The Swiss National Redoubt (; ; ; ) is a defensive plan developed by the Swiss government beginning in the 1880s to respond to foreign invasion. In the opening years of the Second World War the plan was expanded and refined to deal with a potential German invasion. The term "National Redoubt" primarily refers to the fortifications begun in the 1880s that secured the mountainous central part of Switzerland, providing a defended refuge for a retreating Swiss Army.
The National Redoubt encompassed a widely distributed set of fortifications on a general east–west line through the Alps, centering around the major fortress complexes of St. Maurice, St. Gotthard, and Sargans. These fortresses primarily defended the alpine crossings between Germany and Italy and were outside the industrialized and populated regions of Switzerland. These regions were defended by the "Border Line", and the "Army Position" somewhat farther back. While not intended as an impassable barrier, these lines contained significant fortifications, but the National Redoubt was planned as a nearly impregnable complex of fortifications that would deny an aggressor passage over or through the Alps by controlling the major mountain passes and railway tunnels running north-to-south through the region. This defensive line was intended to slow, or deter altogether, an invasion by denying Switzerland's crucial transportation infrastructure to an aggressor.
The plan did not intend to protect the majority of the Swiss population – only few would have found refuge and supplies in the alpine area of the Redoubt – and it also did not lend any protection to the industrial centres of Switzerland, which are located in the Swiss lowlands, the Swiss Plateau. Given that the German armed forces had shown little reluctance in subjecting the civilian population elsewhere to deportations, forced labor or even massacre, Axis invaders could have forced the Swiss government to a quick surrender.
The Swiss strategy assumed that the Axis powers would not have an alternative to the heavily defended alpine passes of Switzerland. Because of possible reprisals against Swiss civilians, British Field Marshal Montgomery judged the National Redoubt to be an “impractical absurdity”.
The National Redoubt has been the subject of debate in Swiss society, with many fortifications decommissioned by the early 21st century.
Swiss Alps
The concept of "réduit" is a recurring theme in Swiss defence theory. Having stayed neutral during World War II, Switzerland retained the concept for its plans of resistance against a potential Soviet invasion during the Cold War, when it became a strong influence on the Swiss concept of neutrality.
History Fortification of the Swiss alpine region began in the 1880s, shortly after the opening of the Gotthard railway. Forts similar to those of Belgian military engineer Henri Alexis Brialmont were built at Airolo, the Oberalp Pass, Furka Pass, and Grimsel Pass, all in the Central Alps. Additional positions were constructed in the area of Saint-Maurice, using mining and tunneling techniques in the steep mountainsides of the glacial valley.Kauffmann, p. 152
In the immediate aftermath of World War I, there was little Swiss interest in further fortifications. However, during the 1930s, as France built the Maginot Line from the Swiss border to the Belgian border and Czechoslovakia built the Czechoslovak border fortifications, Switzerland re-examined its fixed defenses. At the same time, job creation programs became desirable as a result of the worldwide Great Depression.Kauffmann, p. 153 Design work began in 1935, and in 1937 construction began on the expanded Alpine fortifications, the Border Line, and the Army line fortifications.Kauffmann, p. 154
Guisan plan General Henri Guisan developed a strategy for the defence of Switzerland that recognised its limited resources in equipment and manpower compared to its potential adversaries. Guisan proposed a delaying strategy in the broken terrain of the borders to keep an invading force out of the open country in the central plateau for as long as possible to allow an orderly retreat to the secured Alpine perimeter. Once the retreat to the Alps was complete, the Swiss government could remain in hiding for an extended time. Accordingly, border fortifications were improved, with major programs along the Rhine and at Vallorbe in the Jura. The strategic Alpine nodes of Saint-Maurice, Saint Gotthard, and Sargans were identified as the primary points of access to the Alpine redoubt for a potential aggressor. While Saint Gotthard and Saint-Maurice had been previously fortified, the area of Sargans was newly vulnerable because of a drainage program of former wetlands along the Rhine that would now provide easy access to the eastern Alpine gateway at Sargans.
