Commodore John Hazelwood (1726 – March 1, 1800) was an English-born American sea captain and naval officer who served in the Pennsylvania State Navy and Continental Navy during the American Revolutionary War. Born in England about 1726, he became a mariner and settled in Philadelphia early in life, married and had several children. Promoted to Commodore during the Philadelphia campaign, he also became commander of Fort Mifflin while it was under siege by the British. Throughout the campaign Hazelwood and George Washington were in frequent communication with letters.
During the weeks he spent engaging the Royal Navy on the Delaware River, Hazelwood innovated several naval tactics and played a major role in the development of riverine warfare in the United States. Recommended by Washington and his council, Hazelwood was chosen to lead a large fleet of American ships and riverboats up river to safety. For his bravery and distinguished service Congress awarded him with a ceremonial military sword, while the famous presidential artist Charles Willson Peale found Hazelwood worthy enough to paint his portrait. After the Revolution Hazelwood lived out his remaining years in Philadelphia.
Personal life
In the years before the American Revolution broke out Hazelwood served as a sea captain on various merchant vessels, most often shipping goods between Philadelphia and London. In 1772 he became one of the founders of the Saint George society of Philadelphia.History Central article: John Hazelwood Hazelwood married his first wife, Mary Edgar, who died in 1769 at age 36. In 1771 he married the widow Ester Leacock. His first and second marriage brought him five children. His first child, Thomas, by his first wife, became a captain in the Pennsylvania Navy during the Revolution. His son, John, was a lieutenant in an artillery company serving in the Pennsylvania Western Expedition in 1794. John Jr. died in action only weeks after his father's death in 1800 and was buried next to him. Hazelwood was a vestryman of Christ Church in Philadelphia from 1779 to 1783.Leach, 1902, p. 6
Naval career
A commissioned officer in the Pennsylvania Navy, Commodore Hazelwood commanded all naval vessels of the Pennsylvania and Continental navies on the Delaware River. In the years before the American Revolution he commanded a number of ships including the Susanna and Molly in 1753, the Greyhound in 1762, the Monckton in 1763, the Sally in 1771 and the Rebecca in 1774.Leach, 1902, p.1 The earliest known record of Hazelwood's service in the American Revolutionary War is 1775.Leach, 1902, p.2 Hazelwood was appointed supervisor of building and management of fire-vessels in December, 1775, and by October 1776 was promoted to Commodore in the Pennsylvania Navy.History Central, 2016
Early Revolution
During the Revolutionary War, Hazelwood played an important role in the planning of the various American river defenses. During the months prior to the British advance on Philadelphia he oversaw the development and construction of fire-vessels, which were used in conjunction with the many river obstructions, Cheval de frise, that were also developed for use in the Delaware River. The designs proved effective and in July, 1776, Hazelwood was immediately sent to Poughkeepsie, New York, (one among a committee of three) with orders to plan for and construct similar river obstructions to prevent British marine navigation on the upper Hudson River;
At the time Commodore John Barry was the senior navy captain in Philadelphia and the visible choice to command both the Pennsylvania and Continental navies, but command was given to Hazelwood, already in command of the Pennsylvania Navy.McGrath, 2015, pp. 165–166 Hazelwood was soon promoted to Commodore of both the Pennsylvania and Continental navies in the Delaware River some time in 1777 but the exact date is not known.
Hazelwood planned for and participated in the defense of the Delaware River approach to Philadelphia in 1777 before and during the Siege of Fort Mifflin, which lasted approximately three weeks. He was soon appointed to oversee the building of and command of fire rafts, which were used to prevent passage of ships bringing badly needed supplies to British troops in Philadelphia. In planning for the fort's defense the Committee of Safety authorized the construction of war-ships, a flotilla of fire-rafts, floating batteries and the construction of river obstacles which were floated into place and sank. Construction of ten fire-rafts reached completion by December 27 where Hazelwood was appointed commander of this fleet of rafts. In the following May the Committee of Safety selected Hazelwood "to survey the river from Billingsport to Fort Island and the East side across from the island.
