The Zgharta Liberation Army – ZLA (), also known as Zghartawi Liberation Army, was the paramilitary branch of the Lebanese Marada Movement during the Lebanese Civil War. The militia was formed in the late 1960s by the future President of Lebanon and za'im Suleiman Frangieh as the Marada Brigade (also translated as Mardaite Brigade (Arabic: Liwa' al-Marada) and was initially led by Suleiman Franjieh's son, Tony Frangieh, who held the command until his death in the June 1978 Ehden massacre. The ZLA operated mainly out of Tripoli and Zgharta, but it also fought in Beirut, Bsharri and Ehden, where they clashed with various Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) guerrilla factions and their allied leftist Muslim militias of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), as well as the rival Christian Kataeb Regulatory Forces (KRF) militia and its successor, the Lebanese Forces (LF).Katz, Russel, and Volstad, Armies in Lebanon 1982–84 (1985), p. 8.
Origins The Al-Marada's military wing was secretly formed in 1967, and at the outbreak of the war in April 1975, its fighters numbered just 700–800 men armed with obsolete firearms acquired on the black market.Makdisi and Sadaka, The Lebanese Civil War, 1975–1990 (2003), p. 44, Table 1: War Period Militias. They first came to light on 17 August 1970 in Beirut, when Tony Frangieh forced his way into the Parliament House leading a group of armed militiamen in order to secure his father's election to the Presidency – an illegal move that the Lebanese official authorities proved powerless to prevent.Bavly & Salpeter, Fire in Beirut: Israel's War in Lebanon with the PLO (1984), p. 51.
Political beliefs Often described as a Mafia-style gangster organization rather than a true political party, the Al-Marada/ZLA seems to have never devised a coherent program or adhered to a particular ideology. Although conservative in outlook, sharing with the other right-wing Christian parties similar viewpoints regarding the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) military presence in Lebanon and the preservation of the pre-war Christian-dominated political status quo, they were generally regarded as a corps of feudal retainers infamous for their brutality and corruption.Katz, Russel, and Volstad, Armies in Lebanon 1982–84 (1985), p. 7.
Military structure and organization Structured along semi-conventional lines into mechanized infantry, 'commando', signals, medical and military police branches, the ZLA had a distinct regional orientation,Rabinovich, The war for Lebanon (1989), pp. 66–68. since its military HQ was established at the small town of Ehden near Zgharta, where the latter residents spend the summer. While their membership and command structure was predominantly Maronite, they did included a number of Greek-Catholics and Greek-Orthodox into their ranks. They initially allied themselves with the other Christian rightist parties' militias – Kataeb Regulatory Forces (KRF), Tigers Militia, Guardians of the Cedars (GoC), Al-Tanzim, Lebanese Youth Movement (LYM), and Tyous Team of Commandos (TTC) –, operating mainly in and out of Tripoli, and other areas of northern Lebanon, being engaged mostly in fighting local Muslim militias,Rabinovich, The war for Lebanon (1989), pp. 66–68. but also fought in East Beirut.Collelo, Lebanon: a country study (1989), p. 240. Thanks to the secret support provided by the Lebanese Army,Tony Badran, Lebanon's Militia Wars in Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis (2009), p. 40. by January 1976 the Frangieh-controlled militia ranks had swollen to 2,400 troops, a total comprising 800 full-time fighters and 1,500 irregulars. At its height in the late 1970s, the Al-Marada mustered some 3,500 men and women equipped with modern small-arms.Library of Congress: APPENDIX B - Lebanon
List of Marada military commanders Tony Frangieh (1967–1978) Robert Frangieh (1978–1982) Suleiman Frangieh Jr. (1982–1990)
Administrative organization and illegal activities The Frangieh clan established in 1978 their own fief in the northern Lebanon, the so-called 'Northern Canton', which comprised the districts of Tripoli, Koura, Zgharta, Bsharri and parts of Batroun. The Canton was run by the Al-Marada's own civil administration of 80 public servants, who were also entrusted of running the militia's own television and radio service, "The Voice of the Marada" (Arabic: عزة صوت المرادة | Iza'at Sawt al-Marada) or "La Voix des Maradah" in French, by hijacking the television and radio signals emitted by the government-owned station at Fih in the Koura District, sending pirate broadcasts.Traboulsi, Identités et solidarités croisées dans les conflits du Liban contemporain; Chapitre 12: L'économie politique des milices: le phénomène mafieux (2007), parte III.
Initially funded by Suleiman Frangieh's own personal fortune, the Al-Marada/ZLA also resorted to racketeering, with additional revenues being generated by the illegal ports of Chekka – Lebanon's industrial hub at the time – and Selaata, both located in the Batroun District, which were used for contraband of arms, agricultural goods and industrial products, drug-trafficking, and barratry. They also levied tolls on the transit trade of agricultural products and other goods at a number of in-land checkpoints, such as Madfoun in the Batroun District.Traboulsi, Identités et solidarités croisées dans les conflits du Liban contemporain; Chapitre 12: L'économie politique des milices: le phénomène mafieux (2007), parte III.
