Forced merger of the Communist Party of Germany and Social Democratic Party of Germany

The east German branches of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) merged to form the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) on 21 April 1946 under heavy pressure from the Soviet occupation forces. Although nominally a merger of equals, the merged party quickly fell under Communist domination and developed along lines similar to other Communist Parties in what became the Eastern Bloc. The SED would be the ruling party of the German Democratic Republic until the end of the republic in December 1989.

Though a sizeable faction of the SPD in the Soviet occupation zone supported the merger, many did not and in the process of the merger, 5,000 Social Democrats who opposed the merger were put in labor camps and prisons and many more were subjected to physical or psychological pressure by the Soviet Military Administration, leading to the unification to now be commonly referred to as a forced merger () by historians and the public at large.

Background Among circles of the workers' parties KPD and SPD there were different interpretations of the reasons for the rise of the Nazis and their electoral success. A portion of the Social Democrats blamed the Communists for the devastation of the final phase of the Weimar Republic.Hermann Weber: Kommunistische Bewegung und realsozialistischer Staat. Beiträge zum deutschen und internationalen Kommunismus, hrsg. von Werner Müller. Bund-Verlag, Köln 1988, S. 168. The Communist Party, in turn, insulted the Social Democrats as "social fascists". The KPD abandoned its ultra-left political line at its 1935 Brussels Party Conference, appealing for a united front with the Social Democrats and a broad anti-fascist popular front including bourgeois forces.Hans Kluth. Die KPD in der Bundesrepublik: Ihre politische Tätigkeit und Organisation 1945 – 1956. Springer-Verlag, 2013. pp. 12, 15, 21Eric D. Weitz. Creating German Communism, 1890-1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State. Princeton University Press, 2021. pp. 293-294, 301-302

In 1945 there were calls in both the SPD and KPD for a united workers' party. The Soviet Military Administration in Germany initially opposed the idea because they took it for granted that the Communist Party would, under their guidance, develop into the strongest political force in the Soviet occupation zone. However, the outcomes of the elections conducted in Hungary and Austria in November 1945, and especially the poor performance of the Communist parties, demonstrated the urgent need for a change of strategy by the Communist party.Andreas Malycha/Peter Jochen Winters: Die SED. Geschichte einer deutschen Partei. C.H. Beck, München 2009. . pp. 28, 42 Both Stalin and Walter Ulbricht recognized the "Austria hazard" („Gefahr Österreich“)Wortlaut Walter Ulbrichts siehe Mike Schmeitzner, Sowjetisierung oder Neutralität? Optionen sowjetischer Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland und Österreich 1945–1955, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2006, , S. 281 f., hier S. 283. and launched in November 1945, a campaign for unification of the two parties in order to secure the leading role of the Communist party.

Preparation for the merger

Under heavy pressure from the Soviet occupation forces and the Communist Party leadership, and with the support of some leading Social Democrats, working groups and committees were formed at all levels of the parties, whose declared aim was to create a union between the two parties. Many Social Democrats unwilling to unite were arrested in early 1946 in all areas of the Soviet occupation zone.„Die nunmehr frei zugänglichen zeitgenössischen Dokumente über die von örtlichen sowjetischen Kommandanturen gemaßregelten und inhaftierten Sozialdemokraten geben Aufschluss darüber, wie vielerorts erst psychischer Druck der Besatzungsoffiziere die Vereinigung möglich machte.“ Andreas Malycha, Der ewige Streit um die Zwangsvereinigung, Berliner Republik 2/2006 (online). A second conference of KPD and SPD representatives held on 26 February 1946 articulated the path towards party unification.

On 1 March 1946, a chaotic conference of SPD party officials, convened on the initiative of the Communist and SPD leaderships, was held in the Admiralspalast, Berlin. The meeting voted to arrange a vote of SPD party members, both in the Soviet occupation zone and across Berlin, on the proposed merger with the Communist Party.„In der Versammlung sozialdemokratischer Funktionäre vom 1. März 1946, die auf Betreiben der KPD- und SPD-Spitze einberufen worden war, um die Einheitsfrage offensiv zu debattieren, in deren Verlauf dann jedoch die Entscheidungskompetenz des Zentralausschusses offen in Frage gestellt und ein mehrheitliches Votum für eine Urabstimmung abgegeben wurde, kam es für Grotewohl fast zum Debakel.“ Zit. nach Friederike Sattler, Bündnispolitik als politisch-organisatorisches Problem des zentralen Parteiapparates der KPD 1945/46, in: Manfred Wilke (Hrsg.): Anatomie der Parteizentrale, Akademie Verlag, 1998, , S. 119–212, hier . On 14 March 1946 the Central Committee of the SPD published a call for a merger of the SPD and KPD. A ballot was scheduled to take place of SPD members in Berlin on 31 March 1946. In the Soviet sector (subsequently known as East Berlin) Soviet soldiers sealed the ballot boxes less than thirty minutes after the polls had opened, and dispersed the queues of those waiting to vote. In West Berlin more than 70% of the SPD members took part in the vote. In the western sector, invited to vote on an immediate merger ("sofortige Verschmelzung") with the Communists, 82% of those voting rejected the proposal. However, on a second proposal for a "working alliance" ("Aktionsbündnis") with the Communists, 62% of those voting did so in support of the motion.Dietrich Staritz, Die Gründung der DDR. 2. Aufl. 1987, , S. 123.

