The Armeno-Georgian War was a short border dispute that was fought in December 1918 between the newly independent Democratic Republic of Georgia and the First Republic of Armenia, largely over the control of former districts of the Tiflis Governorate, in Borchaly (Lori) and Akhalkalaki.
In May 1918, towards the end of World War I, Armenia and Georgia both declared their independence, dissolving the short-lived union between them. Both Georgia and Armenia claimed Lori and Akhalkalaki, both of which were populated primarily by Armenians. The border dispute turned into an open military conflict on 7 December 1918. Armenian forces initiated coup de mains that brought them within 10 kilometers of the Georgian capital, Tiflis, before Georgian troops were able to organize counterattacks. Allied intervention forced a ceasefire. Battles continued until the ceasefire came into effect at midnight on December 31.
A neutral zone, under Allied supervision, was declared in the Borchaly district, which would later be split in between the two states. The large Armenian population of Tiflis and other Georgian-controlled regions was subject to mass arrests and other forms of persecution both during and after the war. Armenia did not succeed in the nearly-obtained original goal of gaining land up to the Khrami River, and the entire war took place on land that had been controlled prior by Georgia. The result of the war is considered inconclusive, with the Armenian side declaring a successful liberation of Armenian territories and the Georgian side declaring a successful defense against an invasion.
Background Russian Revolution
After the February Revolution, the Russian Provisional Government installed the Special Transcaucasian Committee to govern the area. However, after the October Revolution, the Special Transcaucasian Committee was replaced on 11 November 1917 by the Transcaucasian Commissariat, centred in Tbilisi. The Commissariat concluded the Armistice of Erzincan with the Ottoman Empire on 5 December 1917, which ended a localised armed conflict with the Ottoman Empire. The Commissariat actively sought to suppress Bolshevik influence and meanwhile to pursue a path towards Transcaucasian independence from Soviet Russia. That included establishing a legislative body, the Transcaucasian Sejm, to which the Commissariat surrendered its authority on 23 January 1918 after the dispersal of the Russian Constituent Assembly by the Bolsheviks. The secessionist and anti-Bolshevik agenda eventually brought Transcaucasian Sejm into conflict with the central government. On 3 March, the Russians signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, marking Russia's exit from World War I. In the treaty, Russia agreed to return territory gained during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, despite the fact that the territory was under the effective control of Armenian and Georgian forces. The Trebizond Peace Conference between the Ottoman Empire and the Sejm began on 4 March and continued until April. The Ottomans offered to surrender all of their ambitions in the Caucasus in return for recognition of the re-acquisition of the eastern Anatolian provinces awarded at Brest-Litovsk.
By then, leading Georgian politicians viewed an alliance with Germany as the only way to prevent Georgia from being occupied by the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, the National Council of Georgia declared the independence of the Democratic Republic of Georgia on 26 May and, two days later, signed the Treaty of Poti with Germany to place itself under German protection. The following day, the Muslim National Council announced the establishment of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. Having been largely abandoned by its allies, the Armenian National Council declared independence on May 28. On 4 June, the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Batum with each of the three Transcaucasusian states, which brought the conflict with the Ottoman Empire to an end. The treaty awarded the southern half of the ethnically Armenian Lori subdistrict () and Akhalkalaki district to the Ottomans, but it did not firmly delineate the borders between the new Transcaucasus states. In order to deny the Ottomans a direct route to Tbilisi, Georgian units, supported by German officers, took possession of northern Lori and established outposts along the Dzoraget River. The Georgian prime minister Noe Zhordania assured the Armenian National Council that the occupation was a temporary measure. However, in a subsequent meeting Georgian representatives laid claim to all of the districts of the Tiflis Governorate, as well as the Pambak subdistrict of the Erivan Governorate, eliciting protests from the Armenian side.
Initial clashes
In early October 1918, the Ottomans pulled back from southern Lori, which eliminated the territorial buffer between Armenia and Georgia. The Armenian military quickly filled the void by taking control of much of southern Lori on 18 October and, in the absence of any resistance, probed further north. The first incident between Armenia and Georgia occurred the same day, when an Armenian army detachment seized the railway station in the village of Kober, near modern-day Tumanyan, and refused a subsequent demand from the Germans to withdraw. Another village, Korinj, was also seized. The Armenians withdrew when Georgia sent a detachment to confront them, but they later returned to Korinj and occupied Tsater. Armenia's ambassador to Tbilisi, Arshak Djamalian, insisted that Armenian claims over Lori were indisputable, but that his government wished to pursue its claims solely by diplomatic means. the Armenian parliament sent a message to its Georgian counterpart declaring calling for an amicable solution "in the name of the centuries-long brotherly relations of the two peoples". The Georgian government agreed with a peaceful settlement in principle. However, Armenian troops had to leave recently occupied villages, and further operations within the Tiflis Governorate would be considered an act of war. The commander of the German military expedition reminded Djamalian that Germany was obliged to defend its protectorate. On October 24 the Georgian government declared martial law in Lori, deployed General Tsulukidze and ordered him to deal with armed formations behind Georgian lines. He was, however, instructed to avoid direct confrontation with the Armenian troops, who were occupying Korinj and Tsater. On October 26 the invading Armenian forces were ordered to return and left the two villages amid the deployment of a Georgian contingent in the area.