Hazelwood was given a scouting assignment on September 19, with orders to move the American fleet to Darby Creek to observe British strength, vessels and activity at Chester. Various American rivercraft also engaged and harassed the British at various points along the river. In the process Hazelwood obtained much information about the British presence, which was copied and passed on to other commanders in the greater area.Dunnavent, 1998, p. 31
Philadelphia finally fell on September 26 and Vice Admiral Howe and the British army entered the city, however they were low on ammunition and supply and had not established a naval supply route along the heavily defended Delaware River. In the days that followed the British began fortifying the shore surrounding the city and at the mouth of the Schuylkill River, bringing in heavy guns and supplies. During October the American fleet engaged British naval vessels and gave support to American forts along the river. Hazelwood frequently ordered galleys to deter British ships away from Billingsport.Dunnavent, 1998, p. 35 Hazelwood's galleys kept up a disrupting fire while others patrolled the waters around Fort Mifflin. On October 9, Hazelwood's fleet of galleys attacked the British battery at Webb Ferry. Two days later, Hazelwood landed a body of militia on Carpenter's Island, assaulting the middle battery and capturing fifty men and two officers. A second assault on British batteries was attempted the next day but was met with heavy fire, causing the American vessels to withdraw after receiving heavy losses.Dorwart, 1998, pp. 36–38
On October 22 the British launched naval assaults on positions below the fort in concert with a ground assault on Fort Mercer. In a letter written on October 23, 1777 to Washington, a fatigued Hazelwood claimed that on that morning his fleet had driven the British fleet down river and forced one of its frigates ashore where the vessel accidentally exploded somehow. He reported also that his fleet was in need of reinforcements but maintained that he would not draw any men from the fort, as they were badly needed there.Hazelwood, Sparks, 1853, pp. 12–13 At this time the Marine Committee of Congress ordered Hazelwood and his second in command, Captain Charles Alexander, to take a small fleet of vessels and fire on British positions in and about Philadelphia. During the exchange of fire, the American frigate USS Delaware, commanded by Alexander, received heavy damage and was run aground where Alexander, his crew and ship were soon captured.Dorwart, 2008, p.144Dunnavent, 1998, pp. 31–33 When the tide had risen the Delaware was brought back to Philadelphia. On October 23, Hazelwood's gunboats and galleys maintained a harassing fire on British men-of-war trying to dismantle river obstructions. In the process the British ship of the line HMS Augusta, commanded by Francis Reynolds grounded and mysteriously caught fire and blew up. The sloop of war Merlin also grounded, forcing its crew to burn the vessel. On October 27 Washington advised Hazelwood that he should send a party to the waterfront at Philadelphia at night and burn the captured Delaware but Hazelwood thought the prospect too risky and declined.Dornwart, 1998, pp. 41–42
Though the capture of the Delaware was a major tactical loss, Hazelwood now realized that attacking British positions and vessels about Philadelphia with smaller vessels more suitable to river navigation was a feasible effort.Dunnavent, 1998, p. 37 During the weeks Hazelwood had engaged the British on the Delaware River he innovated and developed many naval riverine tactics and introduced the idea of small boat riverine warfare to the American navy.Dunnavent, 1998, p. 38 However, in the face of mounting British forces Hazelwood's fleet eventually proved too small to maintain an effectual fire while maintaining a defense for forts Mifflin and Mercer.
Siege of Fort Mifflin
Hazelwood played a major role in the American effort in keeping British ships from reaching Philadelphia by way of the Delaware River. In the months leading up to the British siege of Fort Mifflin Washington's headquarters at this time was located north of Philadelphia in Whitemarsh where he maintained frequent communication with Hazelwood, sending him reports, orders and advice.Fitzpatrick, 1933, v.9, numerous letters to Hazelwood at this time: See Table of Contents. Fort Mifflin, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Smith, was located on an island in the middle of this river and was a key point of defense for the Americans. The fortress, along with Fort Mercer on the east bank, were the only obstacles preventing the British naval access to Philadelphia. Vice Admiral Howe dispatched a message to Hazelwood requesting that he surrender the Pennsylvania fleet, allowing Howe and his fleet to control the Delaware Bay, where Hazelwood was allegedly promised a pardon from the King if he cooperated. Hazelwood refused the dubious offer, declaring that he would "defend the fleet to the last".Leach, 1902, pp. 3–4
The successful siege upon the stone and earthen fort required the prolonged bombardment by the fleet under the command of Admiral Howe, also involving land batteries, lasting from September 26 to November 16, 1777. The standoff and defense of the fort allowed time for Washington and the Continental Army to safely deploy for the Battle of White Marsh and its subsequent withdrawal to Valley Forge. Washington received warnings from Generals Porter and Lee, stationed on the Schuylkill River at Philadelphia, that the British were making communication runs across the river at night using small boats. In a letter of November 4, Washington advised Hazelwood to do all he could to stop the activity.Washington, Fitzpatrick (Ed), 1933, p. 9 Hazelwood's efforts to end the communications were a failure. Several days before the fall of the fort Washington dispatched another letter to Hazelwood inquiring about his status, urging that if at all possible to remain at his station with the fleet after the fort has fallen so as to hinder and prolong British operations long enough to allow the river to freeze over, preventing passage of supply ships into Philadelphia until the spring thaw.Washington, Fitzpatrick (Ed), 1933, pp. 59–60