During the Khrushchev era, especially from 1956 through 1962, the Soviet Union attempted to implement major wage reforms intended to move Soviet industrial workers away from the mindset of overfulfilling quotas that had characterised the Soviet economy during the preceding, ideologically-stricter, Marxist-Leninist period and toward a financial incentive that primarily reflected liberal, capitalist-oriented economic principles. This shift in political trajectory was understood by international Marxist-Leninists as a development in the emergence of modern revisionism: the socialist nation's elopement from traditional, Marxist-Leninist principles.
Throughout the Stalinist period, most Soviet workers had been paid for their work based on a piece-rate system. Thus their individual wages were directly tied to the amount of work they produced. This policy was intended to encourage workers to toil and therefore increase production as much as possible. The piece-rate system led to the growth of bureaucracy and contributed to significant inefficiencies in Soviet industry. In addition, factory managers frequently manipulated the personal production quotas given to workers to prevent workers' wages from falling too low.
The wage reforms sought to remove these wage practices and offer an efficient financial incentive to Soviet workers by standardising wages and reducing the dependence on overtime or bonus payments. However, industrial managers were often unwilling to take actions that would effectively reduce workers' wages and frequently ignored the directives they were given, continuing to pay workers high overtime rates. Industrial materials were frequently in short supply, and production needed to be carried out as quickly as possible once materials were available—a practice known as "storming". The prevalence of storming meant that the ability to offer bonus payments was vital to the everyday operation of Soviet industry, and as a result the reforms ultimately failed to create a more efficient system.
Background
Existing system
During the period of Stalinism, the Soviet Union attempted to achieve economic growth through increased industrial production. In 1927–1928, the sum total of Soviet production of capital goods amounted to 6 billion roubles, but by 1932, annual production increased to 23.1 billion roubles.Robinson (2002), page 38 Factories and industrial enterprises were actively encouraged to "achieve at whatever cost",Hosking (1985), page 153 with a strong emphasis placed on overfulfilling stated targets so as to produce as much as possible. For example, the slogan for the first Five-Year Plan, "The Five-Year Plan In Four Years!",Time (1933) called on workers to fulfill the state's objectives a year earlier than planned.
Frantically rushed production was very common in Soviet industry, and in particular a process known as "storming" (Russian: штурмовщина, pronounced shturmovshchina) was endemic;Smith (1976), page 286 it involved crash programs in which factories tried to undertake all their monthly production quota in a very short space of time. This was usually the result of a lack of industrial materials that left factories without the resources to complete production until new supplies arrived at the end of the month. Workers then worked as many hours as possible to meet monthly quotas in time; this exhausted them and left them unable to work at the beginning of the next month (although lack of raw materials meant there would have been very little for them to produce at this point anyway).
To encourage individual workers to work hard and produce as much as they possibly could, most workers in Soviet industry were paid on a piece-rate; their wage payments depended upon how much work they personally completed. Soviet workers were given individual quotas for the amount of work they should personally deliver and would earn a basic wage (stavka) by fulfilling 100 percent of their quota. The wage rate for work would grow as production over this level increased. If a worker produced 120 percent of his own personal quota for the month (for example, if he was supposed to produce 1,000 items, but actually produced 1,200) he would receive his basic wage for the first 100 percent, a higher rate for the first 10 percent of over production and an even higher rate for the next 10 percent. Soviet authorities hoped that this would encourage a Stakhanovite spirit of overfulfillment of quotas among the Soviet workforce. In 1956, approximately 75 percent of Soviet workers were paid under such a piece-rate system,Fearn (1963), page 7 so the majority of Soviet workers could significantly boost their earnings by increasing their output.Filtzer (1992), page 93
Average wage rates in the Soviet Union were published relatively rarely. Some academics in the West believed this was because the Soviet government wanted to conceal low average earnings. Alec Nove wrote in 1966 (when wage statistics were published for the first time since the Second World War) that the lack of transparency surrounding average wages was intended to prevent Soviet workers from discovering the huge disparities that existed between wages in different sectors of the Soviet economy.Nove (1966), page 212
Problems The piece-rate approach to wages had been introduced in the first Five-Year Plan in 1928 and had changed very little since then. In practice the piece-rate system led to many inefficiencies in Soviet industry.Filtzer (1992), page 95 One issue was the vast bureaucracy that was involved in administering wage payments. Each Soviet ministry or government department would set its own rates and wage scales for work in the factories or enterprises for which they were responsible. Within one ministry there could be great variation in pay rates for jobs requiring largely identical responsibilities and skills, based on what the factory was producing, the location of the factory and other factors that Moscow considered important.Fearn (1963), page 8 Basing payments on these central directives often led to long and costly processes in the calculation of wages. Historian Donald Filtzer wrote of one 1930s machinist who in one month completed 1,424 individual pieces of work. Amongst these had been 484 differing tasks, all of which had been assigned a basic individual payment rate of between 3 and 50 kopecks each (1 rouble was made up of 100 kopecks). To calculate this worker's wage, his employer had to process 2,885 documents which had required some 8,500 signatures on of paper, costing the factory 309 roubles, a fifth of what they would pay the worker, whose total earnings for the labour amounted to 1,389 roubles.
