The Battle of Konna was a battle in the Northern Mali Conflict fought in January 2013 in the town of Konna in central Mali. Various Islamic fundamentalist rebels fought against the government of Mali, which was supported by French soldiers participating in Operation Serval. This battle was among the first French engagements in their intervention in the Mali War.

The fighting first started when rebel fighters disguised as passengers on a public bus infiltrated the town. The bus was stopped at a Malian army checkpoint on the outskirts of Konna. As soldiers entered the bus to search it, the Islamists opened fire, killing the soldiers. Additional rebels then poured into the town. After several hours of fighting, the Malian army was routed to its base, abandoning the town to the rebels and reportedly leaving several heavy weapons and armored vehicles behind.:fr:Bataille de Konna Around 25 Malian soldiers were killed.

An estimated 1,200 Islamist fighters advanced to within 20 kilometers of Mopti, a Mali military garrison town.

The battle ended in a victory for the Malian government and France, with rebel fighters driven out of the town.

Background On January 1, 2013, representatives of Ansar Dine presented two main demands to the Malian government through Burkinabe mediator President Blaise Compaoré: the proclamation of 'the Islamic character of the Malian State in the constitution' and autonomy for the Azawad region. The Malian government rejected these demands. Consequently, on 3 January 2013, Ansar Dine leader Iyad Ag Ghali declared an end to the ceasefire, citing the government's "bad faith".

On the 4th, Ansar Dine handed over a document to the Burkinabè mediator and president Blaise Compaoré in which it called for the autonomy of Azawad and the application of Sharia law in northern Mali. However, since January the 2nd, from the regions of Gao and Timbuktu, the jihadist forces of Ansar Dine, Movement of Oneness and Jihad in Western Africa (MUJAO), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram were gathering in Bambara Maoudé. On the 7th, about fifty of their vehicles passed Douentza and positioned themselves at Dangol Boré, facing the Malian army. For added discretion, jihadist pickups avoided forming in columns, instead opting to move in wooded areas in small groups in scattered formation so as not to be signaled by plumes of smoke. The pickup trucks were camouflaged by being covered with mud and the fighters hid under tent cloths to escape the infrared vision.

Forces in presence Malian forces were expected to fight in the region of Mopti, command provided by Colonel Major Didier Dacko. Commander Abass Dembélé headed the Malian forces of the Volunteer Commandos Group (GCV). Kassim Goïta, Gao's regiment, Elysé Daou, the National Guard and Captain Pascal Berthe, the artillery. The Malian forces consisted mainly of soldiers of the 62nd Motorized Infantry Regiment, as well as elements of the 35th Armored Regiment and the 36th Artillery Regiment. In December 2012, the newspaper Jeune Afrique reported that according to a military source more than 2,000 soldiers were present in Konna.

The number of Salafist fighters is not known precisely. Shortly before the offensive, the DGSE estimated that the jihadists amounted to around 1,500 near the demarcation line, including 300 men from AQIM and 600 from MUJAO. 30 pick-ups formed the vanguard, supported by a reserve of 40 other vehicles in Douentza, while 80 other pick-ups were then detached to take part in the Battle of Diabaly. Malian services estimated the jihadist forces at about 5,000 men. According to a report from the French Senate on 23 April 2013, 1,500 to 3,000 jihadists were mobilized for the offensives in southern Mali. The strength of the Salafist rebels was initially estimated at 1,200 men according to RFI and Al Jazeera. On the night of 9 January to 10 January, a teacher near Dangol-Boré said he had counted more than 300 jihadist vehicles. According to the reporter Jean-Paul Mari, the assailants initially gathered 70 vehicles around Bambara Maoudé then engaged 150, including 70 from Ansar Dine, in the assault on Konna. According to Laurent Touchard, the jihadist forces gathered north of the demarcation line were 1,500 to 2,500 men with 300 vehicles. Their forces were made up of some of the most seasoned and well-equipped combatants, with recruits usually left behind to hold the cities.

Shortly before the attack, various chiefs met briefly at Lere Iyad Ag Ghali, emir of Ansar Dine, as well as Djamel Okacha and Abu Zeid who took command of the detachment which would attack the city of Diabaly. Iyad Ag Ghali was the main initiator of the offensive, the leaders of AQIM and MUJAO agreed to join but without enthusiasm, they had decided to consolidate their positions in the north. However, the Salafist objective was not known with certainty, two hypotheses were supposed by the DGSE. According to the first, the goal of the jihadists was to seize Bamako and take control of the country, according to the second, the offensive was only aimed at the cities of Mopti and Sévaré and the international airport of Mopti Ambodédjo, the only airport in central Mali, whose takeover would greatly handicap the deployment of a possible international intervention.Jean-Christophe Notin, La guerre de la France au Mali, Tallandier, 2014.