In November and early December, the Armenians of Lori protested that Georgian troops, under the guise of "conducting investigations", robbed food and supplies from the homes of Armenian peasants and molested women. Georgian troops were accused of similar crimes at Akhalkalaki. The historian Christopher J. Walker compared the Georgian occupation of Lori to a "tsarist-style military bureaucracy". The historian Leo wrote:
The Armenian government made attempts to solve the dispute diplomatically on 9 and 12 December, which terms the Georgian government rejected. On 12 December, Armenian Prime Minister Hovhannes Kajaznuni sent the following message to his Georgian counterpart Noe Zhordania:
Georgia had begun to prevent railroads from transporting foreign supplies into Armenia, which resulted in famine.
Disputed regions Armenian-American historian Richard G. Hovannisian in his book The Republic of Armenia describes the political history of the region of Lori:
In 1829, following the Russo-Turkish War, the regions of Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikhe underwent a significant redistribution of their population after being ceded by the Ottoman Empire to the Russian Empire under the Treaty of Adrianople. Many thousands of Armenians from Ottoman Armenia, who had shown open sympathy for Russia, were resettled in these newly incorporated territories, contributing to an Armenian majority, while many local Muslim Georgians fled to the Ottoman Empire following their incorporation into the Russian Empire.
War
Order of Battle Armenia To Armenia, the primary regional threat were the Ottoman Empire and other Turkic factions. For them, an Ottoman breakthrough at the Caucasian Front was equalled with the demise of the Armenian nation. Therein and the fear of foreign incursions was the basis of creating a national military corps, even before gaining independence in 1918. Such a proposal was approved on 11 July 1917 by the provisional government and High Command. The planned Armenian corps was structured not too differently to their later Georgian counterpart, also partially inspired by Russian military doctrines and organisation. Plans were already made in 1917 and roots lied in the Armenian units that had fought for the Russian Empire since 1914. The largest of those (1,500 men strong) was led by Andranik. In 1917 some 80,000 Armenians were serving in the ranks of the Imperial Russian Army. Nearly as many in the Caucasus. In the TDFR, the corps was to consist of two infantry divisions, one "special division", one artillery division, one cavalry brigade and an engineer regiment, supplemented by six separate regiments deployed to different areas, including the Tiflis Governorate. One to be assigned for the protection of railroads. The special division was to draw manpower from Armenians who fled the Ottoman Empire. According to leaderships plans, each division would be made up of four infantry regiments with their own artillery and cavalry detachments. The cavalry brigade was to consist of two cavalry regiments and two artillery batteries. In addition several reserve units would be requested and some formed. Implemented, the Armenian army would have been of substantial size. Ultimately, the Armenians succeeded in creating an overall larger fighting force. On 1 January 1918, the Armenian Army comprised about 40,000 personnel and consisted of two rifle divisions, three volunteer brigades, one cavalry brigade and several militia battalions. Their main cadres were formed from people who had served in the period of 1914–1916. The formations were well equipped with machine guns, but lacking in artillery due to shortcomings of experienced and trained personnel in that particular area. The rifle divisions were each equipped with six heavy artillery batteries, while light guns were transferred to the volunteer forces. According to Denikin, during the summer of 1918, peacetime strength was at 22,000 men and more than 44,000 troops could be mustered in wartime. However those numbers fluctuated heavily and were more likely in the scale of 10,000–15,000. While Jones mentions three Armenian divisions by end of January and their disposition in detail. A problematic factor were ongoing conflicts like with Azerbaijan, that drew thousand of bodies in manpower, away from the mainland.
By June 1918, after establishing independence, the Armenian army at the time numbered some 12,000 men and gradually grew to 40,000. Its officer corps consisted of Armenians as well as Russians. However Allen and Muratoff note that the Armenian forces became weaker and less effective. Their 24 rifle and eight volunteer battalions didn't exceed 16,000 riflemen, 1,000 cavalrymen and 4,000 militia. Battalion sizes ranged from 400 to 600. Because of the Treaty of Batum, the size of the Armenian corps was further reduced by the end of July 1918, to only one division. This restriction however did not touch separate formations not integrated in the corps and subordinated to the government, such as the volunteer brigade led by Andronik. Despite those setbacks, Armenia was able to create a fully structured corps, beating Georgia to it by many months and into the upcoming war.
Georgia