The Sacred Sword of the Patriots League (SSPL) (Mặt trận gươm thiêng ái quốc) was a sustained black operation that originated in the Central Intelligence Agency and was carried out by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG) during the Vietnam War. It involved a combination of psychological warfare (PSYWAR) and psychological operations (PSYOP), today known as military information support operations (MISO).
The SSPL was "planned and implemented beginning in April 1963," though it continued to develop through 1968.Friedman, Herbert A. The Sacred Sword of the Patriots League. Retrieved 2012-4-24. It formed the centerpiece of various PSYOP directed against North Vietnam, which were codenamed Humidor.Schultz, Richard H. Jr., The Secret War Against Hanoi. HarperCollins, 1999. p. 137. It attempted to convince the people—and sometimes the government—of North Vietnam of the existence of an autonomous, non-communist society within North Vietnam. Creating and promulgating the "legend" of the SSPL required U.S. Special Forces to build on PSYWAR techniques established by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. Some historians believe the SSPL managed to divert the attention of North Vietnamese officials enough to justify its expenses and manpower. However, the program is not known for any particularly noteworthy successes and it suffered from a lack of direction regarding its ultimate goals. Recurring disagreements between some military leaders in Vietnam and policymakers in Washington kept the program from ever becoming an actual counterrevolutionary force within North Vietnam. It was mostly disbanded in 1968 following an early round of negotiations in what became the Paris Peace Accords of 1973.
Origins
U.S. historical precedent The SSPL drew from a short history of elaborate deceptions in U.S. military history. Historian John Plaster asserts that the MACV-SOG branch which ran the SSPL was "patterned after the old OSS Morale Operations Division," formed by William Donavan in 1943.Plaster, John H., SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam. Simon & Schuster, 1997. p. 118. The comparison is apt, as both largely relied on deceptive radio operations, fraudulent letters, and distribution of leaflets. The SSPL also benefited from the experiences of Herbert Weisshart, who was appointed Deputy Head of MACV-SOG's PSYOP at its inception. Unlike most SOG commanders, Weisshart arrived with experience PSYOP. "Part of a six-man psychological warfare team dispatched to Taiwan in 1952, he had been instrumental in coordinating leaflet drops and radio play against China in support of one of the Central Intelligence Agency's first notional resistance campaigns."Conboy, Kenneth and Dale Andrade, Spies and Commandos: How America Lost the Secret War in North Vietnam. University Press of Kansas, 2000. p. 77. Still operating in 1963, Weisshart's fictional resistance movement against mainland China became the CIA's "longest running notional campaign." The "Legend" of the SSPL The American founders of the SSPL chose to root it in popular Vietnamese history. The name hearkened back to the 15th century Emperor of Vietnam, Lê Lợi, who led a revolt against Chinese rule. His guerrilla warfare tactics succeeded in winning Vietnam's independence from China after 1,000 years of subservience. Sometime after the war, Lê Lợi's famous sword was taken from him by a turtle. The Emperor declared that the sword had been entrusted to him for the duration of the war, only to be taken by the turtle of the Lake of the Returned Sword after his victory.
The story of Lê Lợi fulfilled Weisshart's declared goal of pursuing "a legend and an easily recognized symbol upon which to base a notional resistance movement in North Vietnam."Schultz, Richard H. Jr., The Secret War Against Hanoi. HarperCollins, 1999. p. 139. It was a story that "Every school child in North Vietnam knew."Schultz, Richard H. Jr., The Secret War Against Hanoi. HarperCollins, 1999. p. 141. Knowing that North Vietnam relied on Chinese aid, SOG framed the SSPL as anti-Chinese nationalist movement, while steering clearly making ideological statements that might lose some North Vietnamese support. The legend also emphasized the historical union between South and North Vietnam against any kind of imperial aggression.Chandler, Robert W., War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam. Westview Press, 2011. p. 9.
According to the legend, the SSPL was founded by Lê Lợi admirer Lê Quốc Hùng in response to the communist land reforms of 1953. It supposedly had 10,000 members and held its first national Congress in 1961. The SSPL opposed all foreign involvement in North and South Vietnam.Schultz, Richard H. Jr., The Secret War Against Hanoi. HarperCollins, 1999. pp. 141-2.
Early development In April 1961, President John F. Kennedy demanded the establishment of "networks of resistance" in North Vietnam.Conboy, Kenneth and Dale Andrade, Spies and Commandos: How America Lost the Secret War in North Vietnam. University Press of Kansas, 2000. p. 75. It took government officials some time to build the resources necessary to cross the Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone. Responsibility for PSYOP against North Vietnam initially went to the CIA, which continued to play a supporting role throughout the war. In 1962 the CIA identified Hmong tribesmen as worthy recruits for North Vietnamese resistance. But by the spring of 1963 their pilot program had a total of just eight recruits. CIA Deputy Chief and Chief of Operations in Saigon, William Colby, chose Herbert Weisshart to expand North Vietnamese resistance and PSYWAR operations beginning in March 1963.Schultz, Richard H. Jr., The Secret War Against Hanoi. HarperCollins, 1999. p. 130.
