The United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) was the second phase of the United Nations intervention in Somalia and took place from March 1993 until March 1995, following the outbreak of the Somali Civil War in 1991. UNOSOM II carried on from the transitory United States-controlled (UN-sanctioned) Unified Task Force (UNITAF), which had been preceded by UNOSOM I. Notably, UNOSOM II embarked on a nation-building mission, diverging from its predecessors. As delineated in UNSCR 814, the operation's objectives were to aid in relief provision and economic rehabilitation, foster political reconciliation, and re-establish political and civil administrations across Somalia.
UNOSOM II was a substantial multinational initiative, uniting over 22,000 troops from 27 nations. This operation marked the largest multilateral force ever assembled for peacekeeping, and at that time, it was the costliest UN operation. The operation abandoned the careful rules of engagement set by UNITAF, and notably was the first UN mission authorized from the start to use military force proactively, beyond self-defense.
Four months into its mandate in June 1993, UNOSOM II transformed into a military campaign as it found itself entangled in armed conflict with Somali factions, predominantly against the Somali National Alliance (SNA) led by Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid. As the intervention progressed, military operations against the SNA took focus, relegating the task of political reconciliation, institution-building and humanitarian aid to a peripheral role. Three months into the conflict, the US military implemented Operation Gothic Serpent to assist UNOSOM II against the SNA with special forces. Soon after, the infamous Battle of Mogadishu took place, signifying the end of the hunt for Aidid and military operations in Somalia. The United States withdrew six months after the battle, and the remaining UN forces departed from Somalia in early 1995, concluding the operation.
UNOSOM II faced heavy criticism for human rights abuses, violations of international law, and the use of excessive force, attracting scrutiny from a wide range of humanitarian organizations, academics and journalists. Furthermore, the operation was widely criticized for an overemphasis on military operations, diverging from its original humanitarian intent. The humanitarian impact and number of lives saved is disputed.
Background
1991 saw the outbreak of the full-scale Somali Civil War, which led to the collapse of the Somali Democratic Republic. The following year, a famine emerged, driven by both a major drought and the major fighting that engulfed the nation’s breadbasket in the southern regions.
The United Nations created the UNOSOM I mission in April 1992 in response to the crisis. During July 1992 the first UN troops landed in Somalia, seven Pakistani military troops under the command of Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen. In August 1992, UNOSOM I head Mohammed Sahnoun secured an agreement with Mohamed Farah Aidid of the Somali National Alliance (SNA) to allow 500 UN peacekeepers, with the condition that any further deployments required SNA approval. However, later that month, UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali announced plans to expand UNOSOM to 3,500 troops without consultation, to the surprise of both Sahnoun and the SNA. Sahnoun recognized this move would undermine his local support, as it had been made without consulting Somali leaders and elders. He attempted to delay the deployment in order to renegotiate but was overruled. The intervention began fueling nationalist opposition to foreign troops, strengthening support for Aidid’s SNA, which condemned the UN’s perceived colonial practices.
The UN Secretariat believed Somalia represented an ideal candidate for a test case of a UN operation in expanded size and mandate. In the view of some top UNOSOM I commanders, the scope of the famine in Somalia was being exaggerated in order to justify using Somalia as an experiment for 'conflict resolution'. The United States had various motives for military involvement in Somalia. The US armed forces wanted to prove it's capability to conduct major 'Operations Other Than War', while the US State Department wanted to set a precedent for humanitarian military intervention in the post-Cold War era.
On 9 December 1992, American troops began landing on the Somali coastline at Mogadishu. Over 20,000 US troops were deployed. The famine in Somalia was already abating as UNITAF began landing. The operations of UNOSOM I were suspended. UNITAF was authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The United States designed the UNITAF mission to be a transitional action under U.S. control, structured into four phases. Initially, troops were deployed to secure key harbor and airport sites in Mogadishu and Baledogle, forming the operation's base. The security zone was then extended to encompass the surrounding regions of southern Somalia. The third phase involved further southern expansion of the security zone into Kismayo and Bardera while ensuring secure routes for humanitarian operations. Finally, in the last phase the U.S. transferred operations to the UN and withdrew most UNITAF forces. Expansion of mandate On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his recommendations for effecting the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. He noted that despite the size of the UNITAF mission, a secure environment was not yet established. There was still no effective functioning government or local security/police force. The Secretary-General concluded that, should the Security Council determine that the time had come for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the latter should be endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia. UNOSOM II would therefore seek to complete the task begun by UNITAF. The new mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to assist in rebuilding their economic, political and social life, so as to recreate a Somali State. Most notably it would also mandate the disarmament of Somali militias.
