The Ufton Nervet rail crash occurred on 6 November 2004 when a passenger train collided with a stationary car on a level crossing on the Reading–Taunton line near Ufton Nervet, Berkshire, England. The collision derailed the train, and seven people—including the drivers of the train and the car—were killed. An inquest found that all railway personnel and systems were operating correctly, and the crash was caused by the suicide of the car driver.
The crash led to the Rail Safety and Standards Board investigating whether safety could be improved with the introduction of laminated or toughened glass or seat belts; the report found that laminated glass may improve "passenger containment" in the event of an incident. It recommended against the introduction of seat belts as the findings showed that they would introduce more injuries in most incidents.
In the 10 years after the crash, four further fatal incidents took place on the level crossing and a near-miss occurred when a train traversed the crossing without the barriers lowered. The level crossing was closed and replaced by a road bridge in 2016.
Background Ufton Nervet level crossing
Ufton Nervet level crossing was an automatic half-barrier level crossing (AHBC) situated on the Reading–Taunton branch of the Great Western Main Line between and stations in Berkshire. In the United Kingdom, AHBCs are used on roads where traffic is unlikely to block the crossing and where the line speed is not more than . Ufton Nervet AHBC was situated on Ufton Lane, an unclassified road connecting the A4 (between Reading and Newbury) with the village of Ufton Nervet. The railway at the crossing is surrounded by fields, and was a short distance from the A4. Approximately beyond the crossing is a set of points where a goods loop departs the main line.
When the barriers are lowered at AHBCs, they extend only across the entrances to the crossing, leaving the exits clear. The crossing sequence—comprising flashing lights, alarms, and the barriers—is triggered automatically by approaching trains when they activate a treadle known as the strike-in point. The time given for the train to approach the crossing is dictated by the speed of the line and is sufficient to allow road users to clear the crossing; the minimum time permitted for this is 27 seconds. At Ufton Nervet, the strike-in point was from the crossing, which gave 39 seconds for trains travelling at the line speed of . The crossing was located after a slight right-hand bend, and the maximum visibility of the crossing for drivers on the down line was ; a train travelling at line speed would cover this distance in 13 seconds.
Car driver The car driver was Brian Drysdale, a 48-year-old chef at Wokefield Park, approximately from Ufton Nervet. He was concerned about the upcoming results from a recent HIV test, thinking that he had contracted the virus from a relationship in the late 1990s and possibly believing that he had developed AIDS. He spoke to NHS Direct in the week preceding his death, saying that he had had suicidal thoughts and thought he was having a nervous breakdown. On 6 November 2004, Drysdale tried four times to telephone the clinic who were testing him for HIV, but it was closed for the weekend. That day he left work at 17:30 GMT and drove to the level crossing.
Train and crew The train involved in the crash was the 17:35 First Great Western (FGW) service from to , carrying headcode 1C92. The train consisted of ten vehicles—the leading Class 43 power car (43019; City of Swansea / Dinas Abertawe), eight passenger coaches, and a trailing Class 43 power car (43029). It was driven by Stan Martin, who had been a train driver for 30 years.
Three further crew members were aboard the train—two train managers and a customer host serving in the buffet car.
Collision On 6 November 2004, the train departed Paddington on time at 17:35, making its first scheduled stop at before departing one minute late at 18:03. After clearing speed restrictions at Southcote Junction on the down line, the train accelerated towards the line speed of .
Immediately preceding the collision, an off-duty Thames Valley Police officer happened upon Drysdale manoeuvring his Mazda 323 between the barriers on the level crossing before switching off the lights and ignition. Drysdale appeared to ignore the officer, who was flashing his headlights and sounding his horn. At 18:11, the train reached the strike-in point, triggering the crossing sequence. The police officer attempted to use the emergency telephone.
Travelling at , Martin applied the emergency brake 2–3 seconds before the collision. At 18:12, the train collided with the car. The impact trapped the car's engine block beneath the train's leading axle, lifting the wheelset and causing the bogie to yaw. This in turn made wheel flanges climb and derail. The train continued upright for until it reached a set of points at the start of a loop, causing a "catastrophic derailment" of all vehicles. The leading power car came to rest on its side beyond the point of derailment. The passenger carriages were at varying angles relative to both the vertical and the direction of travel, and the third passenger carriage (coach F) had been folded horizontally around a bogie that had embedded in the embankment.
Six people were killed at the scene: Drysdale, Martin, and four passengers. Passengers were ejected through broken windows, including at least two (and as many as four) of the fatalities. All of the passengers who were killed—as well as the majority of those who sustained non-fatal injuries—had been travelling in coaches D and E.
