The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) operated McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet fighter aircraft between 1984 and 2021. The Australian Government purchased 75 A and B variants of the F/A-18 in 1981 to replace the RAAF's Dassault Mirage III fighters. The Hornets entered service with the RAAF between 1984 and 1990. Four Hornets were destroyed in flying accidents during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
RAAF Hornets were first sent on a combat deployment as part of the Australian contribution to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. During the invasion, 14 Hornets flew patrols over Iraq, as well as close air support sorties to assist coalition ground forces. RAAF F/A-18s also provided security for the American air base at Diego Garcia between late 2001 and early 2002, and have protected a number of high-profile events in Australia. Between 2015 and 2017 a detachment of Hornets was deployed to the Middle East and struck ISIL targets as part of Operation Okra.
Commencing in 1999, the RAAF put its Hornets through a series of upgrades to improve their effectiveness. However, the aircraft became increasingly difficult to operate and were at risk of being outclassed by the fighters and air-defence systems operated by other countries. The type was replaced by 72 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II fighters. The Australian Government offered the Hornets for sale after they were retired and 25 were sold to Canada in early 2019. Eight F/A-18s were preserved for historical purposes in Australia. The remaining Hornets were scrapped after a deal to sell them to a private company failed in 2023.
Selection The RAAF began the initial stages of finding a replacement for its Dassault Mirage III fighters in 1968. The service issued an Air Staff Requirement for new fighter aircraft in December 1971, which received a larger than expected number of proposals from manufacturers. At that time the RAAF expected to start phasing out the Mirage IIIs in 1980.Wilson (1993), p. 80 In 1973, a team of RAAF personnel inspected the McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle, Northrop YF-17, Saab 37 Viggen and Dassault Mirage F1 programs, but recommended that any decisions about a suitable replacement be delayed so that several new fighters that were expected to soon become available could also be considered.Wilson (1993), p. 81 In August 1974 the Australian Government decided to defer the fighter replacement project and extend the Mirage IIIs' operational life into the 1980s. One of the four Mirage III-equipped squadrons was also disbanded at this time.
Work on the Mirage replacement program resumed in 1975, and the Tactical Fighter Project Office was established in 1976 to manage the process of selecting the RAAF's next fighter. A request for proposals was issued in November that year and attracted eleven responses. By March 1977 the office had chosen to focus on the F-15 Eagle, General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon, Dassault Mirage 2000 and Panavia Tornado, as well as the McDonnell Douglas F-18A and F-18L; the F-18A was a carrier-based fighter developed from the YF-17 for the United States Navy, and the F-18L was a land-based variant of this design. The Grumman F-14 Tomcat was also considered by the project office, but was regarded as unsuitable and never placed on the official shortlist.McLaughlin (2005), p. 51 In November 1978, the F-15 and Tornado were removed from the list of aircraft being considered. The Tornado was excluded as it was principally a strike aircraft and had limited air-to-air capability. While the F-15 was an impressive aircraft that met or exceeded almost all of the RAAF's requirements, it was believed that the air force did not need a fighter with such advanced capabilities and that introducing it into service could destabilise Australia's region.McLaughlin (2005), p. 52
Further evaluation of the remaining aircraft took place during 1979. Wing Commander (and later Air Vice-Marshal) Bob Richardson test-flew a Mirage 2000 in April 1979, and reported that while the aircraft had excellent aerodynamic characteristics, its avionics, radar, fuel system, cockpit and weapons capability were inferior to those of US designs.McLaughlin (2005), p. 53 Richardson also test-flew a YF-17 that was being used as a demonstrator for the F-18L in mid-1979, and was impressed by its capabilities. No F-18Ls had been ordered at this time, and the RAAF did not want to take on the risk of being the lead customer for the design.McLaughlin (2005), p. 55 At about the same time, the RAAF rejected an offer of F-14 Tomcats that had been originally ordered by the Iranian Government but not delivered as a result of the revolution in that country. While the Tomcats were made available at a greatly reduced price, the air force judged that these aircraft were too large and complex for its requirements.
With the Mirage 2000 and F-18L rejected, the RAAF was faced with a choice between the F-16 and F-18A. Richardson and several other RAAF pilots tested United States Air Force (USAF) F-16Bs in 1979 and 1980, and reported that the aircraft had excellent performance but could be difficult to control at times. The evaluation team was also concerned about the reliability of the F-16's engine and regarded the aircraft as technologically immature. It was also noted that the aircraft's radar was inferior to that of the F-18A, and that F-16s could not fire the beyond-visual-range (BVR) air-to-air missiles and long-range anti-shipping missiles that the F-18A was capable of operating.McLaughlin (2005), pp. 56–57 In contrast, the evaluation team was impressed by the F-18A, and regarded it as being a more robust and survivable aircraft as it had been designed to operate from aircraft carriers; these features were important for operations from bare bases in northern Australia.McLaughlin (2005), p. 57 Richardson and three other RAAF pilots test-flew F-18As, and reported that the aircraft handled well, but had some deficiencies with its flight control system and engines; these were not seen as major flaws by the evaluation team.McLaughlin (2005), pp. 57–58 The F-18A's twin engines were considered to be its main advantage over the single-engined F-16, as research conducted by the evaluation team found that the attrition rate for single-engined fighters was twice that for aircraft with two engines.McLaughlin (2005), p. 59 Overall, the RAAF judged that both the F-16 and F-18A were too immature for a decision to be made in 1980 as had been originally planned, and recommended to the Government that this be deferred by a year.
