United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159 (1805), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that it had no jurisdiction to hear appeals from criminal cases in the circuit courts by writs of error. Relying on the Exceptions Clause, More held that Congress's enumerated grants of appellate jurisdiction to the Court operated as an exercise of Congress's power to eliminate all other forms of appellate jurisdiction.
The second of forty-one criminal cases heard by the Marshall Court, More ensured that the Court's criminal jurisprudence would be limited to writs of error from the state (and later, territorial) courts, original habeas petitions and writs of error from habeas petitions in the circuit courts, and certificates of division and mandamus from the circuit courts. Congress did not grant the Court jurisdiction to hear writs of error from the circuit courts in criminal cases until 1889, for capital crimes, and 1891, for other "infamous" crimes. The Judicial Code of 1911 abolished the circuit courts, transferred the trial of crimes to the district courts, and extended the Court's appellate jurisdiction to all crimes.Brent D. Stratton, Criminal Law: The Attenuation Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: A Study in Attenuated Principle and Dissipated Logic, 75 139, 139 n.1 (1984). But, these statutory grants were construed not to permit writs of error filed by the prosecution, as in More.Rossman, 1990, at 524 n.19 (citing United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892)).
More arose from the same Federalist/Jeffersonian political dispute over the judiciary that gave rise to Marbury v. Madison (1803) and Stuart v. Laird (1803). Benjamin More, a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia, argued that the repeal of statutory provisions authorizing compensation for his office violated the salary-protection guarantees for federal judges in Article Three of the United States Constitution. Below, a divided panel of the United States Circuit Court of the District of Columbia had sided with More, interpreted the repeal act prospectively, and sustained his demurrer to the criminal indictment for the common law crime of exacting illegal fees under color of office.
Background
United States presidential election, 1800
The Federalist Party and the Democratic-Republican Party comprised the First Party System in the United States. Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson defeated Federalist John Adams in the 1800 presidential election. Jefferson's party also took control of Congress in the House and Senate elections. After the elections, the lame duck Federalist administration passed the Judiciary Act of 1801 (the "Midnight Judges Act"), creating 16 new circuit judgeships to preside in the circuit courts (as opposed to the district judges and the Supreme Court justices riding circuit).Murrin, Johnson, McPherson, et al Murrin, Johnson, McPherson, et al Along with the District of Columbia Organic Act of 1801 (the "Organic Act"), the statutes created many judicial vacancies, and Adams filled nearly all of these judgeships on his last day in office. Marshall, in his dual role as Adams' Secretary of State, failed to deliver some of these commissions before leaving office.
Companion cases
Immediately after his inauguration, Jefferson instructed his Secretary of State, James Madison, to stop delivery on all outstanding commissions., 1985, at 19. Further, an act of March 8, 1802 abolished the circuit court judgeships created by the Midnight Judges Act (15 of which had already been filled), restoring the system created under the 1789 and 1793 acts., 1985, at 19, 22. Federalists viewed this as unconstitutional and looked to the then-pending case of Marbury v. Madison—concerning a confirmed D.C. justice of the peace who had not received his commission—as a test case for the constitutionality of the repeal. The next session of the Supreme Court was in June, one month before the repeal would take effect. But, the Judiciary Act of 1802 delayed the Court's next session until February 1803, and made other changes to the structure of the judicial system., 1985, at 20.
More broadly, Jefferson removed 146 of 316 (46%) incumbent, second-level, appointed federal officials, including 13 U.S. Attorneys and 18 U.S. Marshals., 1985, at 22. Jefferson also displaced two district judges—Ray Greene and Jacob Read—citing technical flaws in their appointments. Further, District Judge John Pickering was impeached and removed from office on a party-line vote., 1985, at 23. The following day, the House impeached Justice Samuel Chase, but six Democratic-Republicans crossed party lines in the Senate to prevent his conviction by a single vote.
In Marbury, the Supreme Court held that Madison's failure to deliver the commission to Marbury was illegal, but did not grant Marbury a writ of mandamus on the ground that § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitutional insofar as it authorized the Court to issue such writs under its original jurisdiction.Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Stuart v. Laird—involving a civil judgment rendered by a circuit court constituted under the Midnight Judges Act and enforced by a circuit court constituted under the Judiciary Act of 1802—challenged the constitutionality both of abolishing the circuit judgeships and of requiring the Supreme Court justices to ride circuit. In a brief opinion, the Court rejected both challenges.Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 299 (1803).
District of Columbia Organic Act of 1801 Both the United States Circuit Court of the District of Columbia and the D.C. justices of the peace were created on February 27, 1801 by the District of Columbia Organic Act of 1801.District of Columbia Organic Act of 1801, 2 Stat. 103. Unlike its better-known predecessor, the Midnight Judges Act,Judiciary Act of 1801 (Midnight Judges Act), 2 Stat. 89. the Organic Act survived repeal by the Jeffersonian Congress.John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different?: A Historical View, 92 375, 378 (2006).