Response and aftermath The police officer who witnessed the incident called 999 and was able to accurately describe the location to emergency services. He could not see the train in the darkness, but using a torch was able to see the wreckage of the car in the downside cess, as well as Drysdale's body, which had been ejected from the car and was from the point of collision. The officer continued along the track where passengers were leaving the wreckage via broken windows and using mobile phones to see in the dark. One of the train managers attempted to use a lineside signal post telephone, but the cables had been damaged in the derailment. At 18:21, he used his mobile phone to contact the Integrated Electronic Control Centre in Swindon. He then contacted the other train manager, who informed him that he had deployed track-circuit operating clips.
The first fire appliance arrived at the scene at 18:25, the first ambulance at 18:31, and representatives from Thames Valley Police and the British Transport Police both at 18:35. In total, the scene was attended by 180 police officers, 84 fire crew, 50 ambulance crew, and 36 doctors and paramedics. Crews arrived in 22 fire appliances and 25 ambulances.
Between 200 and 300 passengers were estimated to have been on board. Of these, 120 were injured, 71 admitted to hospital, and 18 described as having serious injuries. Minor injuries were initially treated at the nearby Winning Hand pub, and casualties were admitted to Basingstoke Hospital and the Royal Berkshire Hospital in Reading. A seventh person, a passenger, died in hospital the day after the crash.
Removal of the train began on 9 November. The railway was closed until 16 November, with local services being replaced by rail replacement bus services and longer-distance services travelling from Reading to via . After the reopening of the line, a temporary speed restriction was in force to allow bedding-in of the new track ballast. Leading car 43019 was written off in the collision and was scrapped. Trailing power car 43029 sustained only minor damage and was later returned to service, eventually being renamed Caldicot Castle.
Investigation and inquest An investigation was carried out by Thames Valley Police and British Transport Police, and reports were prepared by the Health and Safety Executive.
The Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) published a preliminary report on 1 February 2005 which stated that there was no evidence that maintenance condition of the train contributed to the derailment, and there was no evidence that Network Rail or First Great Western staff were deficient in their fitness for duty. The investigation found that the automatic half-barrier equipment and its ancillary equipment were properly maintained, in good condition, and operated correctly at the time of the incident. The track had been surveyed by a track geometry car 15 days prior to the incident, and all aspects of track geometry were found to be compliant. It was reported that Martin was driving the train in accordance with normal operating procedures. The report found that the loss of lighting in all coaches following the crash made passengers' orientation and egress difficult.
The RSSB report concluded that while converting the crossing to a CCTV-monitored crossing would lower risk of annual fatalities from 1 in 88,000 to 1 in 760,000, the value of the estimated safety benefits was significantly lower than the £1 million cost of the conversion works. The risk of 1 in 88,000 was deemed to be tolerable provided measures were in place to ensure the risk was as low as reasonably practicable. The report made recommendations including improving emergency communications at the level crossing and moving a set of points whose position was a factor in the train's derailment. Network Rail implemented all the safety recommendations. The RSSB subsequently undertook research into improving seat and table design on board passenger carriages, as well as the effect of two-point seat belts on minimising passenger injuries during incidents. The report concluded that two-point seat belts would cause more injury to passengers in the majority of incidents, and the RSSB recommended they were not installed. Later studies drew a similar conclusion with three-point seat belts.
On 1 June 2005 it was announced that an inquest into the crash would be held at Windsor Guildhall. The inquest, due to open on 17 October 2005, was delayed because of a dispute over whether the families of the victims should be given legal aid. The inquest finally began in October 2007, after Mr Justice Owen overturned Bridget Prentice's original decision to deny legal aid. The jury heard the testimony of the police officer witness, who stated that Drysdale did not appear to be acting with any urgency; he believed that the crash was caused by a suicide attempt. A forensic investigator told the inquest that he had been able to determine that the car had been parked on the level crossing with its engine and lights switched off. Its fuel tank still contained petrol, which the inquest heard suggested that the car had not broken down. The inquest was told that Martin died from suffocation, and the other fatalities were caused by serious head and chest injuries.
During the inquest, David Main—whose partner and daughter were killed—said that "trains are not safe [...] If laminated glass had been fitted they wouldn't have been [ejected from the carriage]". The RSSB conducted an R&D programme into requirements for train windows; their report identified that although broken windows resulted in passengers being ejected from carriages at Ufton Nervet, the ability to break windows after an incident is crucial for passengers to escape. A 2007 report stated that the introduction of laminated glass would provide "significantly better passenger containment protection in accidents" than toughened glass. In a consultation with emergency services it was established that laminated glass would still allow rescuers to access trapped passengers.