The Government accepted the RAAF's recommendation, and delayed its decision on a Mirage III replacement until late 1981. This gave General Dynamics an opportunity to offer the improved F-16C to the RAAF. The capability of these aircraft was closer to that of the F-18 as they were equipped with BVR missiles. Richardson and another RAAF pilot test-flew F-16Cs in May 1981. The F-18 design was also improved during 1981, and was redesignated the F/A-18. When RAAF test pilots flew these aircraft during 1981, they found that the deficiencies they had detected in 1980 were now addressed.McLaughlin (2005), p. 60 Overall, the RAAF concluded that while both aircraft met its requirements and the F-16 was less expensive, the F/A-18 was the superior design as it was more technologically mature, easier to maintain during operational deployments, and likely to have a much lower attrition rate.McLaughlin (2005), pp. 60–61 The Government accepted this advice, and announced on 20 October 1981 that 75 F/A-18s would be ordered. As part of this announcement, Minister for Defence Jim Killen acknowledged that the F-16 would have been seven percent cheaper to purchase, but stated that the F/A-18's lower running costs and expected attrition rate greatly reduced the difference between the lifetime cost of the two designs.McLaughlin (2005), pp. 61–62
Instead of directly ordering the aircraft from McDonnell Douglas, the Australian Government purchased its F/A-18s through the US Government's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.Wilson (1993), p. 83 Ordering the aircraft via the US Government allowed the RAAF to take advantage of the superior purchasing power of the US military, and reduced the service's project management requirements.McLaughlin (2005), p. 67 This led to a complicated arrangement whereby the aircraft were ordered by the US Government, delivered to the US Navy, and then transferred to the RAAF once initial flight testing had taken place. The process functioned smoothly and was cost effective.McLaughlin (2005), pp. 69–70
Production
The RAAF's order of 75 Hornets comprised 57 single-seat A variant fighters and 18 two-seat B variant operational training aircraft.Wilson (2005), p. 35 It was planned that each of the three fighter squadrons and the single operational conversion unit that were to operate the F/A-18 would be allocated 16 aircraft, of which 12 were expected to be operational at any time while the other four were undergoing maintenance. The remaining eleven Hornets were labelled the "half-life attrition buy" and would replace the aircraft that were expected to have been lost by 2000; as it happened, this greatly exceeded the RAAF's actual losses.McLaughlin (March 2005), p. 55 Deliveries were planned to start in late 1984 and be completed in 1990. The total cost of the F/A-18 program, including the aircraft, spare parts, other equipment and modifications to the RAAF's fighter bases, was calculated as billion in August 1981, but was rapidly revised upwards due to the depreciation of the Australian dollar at this time.McLaughlin (March 2005), p. 54
The Australian Hornets were very similar to the standard US Navy variants, but incorporated a number of minor modifications. These included the addition of an instrument landing system/VHF omnidirectional range (ILS/VOR) system, a high-frequency radio, a different ejection seat harness and the deletion of all equipment used only to launch the aircraft from catapults. In addition, two of the Australian aircraft were fitted with flight-test instrumentation so that they could be used as part of trials.Wilson (1993), p. 86
The Government sought to use the Mirage III replacement program as a means to increase the capabilities of Australia's manufacturing industry. Accordingly, it was decided to build the aircraft in Australia, though it was recognised that this would lead to higher costs than if the fighters were purchased directly from the United States. While the first four RAAF Hornets were built in the United States, the remainder were assembled at the Government Aircraft Factories (GAF) plant at Avalon Airport in Victoria, and their engines were produced by the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation at Fishermans Bend in Melbourne. Another twelve Australian companies were involved in other stages of the project.McLaughlin (March 2005), pp. 54–55 These firms were sub-contracted to McDonnell Douglas and the other major US companies that produced components for the F/A-18, and had to comply with the requirements of the FMS program. The Australian Government hoped that Singapore and New Zealand would purchase Australian-built Hornets, but this did not eventuate. The Canadian Government expressed interest in purchasing 25 Australian-built F/A-18As in 1988 in order to increase its force of these aircraft after they had ceased to be manufactured in the United States, but this did not lead to any sales.Wilson (1993), pp. 127–128 +F/A-18A and B variant deliveriesWilson (2005), p. 42 Year F/A-18A F/A-18B Total 1985 1 7 8 1986 12 0 12 1987 7 7 14 1988 21 4 25 1989 12 0 12 1990 4 0 4 Total 57 18 75