The ZLA in the Lebanese Civil War Early stages and expansion 1975–78 The small ZLA entered the civil war only in July 1975, in response to a series of attacks in the Sunni Muslim-dominated northern port city of Tripoli on shops and offices owned by Christians from Zgharta by local Muslim militias.Weinberger, Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: The 1975–76 Civil War (1986), pp. 157–158. On 28 August 1975, the ZLA clashed again at Tripoli with the local Sunni militias, but also at Zahlé with the local Greek-Catholic Zahliote Group (ZG) militia, despite the intervention of Lebanese Army troops in a vain attempt to curb the fighting.Hokayem, L'armée libanaise pendant la guerre: un instrument du pouvoir du président de la République (1975-1985) (2012), p. 20. In October that year, ZLA militiamen were heavily committed in the Battle of the Hotels in Beirut, though later on 14 January 1976 they were rushed to defend Zgharta, which was besieged by PLO – Lebanese National Movement (LNM) forces in retaliation for the fall of the Palestinian refugee camp of Dbayeh in the hands of the Lebanese Front's Christian militias earlier that same day.Hokayem, L'armée libanaise pendant la guerre: un instrument du pouvoir du président de la République (1975-1985) (2012), p. 21. Deployed again to Beirut in March 1976, they assisted the hard-pressed Republican Guard battalion in the defense of the Presidential Palace in the Baabda District from a two-pronged combined PLO – LNM – Lebanese Arab Army (LAA) assault, though prior to the attack President Suleiman Frangieh had decamped to the safety of Zouk Mikael, near Jounieh, and later to Kfour in the Keserwan District.O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), pp. 46-47.Hokayem, L'armée libanaise pendant la guerre: un instrument du pouvoir du président de la République (1975–1985) (2012), p. 30.
Despite having joined in January 1976 the Lebanese Front alliance that gathered the main rightist Christian parties and their militias, the Frangiehs close ties to Syria (Suleiman was a personal friend of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad), along with their bitter political squabbling with the Gemayel clan – leaders of the Kataeb Party or 'Phalange' – and their disagreements with the other Christian leaders over their tactical alliance with Israel, prompted them to break from the Lebanese Front in 1977, an act that would ultimately led to the tragic events of the following year.Tony Badran, Lebanon's Militia Wars in Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis (2009), p. 41.
The later years 1979–1990
On June 7, 1978, six Marada militiamen assassinated the Kataeb party leader Joud el Bayeh who represented the party in Zgharta and wanted to open an office in the region. This would bring about retaliation as the Lebanese Forces would respond with an attack on Ehden where Tony Frangieh commanded his militia from. After Tony Frangieh was killed in the Ehden massacre perpetrated by the Lebanese Forces (LF) in June 1978,Bavly & Salpeter, Fire in Beirut: Israel's War in Lebanon with the PLO (1984), p. 53.Katz, Russel, and Volstad, Armies in Lebanon 1982–84 (1985), p. 8.Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), p. 55.Collelo, Lebanon: a country study (1989), p. 240.O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 79.Tony Badran, Lebanon's Militia Wars in Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis (2009), p. 41. he was replaced in the militia's command by his younger brother Robert Frangieh, later succeeded by his nephew Suleiman Frangieh Jr. in 1982.
In the months immediately after the Ehden killings, the Frangiehs were not only able to prevent the ZLA from being totally destroyed or absorbed into the Lebanese Forces, but also succeeded in ruthlessly driving the latter out of the Koura District by the end of the 1970s, kidnapping or slaughtering nearly 100 Phalange' members and forcing the remaining 25,000 to either flee the region or go underground.Mardelli, Middle East Perspectives: From Lebanon (2012), p. 390. It has also been suspected that the Al-Marada/ZLA were behind the assassinations of Bashir Gemayel's infant daughter and bodyguards by a car bomb explosion in February 1979Katz, Russel, and Volstad, Armies in Lebanon 1982–84 (1985), p. 8. and later of Bashir himself in September 1982, although the degree of involvement of the Zgharta-based militia on any of these attacks remains unclear. After 1978, the Frangiehs switched their allegiance to the LNM camp and then to Syria, even lending their support to Syrian Army units at east Beirut against the Christian militias and the Army of Free Lebanon (AFL) during the Hundred Days' War. They joined in July 1983 the Lebanese National Salvation Front (LNSF), subsequently supporting in 1988–1990 the Syrian-sponsored Taif Agreement and the parliament-based provisional government of Sunni Prime-Minister Selim Al-Hoss against General Michel Aoun's Maronite-dominated military interim government.
Pushed to the sidelines for the rest of the civil war, the Al-Marada/ZLA was able to remain active thanks to Syrian support and although its numbers dwindled to 1,600 fighters by the mid-1980s, the Al-Marada managed to hold on to the 'Northern Canton'. On July 11, 1984, the Al-Marada/ZLA clashed with the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) militia forces for the control of the Christian villages of Kousba, Kfaraakka, Bsarma, Dahr-al-Ain and several others in the Koura District, with the ZLA eventually managing to drive out the SSNP and assert their dominance over the entire region until the end of the war. It was also alleged that they received the tacit backing from a contingent of unspecified number from the 1,700 men-strong Lebanese Army's Seventh Brigade stationed at Byblos, being regarded as loyal to former president Suleiman Frangieh.Collelo, Lebanon: a country study (1989), pp. 223–224.
Controversy Ruthless fighters with a reputation for racketeering and brutality, the Marada themselves were not above committing sectarian violence against other Christians (and not just Muslims), a trait they manifested in the early years of the civil war.