Weisshart played a role in implementing the CINCPAC Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34-63 for PSYOP directed towards North Vietnam, which was later endorsed by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. "McNamara also desired the development of a notional (fictitious) Vietnamese national liberation movement, which would be the ostensible sponsor of the operations. That was, after all, what the North Vietnamese were doing in the South."Gillespie, Robert M., Black Ops, Vietnam: The Operation History of MACVSOG. Naval Institute Press, 2011. p. 7. The final plan, OPLAN 34Alpha, called for the military "to use all available media and practical means...phantom resistance movements, and psychological development of actual resistance."Gillespie, Robert M., Black Ops, Vietnam: The Operation History of MACVSOG. Naval Institute Press, 2011. p. 24.
A 1966 letter from Major General Richard Abbey, the Deputy Chief of Staff MACV, crisply conveys the thought process behind the SSPL's operations. "The SSPL is the denial mechanism for disclaiming U.S. and Republic of Vietnam sponsorship of Operation Plan 34A activities...The cover story for the SSPL will be that it is the action arm of the front and that it receives it[s] funds from the front. By avoiding public announcement of responsibility for OPLAN 34A operations the SSPL group will not be forced to provide answers to such questions as: Where did the boats come from? Who paid for them? Where are they based? SSPL broadcasts, which the local Saigon residents might hear, can be explained by saying that the SSPL rented air from a local station."Friedman, Herbert A. "The Sacred Sword of the Patriots League." Retrieved 2012-4-24. The SSPL was conceived as the covert U.S. counterpoint to recognized North Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. The main difference is that the SSPL's existence was "notional, whereas the Viet Cong was real.
As the mandate for PSYOP against North Vietnam expanded, U.S. officials decided that the large force required would be better left to the Pentagon instead of the CIA. The transfer, which took place in November 1963, was termed Operation Switchback. Herb Weisshert was transferred to the newly formed MACV-SOG, with operation described in OPLAN 34Alpha to start on 1 February 1964.Gillespie, Robert M., Black Ops, Vietnam: The Operation History of MACVSOG. Naval Institute Press, 2011. p. 8.
The SSPL and the MACV-SOG mission
According to Gordon L. Rottman, who served in MACV-SOG, U.S. Special Forces had five primary duties in the Vietnam War:Rottman, Gordon L., The MACV-SOG Reconnaissance Team in Vietnam, Osprey Publishing, 2011. p. 10. Cross Border Operations to disrupt the Viet Cong, Khmer Rouge, Pathet Lao and NVA Running Bright Light Operations to rescue Americans in North Vietnam Training and dispatching agents into North Vietnam to run resistance movements and intelligence-collection Black PSYOP Gray PSYOP
The SSPL was the focal point of Black PSYOP within MACV-SOG, which was an elite special forces unit that drew from all branches of the military as well as the CIA. MACV-SOG spread the SSPL message by air, boat, ground forces, and telecommunications. The Psychological Operations Group that developed the SSPL was instructed "to advise, assist, and control psychological operations of Strategic Technical Service for the purpose of establishing a climate of opinion in North Vietnam -- [Words Illegible] -- SO/STS operations, supporting SOG/STS physical destruction operations, and exerting PSYOP pressure on the North Vietnamese to erase support for activity in the Republic of Vietnam."Reske, Charles F., MACV-SOG Command History: Annexes A, N & M (1964-1966). Alpha Publications, 1992. p. 83. By 1967, SOG dedicated about 150 members of its staff to covert propaganda, in addition to employing many more Vietnamese citizens for their language skills, cultural understanding and ability to act as members of the SSPL.Plaster, John H., SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam. Simon & Schuster, 1997. p. 150.
SSPL Propaganda
SSPL leaflet campaign MACV-SOG spent significant resources distributing leaflets wherever the enemy was likely to find them. Leaflets chiefly served to demoralize the enemy. During the Vietnam War, this was accomplished at least as much by the volume as the quality of the messages. A typical "MACV PSYOP/POLWAR Newsletter" from August 1969 records 683 million leaflets dropped that month alone, though leaflets dropped by SOG into North Vietnam could be numbered in the tens of millions.Chandler, Robert W., War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam. Westview Press, 2011. p. 85. Leaflets could be left on corpses, blasted out of timed cannons or dropped from aircraft. (Spies and Commandos 106) While many of these leaflets were part of the Chiêu Hồi defection campaign, others specifically referenced the SSPL resistance. SOG depended on a cadre of North Vietnamese defectors to translate and perfect these messages.Schultz, Richard H. Jr., The Secret War Against Hanoi. HarperCollins, 1999. p. 144.