World War II
Debate continued over the extent of the redoubt under the Guisan Plan. A proposal was developed by officers from German-speaking cantons, advocating a more compact redoubt. That was overcome by a proposal, authored by Guisan's chief of staff, Colonel Samuel Gonard, whose plan ratified the Saint-Maurice - Saint Gotthard - Sargans strategy, prefaced by a defence in depth. Additional impetus was provided by the fall of France in June 1940. Two days after the French surrender, on 23 June, the border zones were reduced in priority in favor of the "advanced position" or Army Line. The army was shifted to the center of the country, leaving industries and population centres relatively unprotected. The final Guisan Plan, adopted on 12 July 1940, defined an organised retreat to the Alps in which supplies would be stocked for an indefinite resistance with no thought of further retreat. On 25 July 1940, the Swiss defensive plan was disseminated dictating a fallback to the Alps in the event of an Axis attack, focusing in particular on the Gotthard massif and destroying all access points as necessary once inside.Kauffmann, p.159
The Redoubt strategy was emphasized on 24 May 1941. Until then, only about two thirds of the Swiss Army had been mobilized. After the swift overrunning of the Balkan countries by the Germans in April 1941, in which relatively-low mountains had proven to be little barrier to the mobile German forces, the entire Swiss army was mobilised. The Swiss, lacking a significant armored force, drew the conclusion that withdrawal to the redoubt was the only sound course. Any actions in the Central Plateau would be delaying actions only. The plan was revealed to the public after Switzerland was surrounded by German and Italian forces, with the so-called Rütli Report, a historic and highly-symbolic meeting of the Swiss Army staff and the entire officer corps at the founding site of the Swiss confederation. In case of attack, the Swiss would defend only the High Alps, including the important transalpine roads and rail links. As a last resort, the army would make the routes useless to the Axis by destroying key bridges and tunnels. The plan meant that the populated lowlands, including the economic centres of the country, would be effectively ceded to the Germans. The gold reserves of the Swiss National Bank in Zürich were moved farther away from the German border to the Gotthard Pass and Bern.National Defense Speeded by Swiss by C.L. Sulzberger in The New York Times, July 24, 1938. page 16.
The National Redoubt assumed great importance to the Swiss in 1940, when they were entirely surrounded by Axis powers and thus effectively at the mercy of Hitler and Mussolini. The National Redoubt was a way to preserve at least part of Swiss territory in the event of an invasion. The redoubt was to be manned by eight infantry divisions and three mountain brigades; the Swiss practiced for war by imitating the battles occurring around them. Switzerland's redoubt strategy during World War II was essentially one of deterrence. The idea was to make clear to Germany that an invasion would have a high cost. Simultaneously, economic concessions were made to Germany in the hope that the overall cost of a German invasion would be perceived to be higher than the potential benefits. However, it is clear that Hitler intended to invade eventually and that the Allied landing at Normandy and the difficulties faced in invading the Soviet Union were pivotal in merely delaying an invasion.Let's Swallow Switzerland by Klaus Urner (Lexington Books, 2002). Concessions included a national blackout and the destruction of a secret German radar system that had accidentally landed in Switzerland in exchange for a dozen aircraft.
In its invasion plan, Operation Tannenbaum, Germany planned to capture Geneva and Lucerne, and Italy would capture the Alps; both countries would then divide Switzerland.
Cold War Swiss policy during the Cold War adopted a more aggressive defence of the borders that relied less on a retreat to the mountains. While Switzerland was again surrounded by an alliance, NATO was not considered a threat to Swiss independence; the Warsaw Pact alliance however was considered a threat. The Swiss strategy sought to exact a high price from any direct ground attack on Swiss territory. Control of the Alpine crossings remained a cornerstone of the Swiss strategy of neutrality. The dense network of passive and active barriers and large and small fortifications allowed considerable flexibility in the disposition of Swiss forces and represented an almost-optimal scenario of defence in depth.
The strategic importance of the Alpine crossings had only increased since the Second World War, and any incursion by Warsaw Pact forces would require them to be taken or for terms for their use to be agreed upon to the satisfaction of Switzerland.
In 1953, Swiss policy was formalized to place greater emphasis on the defence of the borders and population centers and to extend the concept of defence in depth, pioneered in the redoubt, to the entire Swiss territory. That corresponded to an unspoken reliance on co-operation with NATO to secure the flanks of Swiss territory and to resupply Swiss forces, which already purchased equipment from members of NATO. The redoubt, with its determinedly-neutralist connotations, lost priority.
Many billions of francs have been invested in building the fortifications in the mountains, which are partly still used by the army. The most important buildings of the redoubt were the fortifications of Sargans, St. Maurice, and the Gotthard region. At the time, caverns in these areas were equipped with essential military infrastructure. Besides cannons and howitzers, the infrastructure consisted of dormitories, kitchens, field hospitals, rooms for the sick, bakeries, and enough space to accommodate 100 to 600 soldiers for up to several months. Because tensions between the West and the Soviet Union, which later fell, cooled down and bunkers became increasingly obsolete because of newer weapon systems, many of the buildings were closed after the Cold War, in the mid-to-late 1990s and the early 2000s. Some of them have been reopened as museums and can be visited.
The construction of enough civilian nuclear fallout shelters for the entire population was mandated in 1978. New apartment buildings were required to have them on site; others paid for the construction of shelters in common buildings or transport tunnels.Self Sabotage: The Swiss Strategy of Rigging Vital Infrastructure to ExplodeThe Secret Military Plans Switzerland Put In Place to Survive the Cold War
Comparison with contemporary projects