The battle Konna's capture by Islamists On January 8, 2013, jihadists were near the demarcation line in the Mopti region. Malian soldiers carried out some warning shots and reinforcements were sent. For their part, the fighters of Ansar Dine performed some artillery fire and rockets in the night. On the 9th, at the end of the afternoon, Lieutenant-Colonel Mamadou Samaké made a reconnaissance mission with a dozen BRDM-2 armored vehicles. The Malian soldiers did not meet any opposition from the jihadists and therefore turned around. But on their way home, they fell into an ambush. All of the Islamist forces crossed the line and attacked the city of Konna. The jihadists reached Konna in the night of 9 to 10 January. On the 10th, the clashes began at 8:30 am and ended at 4 pm. The jihadists attacked from three directions, the first column attacked north, by the road of Korientzé, a village in the municipality of Korombana. A second column attacked to the east, by the road of Douentza, while a third bypassed the south to cut off the retreat of the garrison. To the west, the Niger River makes the area impassable.

According to the Malian government, a bus carrying jihadists managed to infiltrate the city. According to Jean-Paul Mari, around 1 pm, two buses entered the city after being controlled by Malian soldiers, but it turns out that the 14 occupants of these buses were AQIM fighters disguised as civilians. Arriving at a checkpoint in the middle of the military, they opened fire on sixty soldiers before being in turn cut down by the Malians. This version is also defended by Jean-Christophe Notin, it is however contested by Laurent Touchard, according to whom "the aggressor tumbles while the identity of the passengers of the bus - true civilians - is being checked. The bus in question is also targeted by the men of Iyad Ag Ghaly. " Street fighting took place in the city, but Malian soldiers were overwhelmed, disorganized and ran out of ammunition, and their radio messages were intercepted by jihadists. Around 11 am, the Malians begin their withdrawal. The fighting lasted until 4 pm and by 5 pm the Islamist forces controlled the entire city. Outside the city, Lieutenant-Colonel Samaké, almost out of ammunition, also managed to retreat with his armored vehicles. Malian troops were in full retreat towards Sévaré.

Jihadist coalition advances in Sevare and Mopti and Operation Serval However, the jihadist offensive in southern Mali provoked France's entry into the war. On January 11, the French army launched Operation Serval. Air forces were immediately engaged and from January 10 and 11, Special Forces soldiers transported by planes were dropped at Sévaré. On the morning of January 11, Mopti and Sévaré found themselves directly threatened. Only 70 French Special Forces soldiers held the Mopti Ambodédjo International Airport, while the Malian army deployed two T-55 tanks and three BM-21 multiple rocket launchers as artillery. If the jihadists seized Mopti, there would be no defences to oppose their progression to Bamako. Both sides also received reinforcements on the day of 11 January. On the side of the Malians, were 300 "red beret" soldiers of the 33rd Commando-Parachutist Regiment with about twenty armored BRDM-2 vehicles. The Ansar Dine fighters were reinforced by 500 men from MUJAO and AQIM. COS personnel in Sévaré also increased to about 100 men, mainly from the 1st Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment ( 1st RPIMa), the 13th Parachute Dragoon Regiment ( 13th DPR), the Air Parachute Commando No. 10 (CPA-10) and the Marine Commandos of the ESNO 43.

The jihadists then continued their progress and headed towards the cities of Mopti and Sévaré. In the morning, two Malian Mi-24 helicopters, freshly repaired, took off in Bamako and reached Sévaré. At the request of the French, they then went to Konna to attack a group of around one hundred men spotted by an Atlantic-2, celebrating their victory. Around 9 am, the helicopters reached Konna and opened fire on the Salafist fighters, they inflicted losses but also killed some civilians. After their mission was accomplished, they then returned to Sévaré. In the afternoon, the French in turn deployed Gazelle helicopters from the 4th Special Forces Helicopter Regiment to counter the jihadist advance between Konna and Sévaré. Around 2 pm, two aircraft took off in Djibo, Burkina Faso, which, around 4 pm, attacked a group of jihadist pick-ups. However the French flew low, without ground support, and the jihadists had anti-aircraft batteries on some of their vehicles. During the following firefight, a pickup truck was destroyed and its four occupants were killed by a HOT missile, however both Gazelle helicopters were also damaged by ground fire. The co-pilot of the first helicopter was seriously injured by a bullet from an AK-47, and the aircraft managed to reach the nearest French military medical support, but the wounded French soldier, Lieutenant Damien Boiteux, then succumbed to his injuries. The second helicopter crash-landed north of Sévaré, but the crew escaped and were recovered by special forces on the ground. The French then withdrew to Sévaré after destroying their equipment. Two more Gazelle helicopters were engaged soon after and fired with their HOT missiles and 20mm guns, destroying a total of four jihadist vehicles. The jihadists gave up the fight and fell back to Konna and Douentza. Then in the evening, Mirage 2000-D jets based in Ndjamena, Chad in turn came into action. The first two aircraft took off around 19:15 local time. At around 10 pm, they dropped two bombs on a Konna building which had served as headquarters for Ansar Dine. The building was ravaged and several vehicles at the entrance were destroyed. The planes continued their strikes and then bombarded a logistics depot. Around midnight, a second wave of Mirages destroyed four more buildings. The fishing port, the military and administrative buildings, the sub-prefecture and its surroundings were particularly targeted.