While Somalia was not reincorporated into a UN trusteeship as it had been in the 1950s, UNOSOM II was entrusted with the power to make decisions on behalf of the Somali people. This significant shift in mandate incited numerous allegations of UN colonialism. The United Nations, by invoking Chapter VII, essentially transformed the scope of its operations in Somalia, a move that would become a major point of contention in the near future. According to UNOSOM II advisor John Drysdale the majority of Somali political leaders rejected the notion of UN administering any aspect of Somalia, though some prominent figures such as Gen. Mohamed Abshir called for the return of trusteeship. The shift raised suspicions among a wide spectrum of Somalis, inciting concerns about the UN's possible attempts to reestablish a trusteeship. Aidid's faction was particularly vocal about these apprehensions but was not alone. A variety of other Somali factions, including that of Aidid's main adversary, Ali Mahdi, also expressed similar concerns.
Addis Ababa Reconciliation Conference and creation of UNOSOM II
During March 1993, several weeks before UNOSOM II was created, the first UN sponsored Somali peace conference was being held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Conference on National Reconciliation consisted of the majority of Somalis factions and leaders. UN Special Representative Lansana Kouyate of Guinea warned the delegates of the national reconciliation conference that the UN was going to invoke its Chapter VI powers across the entirety of Somalia unless they came to an agreement by 25 March 1993. The conference finalized an agreement 24 hours past the deadline. On 26 March 1993 UNOSOM II, was established by the Security Council in Resolution 814, though did not formally take over operations in Somalia until UNITAF was dissolved just over a month later on 4 May 1993.
UNOSOM II was the first UN mission authorized from the start to use military force proactively, beyond self-defense. John Drysdale notes that by invoking Chapter VII, the UNOSOM II Force Commander could operate with near impunity depending on their interpretation of Article 42 of Chapter VII. Article 42 offered no rules of engagement, in effect gave UNOSOM II forces the power to make arbitrary detentions and offer no right to habeas corpus for Somalis. In Drysdale's view UNITAF had avoided armed conflict with Somali factions due to the careful rules of engagement created by the head of the operation, US Marine Lt. Gen. Robert B. Johnston. Johnston's approach, which focused above all on winning the Somali's public confidence, was lost during the transfer to the far more aggressive UNOSOM II mandate.
Structure UNOSOM II was composed of four main divisions. They were officially led and coordinated in Somalia by the representative of the UN Secretary-General, retired US Admiral Jonathan Howe. The four divisions were tasked with:
Force Command: Maintaining overall security in Somalia and protecting UN operations. The Force Commander was a Turkish General named Cevik Bir, although his second in command, Major General Thomas M. Montgomery, a US military officer, was noted to wield more power and influence, as the command structure was dominated by US officers. Montgomery headed the US Quick Reaction Force and reported directly to the US Pentagon. Division for Humanitarian Relief and Rehabilitation: Planning and coordination of all humanitarian activities. Division for Political Affairs: Promoting political reconciliation and building of transitional governmental and administrative structures. Justice Division: Formation of civil police and rehabilitation of the judiciary. Also tasked with monitoring violations of international law.
UNOSOM II had a strength of 30,000 personnel, including 22,000 troops and 8,000 logistic and civilian staff from Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Spain, South Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States and Zimbabwe. The United States military provided 1,167 troops and numerous helicopter gunships for a Quick Reaction Force, which would remain completely under US operational control.Despite UNOSOM II being composed of a coalition of twenty-seven countries, most of the decision makers and many of the staff were Americans, giving the United States significant control over much of the operation. It was observed that very few nations involved had any representation in the UN military command structure. Due to this, many states providing troops to the operation insisted on maintaining command structures with their own respective governments, which would result in numerous future inter-UNOSOM II disputes between contingents. UNOSOM II Force Commander Cevik Bir openly admitted that the critical posts in his headquarters were filled by Americans by May 1993. In addition to this the representative of the UN Secretary-General in Somalia, retired US Admiral Jonathan Howe, staffed the UNOSOM II headquarters with twenty-eight US officers in key positions. Months into the operation, following the 5 June 1993 killings of the Pakistanis and the passing of UNSCR 837, the US effectively took complete lead of the mission. In the months following US officers operated with minimal consultations with UN headquarters in New York. Marine Lt. Gen. Robert B. Johnston, head of UNITAF, stated that although in his view UNITAF had been success US efforts and losses were in vain if UNOSOM II was also not successful.