D.C. justices of the peace
The D.C. justices of the peace were appointed by the President, in a number at his discretion, and confirmed by the Senate for five-year terms. A D.C. justice of the peace had jurisdiction over "all matters, civil and criminal, and in whatever relates to the conservation of the peace" within their county.District of Columbia Organic Act of 1801, § 11, 2 Stat. 103, 107. The District of Columbia was divided into two counties: Washington County, east of the Potomac River, and Alexandria County, west of the Potomac.District of Columbia Organic Act of 1801, § 2, 2 Stat. 103, 105. Justices of the peace were authorized to "inflict whipping, imprisonment, and fine as high as 500 pounds of tobacco" and to hear civil cases with an amount in controversy up to $20.More, 7 U.S. at 167 (oral argument). One year after More, in Ex parte Burford (1806), the Marshall Court's first original habeas case, the Court granted a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner subjected to preventive detention by the D.C. justices of the peace.Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806).
As to compensation, the Organic Act provided that justices of the peace "shall be entitled to receive for their services the fees allowed for like services by the laws herein before adopted and continued, in the eastern part of said district." A March 3, 1801 amendment to the Organic Act provided that: "[T]he magistrates, to be appointed for the said district, shall be and they are hereby constituted a board of commissioners within their respective counties, and shall possess and exercise the same powers, perform the same duties, receive the same fees and , as the levy courts or commissioners of county for the state of Maryland possess, perform and receive . . . ."Mar. 3, 1801, § 4, 2 Stat. 115, 115.
On March 4, 1801, President John Adams's last day in office, Adams nominated and the Senate confirmed 20 D.C. justices of the peace for Washington County and 19 for Alexandria County.O'Fallon, 1993, at 43 & n.4. On March 16, President Thomas Jefferson issued 15 commissions to justices of the peace in Washington County, including 13 nominated by Adams, and 15 in Alexandria County, including 11 nominated by Adams; the remainder were of his own choosing. (Jefferson's list, submitted to the Senate on January 6, 1802, erroneously contained the name of John Laird, a confirmed Adams appointed who had not received a commission from Jefferson, instead of More.)O'Fallon, 1993, at 48 n.27. The plaintiffs in Marbury v. Madison (1803)—William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper—were among the confirmed Adams nominees not commissioned.
On May 3, 1802, Congress eliminated both the fees for justice of the peace services, except travel expenses, authorized by the Organic Act and fees associated with the justices of the peace's role on the board of commissioners.Act of May 3, 1802, ch. 15, § 8, 2 Stat. 193, 194–95. These two sources represented the entirety of their compensation.O'Fallon, 1993, at 52.
D.C. circuit court The three-judge United States Circuit Court of the District of Columbia was populated by its own judges, rather than by a mixture of district judges and circuit riding Supreme Court justices like the other circuit courts. The D.C. circuit court had jurisdiction over crimes committed within the district.District of Columbia Organic Act of 1801, § 5, 2 Stat. 103, 106. With regard to appeals from the D.C. circuit court, the Organic Act provided: [A]ny final judgment, order or decree in said circuit court, wherein the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the value of one hundred dollars, may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the supreme court of the United States, by writ of error or appeal, which shall be prosecuted in the same manner, under the same regulations, and the same proceedings shall be had therein, as is or shall be provided in the case of writs of error on judgments, or appeals upon orders or decrees, rendered in the circuit court of the United States.District of Columbia Organic Act of 1801, § 8, 2 Stat. 103, 106.
The provision to which the Organic Act referred, that for writs of error from the circuit courts to the Supreme Court in the Judiciary Act of 1789, provided: And upon a like process [as a writ of error from the district court to the circuit court], may final judgments and decrees in civil actions, and suits in equity in a circuit court, brought there by original process, or removed there from courts of the several States, or removed there by appeal from a district court where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars, exclusive of costs, be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court, the citation being in such case signed by a judge of such circuit court, or justice of the Supreme Court, and the adverse party having at least thirty days’ notice.Judiciary Act of 1789, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84.
Unlike the appellate provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the appellate provision of the act of February 27, 1801 was not explicitly limited to civil cases (except insofar as it incorporated the former by reference). Further, because the D.C. circuit court was not constituted within the framework of the Judiciary Act of 1802, appeals to the Supreme Court by way of certificates of division could not issue. After More, the Marshall Court heard six appeals from the D.C. circuit court via original habeas.Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806); Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38 (1822); Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830); Ex parte Watkins, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568 (1833); Ex parte Milburn, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 704 (1835).
Criminal appeals