The "Chongqing model" was a series of social and economic policies adopted in the Chinese megalopolis of Chongqing. It is most closely associated with Bo Xilai, who served as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) committee secretary for the city from 2007 to 2012, though some policies were put in place by Bo's predecessors.
The Chongqing model was characterized in part by increased state control and the promotion of a neo-leftist ideology. It involved a sweeping and sometimes extrajudicial campaign against organized crime, and increased the security and police presence in the city. As a means of addressing declining public morality, Bo launched a "red culture" movement to promote Maoist-era socialist ethics. On the economic front, he actively courted foreign investment and focused on manufacturing for domestic consumption. The Chongqing model was also characterized by massive public works programs, subsidized housing for the poor, and social policies intended to make it easier for rural citizens to move to the city.
The Chongqing model represented an alternative model of development which diverged from the policies favored by the reformist faction led by CCP general secretary Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, as well as the model put by the Guangdong CCP committee secretary Wang Yang. When Bo Xilai was removed from his posts in the spring of 2012, authorities began a campaign to reverse several of the policies that characterized the Chongqing model, including by cracking down on expressions of "red culture". Individuals, who believed they had been wrongly persecuted under the anti-corruption campaign, also began seeking legal redress.
Background Bo Xilai, son of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) icon Bo Yibo, was assigned as Communist Party secretary and Politburo member for Chongqing during the 17th Party Congress in October 2007. His predecessor, Wang Yang, was reassigned to helm the CCP in Guangdong province. At the time, Chongqing was reeling from problems such as air and water pollution, unemployment, poor public health, and complications from the Three Gorges Dam. Prior to the appointment, Bo had served as Minister of Commerce. Bo was initially reluctant to assume the Chongqing post, which was widely viewed as a demotion; he had hoped to become vice-premier instead.
Although Bo was initially unhappy about his reassignment as CCP secretary in Chongqing, he soon resolved to use his new position as a staging ground for a return to higher national office.Karson Yiu and Enjoli Frances, The Mysterious Saga of China’s Bo Xilai, ABC News, 19 April 2012. Bo made no secret of his desire to enter the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) during the 18th Party Congress in autumn 2012, when seven of the nine members of the PSC—including General Secretary Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao—were expected to retire.Ewing, Kent. (2010, 19 March). "Bo Xilai: China's Brash Populist". Asia Times. Retrieved on 16 June 2011. The transition would be an opportunity for the ambitious Bo to join the highest echelon of national leadership, likely as a replacement for ally Zhou Yongkang, head of the party's security apparatus.The Economist, China's new leaders: the princelings are coming, 23 June 2011.
Bo used his leadership of Chongqing to pioneer the Chongqing Model—a systematic set of social and economic policies intended to address diverse challenges facing modern China.Ian Johnson, China’s Falling Star, New York Review of Books, 19 March 2012. This included a set of policies promoting social welfare for the poorest groups, the state as the dominant economic force, maintaining public order, and promoting left wing ideology, including the use of campaigns to mobilize the masses, and singing revolutionary songs. The Chongqing model represented a rebuke of the policies favored by the reformist faction dominated by Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao. It is also frequently contrasted with the Guangdong model championed by Bo's predecessor and political opponent Wang Yang. Whereas the Chongqing model placed emphasized the role of the state in economic and social life, the Guangdong model is characterized by comparatively liberal economic and political policies.The Economist, The Guangdong model: One Chinese province adopts a beguilingly open approach—up to a point, 26 November 2011.
Crackdown on organized crime
Bo's tenure in Chongqing was dominated by a protracted war ostensibly against organized crime and corruption known as "Striking Black" ("Da Hei"). Since 2009, an estimated 5,700 people were arrested in the sweeping campaign that ensnared not only criminals, but also businessmen, members of the police force, judges, government officials, and political adversaries who were accused of corruption or criminal collaboration. The campaign was overseen by police chief and vice mayor Wang Lijun, whom Bo had worked with previously in Liaoning province. Reports from the Jamestown Foundation suggest the initiative was given approval by general secretary Hu Jintao, and Bo struck a careful balance between claiming credit for the campaign and praising Beijing's leadership in the crackdown on crime.
The Striking Black campaign earned Bo national recognition and widespread popularity in Chongqing—all the more because of the city's reputation as a center for criminal activity. The apparent success of Bo's campaign raised Bo's national and international profile and resulted in calls for a nationwide campaign based on his experiences in Chongqing. Through the campaign, Bo gained the support of a number of powerful members of the Politburo Standing Committee, including Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun, Xi Jinping, and Zhou Yongkang, all of whom visited Chongqing or praised Bo's achievements sometime between 2010 and 2011.