Time workers—workers who were paid for the time they spent working rather than by how much they individually produced—also received bonuses based on performance. Factory managers, who did not want these workers to lose out to their piece-rate colleagues, often manipulated output figures to ensure that they would (on paper) overfulfill their targets and therefore receive their bonuses.Filtzer (1992), page 94 Typically, managers were loath to see their employees' wages fall too low, so they frequently kept quotas deliberately low, or offered ways for workers to manipulate their work outputs to achieve a higher bonus. They generally did this to ensure that their factory could run smoothly, rather than out of concern for the workers' personal welfare. The erratic and seemingly arbitrary way that quotas had been set across different industries led to a high level of uncompleted production in industries where it was more difficult to overfulfill production quotas. Managers therefore tried to keep quotas deliberately low to attract workers to their factories to ensure their factories were able to meet their targets.Fearn (1963), page 9
Even without managerial manipulation, quotas were very often low and easy to overfulfill. Quotas had been lowered during the Second World War so that new workers would be able to fulfill their output expectations; in industries such as engineering, it was common for workers to double their basic pay through bonuses.
Reform After the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union went through a process of moving away from Stalinist policies known as de-Stalinization. The purpose of de-Stalinization included not only ending the use of terror and the Gulag system that had existed under Stalin, but also reforming the economic policies of the Soviet Union.Filtzer (1992), pages 1-2 In the 1950s, the Soviet economy had begun to fall behind schedule in the output of several key materials including coal, iron and cement, and worker productivity was not growing at the rate expected.Soviet Economic Policy: December 1956 – May 1957, page 5 In May 1955, Pravda (the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party) announced that a State Committee on Labour and Wages had been formed to investigate changes to wages and a centralised system of wage adjustments.Fearn (1963), page 5 In July 1955, Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin spoke of the need for Soviet industry to end outdated work quotas and reform wages, so that the Soviet Union could better incentivise workers and reduce labour turnover.Fearn (1963), page 13 The subsequent sixth Five-Year Plan for 1956 to 1960 included calls for a reform of wages.Fearn (1963), pages 13–14 The reforms had several objectives, the most important of which was to create a more consistent system of incentives for workers.Filtzer (1992), page 99 It was also hoped that the reforms would help to reduce the levels of waste and misallocation of labour that were frequently found in Soviet industry.Fearn (1963), page 1
Provisions
The Sixth Five Year Plan made several key changes to Soviet workers' wages. Firstly, basic wages were increased so that there would be less pressure to overfulfill quotas, and therefore less pressure to manipulate or distort results.Filtzer (1992), page 96 Wage increases were restricted to the lowest paid jobs, as Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev sought to be seen as the "friend to the underdog". It was also hoped that wage rises for lower paid jobs would encourage more women to enter industry and that freezes on higher paid jobs would deter people from leaving employment.Hoeffding (1958–59), page 394
Secondly, quotas were raised to limit the ability of workers to overfulfill targets. In the case of time workers, this was sometimes done by keeping quotas the same but reducing hours; for example, coal miners saw their working day shortened to six hours.Filtzer (1992), page 97 Some rises were very steep; in the case of engineering enterprises, quotas were raised by 65 percent.
The number of wage rates and wage scales was drastically reduced; this not only cut bureaucracy, but also ensured that workers would be more eager to take on a wider range of tasks. Time workers, for example, would be paid the same regardless of which task they carried out during their shift. This allowed managers to better distribute labour and reduce the frequency of bottlenecks occurring in production. They could do this because workers would be paid a similar rate no matter what they undertook, so it became easier to move workers between tasks.
A major change was made in the way overfulfillment was rewarded. Progressive piece-rates, where rates increased as outputs grew, were ended, and workers were paid a one-off bonus upon overachieving a quota.Filtzer (1992), page 98 Where bonus rates were retained for each percentage of overfulfillment, they were capped. For example, in engineering, bonuses could not exceed 20 percent of their normal earnings.
Lastly, workers whose tasks were considered too important to be paid on a piece-rate basis were moved to a time-rate method. This was largely done in consideration of safety grounds and usually applied to those conducting maintenance or the repair of equipment.
Successes