follows:
Army of the Left (Ejército de la Izquierda)