Bo's measures were criticized for neglecting due process and contributing to the erosion of the rule of law. "By all accounts," wrote Stanley Lubman in The Wall Street Journal, the campaign "involved misuse of both the courts and the police."Stanley Lubman, Bo Xilai’s Gift to Chongqing: A Legal Mess , The Wall Street Journal, 12 April 2012. Individuals targeted in the campaign were arbitrarily detained by the authorities, with an estimated 1,000 being sent to forced labor.Keith B. Richburg, After Bo's fall, Chongqing victims seek justice, The Washington Post, 19 April 2012. Lawyers for the accused were reportedly intimidated; one lawyer was sentenced to 18 months in prison.Tania Branigan, Bo Xilai: downfall of a neo-Maoist party boss who got things done, The Guardian, 20 March 2012. Allegations also surfaced over the use of torture to extract confessions. Moreover, many of those targeted in the campaign were not criminals, but businessmen and political rivals whose assets were reportedly seized in order to help pay for Bo's popular social housing programs. The Wall Street Journal reported estimates that $11 billion was seized through the campaign. Li Jun, a fugitive businessman, told the Financial Times that Chongqing security forces seized his $700 million real estate business and tortured him as retaliation for attempting to purchase land that was also sought by the government.Dan Levin and Michael Wines, Cast of Characters Grows, as Does the Intrigue, in a Chinese Political Scandal, The New York Times, 8 March 2012.Financial Times, Chinese infighting: Secrets of a succession war, 4 March 2012. One microblogger was sentenced to a year in a labor camp for criticizing Bo's alleged abuse of the court system during the campaign.
The campaign to combat crime and maintain political stability also involved the launch of a major electronic surveillance operation in the city. Wang Lijun, Bo's police chief, served as the architect of the state-funded project, which was described in official media as a "comprehensive package bugging system covering telecommunications to the Internet."Jonathan Ansfield and Ian Johnson, Ousted Chinese Leader is Said to Have Spied on Other Top Officials, The New York Times, 26 April 2012. The system involved wiretaps, eavesdropping, and monitoring of internet communications. According to The New York Times, the eavesdropping operations did not only target local criminals, but also the communications of top Chinese leaders.Martin Patience, Bo Xilai scandal: China president ‘was wire-tapped’, 26 April 2012. In August 2011, a phone call between Hu Jintao and anti-corruption official Ma Wen was found to be wiretapped under Bo's orders. The revelation about the eavesdropping operation resulted in intense scrutiny from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and contributed to Bo's downfall in 2012.
Social policies
A cornerstone of Bo's Chongqing model was a series of egalitarian social policies aimed at lessening the gap between rich and poor and easing the rural-urban divide. Bo promoted the notion of pursuing "red GDP"—an economic model embodying communist egalitarianism—and suggested that, if economic development were analogous to 'baking a cake', then the primary task should be to divide the cake fairly rather than building a larger cake.
To that end, the city reportedly spent $15.8 billion on public apartment complexes for use by recent college graduates, migrant workers, and low-income residents. Bo aimed to provide housing for 2.4 million residents by 2012. Residents whose incomes were under 3,000 yuan ($480) per month would be eligible to rent apartments for three years, with an option to buy thereafter.Simon Montlake, Chongqing model up for grabs as party boss Bo exits, Forbes, 15 March 2012. Huang Qifan, who served as mayor under Bo Xilai, indicated in 2010 that the subsidized housing project was "designed to free up more money for people to consume and drive the economy,” and noted that it would borrow elements from Singapore's Housing Development Board.
In 2007, the cities of Chongqing and Chengdu were selected to run pilot projects intended to mitigate the rural-urban divide and ease integration of rural residents into the cities. Under China's hukou registration system, citizens are classified as either rural or urban—a distinction that determines not only where they may live, but also affects educational opportunities, taxation, property rights, and so on. Of Chongqing's 32 million residents, only 27% held urban hukou certificates as of 2007. The 2007 project made it easier for rural residents to obtain urban status—a policy intended not only to help balance inequality, but also to enable the government to develop underused rural land. Under Bo's leadership, Chongqing established "land exchanges" where rural villages could earn credits for maximizing farmland.The Economist, Migration in China:Invisible and heavy shackles, 6 May 2010. Bo pledged to move three million rural residents into urban areas.
Bo's populist approach to social policy was demonstrated during the November 2008 taxi strikes, which saw over 8,000 taxi drivers take to the streets for two days in protests over high fees, unregulated competition, and rising fuel charges. Similar protests in China are frequently suppressed—sometimes forcefully—with official media sometimes blaming labor unrest on criminal instigation.Stephen Wong, Taxi protests test China's tolerance, Asia Times Online, 11 December 2008. Bo's government instead held televised roundtable dialogues with the protesters and citizens, and agreed to allow the formation of a trade union. His handling of situation earned him praise as a comparatively progressive leader.Simon Elegant, China's Taxi Strikes: A Test for the Government, Time, 28 November 2008.Shai Oster, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122990342979025141.html, The Wall Street Journal, 22 December 2008. A businessman who was reportedly involved in organizing the strike was later sentenced on 20 years in prison for disrupting transport and gangsterism.