Party unification day During March 1946 local and district-level joint KPD-SPD party assemblies were held across Germany.Gerhard Besier, Katarzyna Stokłosa. European Dictatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014. p. 339 On 7 April 1946 state-level SED party organizations were formed.

In opposition to the unification process, on 7 April 1946 the SPD anti-merger tendency in western sector of Berlin held a party conference in a school in Zehlendorf (Berlin) at which they elected a three-man leadership team comprising Karl Germer Jr., and .

On 19-20 April 1946 the 15th KPD party congress and the 40th SPD party congress both voted in favour of formalizing the merger into SED. On 21-22 April 1946 another meeting took place in the Soviet-occupied sector of Berlin at the Admiralspalast. This was the Unification congress, and it was attended by delegates from the SPD and KPD. On 22 April 1946 the unification of the KPD and the (East German) SPD into the SED was completed. There were over 1,000 party members in attendance of whom 47% came from the KPD and 53% from the SPD. 230 of the delegates came from the western occupation zones. The 103 social democratic delegates from the western occupation zones participated in the unification congress in breach of the SPD party discipline.Martin Broszat, Gerhard Braas, Hermann Weber: SBZ-Handbuch, München 1993, . The unification congress elected Party Board (Parteivorstand) with 42 communists (out of whom 12 were from the Western occupation zones) and 38 Social Democrats (out of whom 8 were from the Western occupation zones).<ref name=heam>Heike Amos. Politik und Organisation der SED-Zentrale 1949 - 1963: Struktur und Arbeitsweise von Politbüro, Sekretariat, Zentralkomitee und ZK-Apparat'''. LIT Verlag Münster, 2003. pp. 23-24</ref> The SED Party Board held its first meeting on 23 April 1946 and elected a 14-member Central Secretariat consisting of Otto Grotewohl, Max Fechner, Erich Gniffke, Helmut Lehmann, Otto Meier, August Karsten and Katharina Kern (from SPD), Wilhelm Pieck, Walter Ulbricht, Franz Dalhem, Paul Merker, Anton Ackermann, Hermann Matern and Elli Schmidt (from KPD).

The new party would apply equal representation by two representatives between KPD and SPD at every level. The party Chairmen were Wilhelm Pieck (KPD) and Otto Grotewohl (SPD), their deputies Walter Ulbricht (KPD) and Max Fechner (SPD). The handshake of the two party chairmen was embodied in the central element of the new party's logo. Following this special congress individual members of the KPD and SPD would be able to transfer their membership to the new SED with a simple signature.

Although parity of power and position between members of the two former parties continued to be applied extensively for a couple of years, by 1949 SPD people were virtually excluded. Between 1948 and 1951 "equal representation" was abandoned, as former SPD members were forced out of their jobs, denounced as "Agents of Schumacher",Kurt Schmacher was the leader of the SPD in West Germany, which was by now the name being given to that part of Germany not subject to Soviet military administration. subjected to defamation, regular purges and at times imprisonment, so that they were frightened into silence. Influential party positions in the new ruling party were being given almost exclusively to former members of the KPD.

Berlin, the special case

The rules agreed between the occupying powers concerning Berlin itself conferred on the city a special status which differentiated the Soviet sector of Berlin from the Soviet occupation zone of Germany which on three of its four sides adjoined it. The SPD used this fact to run a party referendum on the merger, using a secret ballot, across the whole of Berlin. The referendum was suppressed in the Soviet sector on 31 March 1946, but it went ahead in those parts of the city controlled by the other three occupying powers, and resulted in rejection of the merger proposal from 82% of the votes cast by participating SPD members. The merger of the KPD and SPD to form the SED only affected the Soviet sector of the city. It was not till the end of May 1946 that the four Allies reached agreement: the western allies permitted the SED in the western sectors, and in return the Soviet Military Administration in Germany agreed to allow the SPD back into the eastern sector of Berlin.Beschluss vom 31. Mai 1946 der Alliierten Stadtkommandantur: In allen vier Sektoren der ehemaligen Reichshauptstadt werden die Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands und die neugegründete Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands zugelassen. That did not mean, however, that the SPD was able to operate unhindered as a political party in East Berlin.Anjana Buckow, Zwischen Propaganda und Realpolitik: Die USA und der sowjetisch besetzte Teil Deutschlands 1945–1955, Franz Steiner Verlag, 2003, , page 196 Following the City council elections for Greater Berlin which took place on 20 October 1946, in which the SED and SPD both competed, the total turnout was high at 92.3%. Across the city, the SPD won 48.7% of the vote while the SED won 19.8%. Of the other principal participants the CDU (party) won 22.2% and the LDP 9.3%.

As matters turned out, this was the only free election to take place across the entirety of Berlin until after 1990. Following the 1946 city council election the Soviet Military Administration and the SED in effect divided the city. In 1947 the Soviet city commander vetoed from the election of Ernst Reuter as the city's governing mayor. This was followed up by the blowing up of the City Council Building by "the masses" and the withdrawal of the Soviet city commander from the Allied Kommandatura in 1948, which turned out to be a prelude to the Soviet Union's Blockade of West Berlin.Gerhard Kunze: Grenzerfahrungen: Kontakte und Verhandlungen zwischen dem Land Berlin und der DDR 1949–1989, Akademie Verlag, 1999, page 16.Eckart Thurich: Die Deutschen und die Sieger, in: Informationen zur politischen Bildung, Vol 232, published by the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn 1991.