Convoy PQ 15 (26 April – 5 May 1942) was an Arctic convoy sent from Iceland by the Western Allies to aid the Soviet Union (USSR) during the Second World War. The convoy sailed on 26 April 1942, escorted by the western local escort and rendezvoused with the ocean escort on 28 April. The convoy sailed unknown to the Germans until around midnight on 30 April/1 May when it was spotted by a German reconnaissance aircraft when about south-west of (Bear Island).
Six Junkers Ju 88 bombers attacked the convoy and lost one aircraft for no result. On 2 May the convoy escorts depth-charged a U-boat that turned out to be the Polish submarine , five of the crew being killed and six wounded before the mistake was recognised. The submarine was about outside its patrol zone after not gaining a positional fix for a week due to the weather.
On 1 May, about off Iceland, to the west,, the heavy cover of the Home Fleet and the US Navy Task Force 99, ran into fog and the destroyer received the signal to cease zig-zagging too late. The destroyer was hit amidships by the battleship , cut in two and sunk, 49 of the crew being killed and 206 survivors being rescued. On 3 May the convoy was surprised by six Heinkel He 111 torpedo-bombers that flew below radar cover and sank three ships for the loss of three bombers, a loss of of shipping, there being 137 survivors.
On 4 May, the eastern local escort of two Soviet destroyers, two patrol ships and three British minesweepers arrived, the ships and U-boats skirmishing for no result. The last air attack, by Junkers Ju 88 bombers, near-missed for the loss of one bomber. The convoy arrived at Murmansk having lost three ships to air and U-boat attacks on 5 May. A big German effort against the reciprocal Convoy QP 11 contributed to the relatively untroubled progress of the convoy, despite being laden with supplies for the USSR.
Background
Lend-lease
After Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the USSR, began on 22 June 1941, Britain and USSR signed an agreement in July that they would "render each other assistance and support of all kinds in the present war against Hitlerite Germany". Before September 1941 the British had dispatched 450 aircraft, of rubber, 3,000,000 pairs of boots and stocks of tin, aluminium, jute, lead and wool. In September British and US representatives travelled to Moscow to study Soviet requirements and their ability to meet them. The representatives of the three countries drew up a protocol in October 1941 to last until June 1942 and to agree new protocols to operate from 1 July to 30 June of each following year until the end of Lend-Lease. The protocol listed supplies, monthly rates of delivery and totals for the period.
The first protocol specified the supplies to be sent but not the ships to move them. The USSR turned out to lack the ships and escorts and the British and Americans, who had made a commitment to "help with the delivery", undertook to deliver the supplies for want of an alternative. The main Soviet need in 1941 was military equipment to replace losses because, at the time of the negotiations, two large aircraft factories were being moved east from Leningrad and two more from Ukraine. It would take at least eight months to resume production, until when, aircraft output would fall from 80 to 30 aircraft per day. Britain and the US undertook to send 400 aircraft a month, at a ratio of three bombers to one fighter (later reversed), 500 tanks a month and 300 Bren gun carriers. The Anglo-Americans also undertook to send of aluminium and 3, 862 machine tools, along with sundry raw materials, food and medical supplies.
British grand strategy The growing German air strength in Norway and increasing losses to convoys and their escorts, led Rear-Admiral Stuart Bonham Carter, commander of the 18th Cruiser Squadron, Admiral sir John Tovey, Commander in Chief Home Fleet and Admiral Sir Dudley Pound the First Sea Lord, the professional head of the Royal Navy, unanimously to advocate the suspension of Arctic convoys during the summer months. The small number of Russian ships available to meet Arctic convoys, losses inflicted by based in Norway and the presence of the German battleship in Norway from early 1942, had led to a large number of ships full of supplies to Russia becoming stranded at the west end and empty and damaged ships waiting at the east end.
Despite the views of the Navy, Churchill came under pressure from the president of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, bowed to political reality and ordered the dispatch of a larger convoy to reduce the backlog,
Convoy PQ 13 had been the first convoy to suffer serious casualties, five ships being sunk by submarines, aircraft and surface ships. Tovey asked the Russians for more submarine patrols in the Barents Sea and more destroyer escorts for the final leg of the convoys. More escorts were diverted from Western Approaches Command to increase the close escort to about ten vessels. Bomber Command had sent 33 Halifax heavy bombers to attack Tirpitz on 31 March in exceedingly poor weather, through which few aircraft managed to bomb. No hits were obtained and five of the Halifaxes were shot down. Convoy PQ 14 was considerably larger than earlier convoys.
Signals intelligence
Ultra
The British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based at Bletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers and traffic analysts that intercepted and decoded German naval transmissions. By June 1941, the German Enigma machine Home Waters () settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed but German ships and the U-boats in Arctic waters continued with the older ( from 1942, code-named Dolphin by the British). By mid-1941, British Y-stations were able to read wireless telegraphy (W/T) transmissions and give advance warning of Luftwaffe operations. In 1941, interception parties (code-named Headaches) embarked on warships. Enigma decrypts were used twice to tell Convoy PQ 14 that the big German ships had not sailed.
B-Dienst
The rival German (, Observation Service) of the (MND, Naval Intelligence Service) had broken several Admiralty codes and cyphers by 1939, which were used to help Kriegsmarine ships elude British forces and provide opportunities for surprise attacks. From June to August 1940, six British submarines were sunk in the Skaggerak using information gleaned from British wireless signals. In 1941, read signals from the Commander in Chief Western Approaches informing convoys of areas patrolled by U-boats, enabling the submarines to move into "safe" zones. had broken Naval Cypher No 3 in February 1942 and by March was reading up to 80 per cent of the traffic, which continued until 15 December 1943. By coincidence, the British lost access to the Shark cypher and had no information to send in Cypher No 3 which might compromise Ultra.
Two U-boats were based in Norway in July 1941, four in September, five in December and two in January 1942, seven in February, nine in March and one in April, 23 boats in all, a number maintained for the rest of the year. Hitler contemplated establishing a unified command but decided against it. The German battleship arrived at Trondheim on 16 January, the first ship of a general move of surface ships to Norway. British convoys to Russia had received little attention in 1941, since they averaged only eight ships each and the long Arctic winter nights negated even the limited reconnaissance effort that was available.
had arrived at Trondheim on 16 January, followed on 23 February by the cruisers and . On 21 March the cruiser arrived and on 26 May joined the flotilla. The transfer of more U-boats to Norway in 1942 along with the ships allowed the to contemplate more ambitious operations against Arctic convoys. In May, despite the increased number of aircraft available to 5, (MGK ) was sceptical of the ability to find the British distant escorts, despite the better weather at this time of year, because of the area of sea to be covered. Knowledge of the British dispositions was necessary if the big German ships were to be risked against a convoy.
In March 1942, Adolf Hitler issued a directive for a greater anti-convoy effort to weaken the Red Army and prevent Allied troops being transferred to northern Russia, preparatory to a landing on the coast of northern Norway. ( Hans-Jürgen Stumpff) was to be reinforced and the was ordered to put an end to Arctic convoys and naval incursions. The Luftwaffe and were to work together with a simplified command structure, which was implemented after a conference; the Navy had preferred joint command but the Luftwaffe insisted on the exchange of liaison officers. was to be reinforced by 2./Kampfgeschwader 30 (KG 30) which was to increase its readiness for operations. A squadron of (Aufkl.Fl.Gr. 125) was transferred to Norway and more long-range Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Kondor patrol aircraft from Kampfgeschwader 40 (KG 40) were sent from France. At the end of March, the air fleet was divided. [ Alexander Holle], the largest command, was based at Kirkenes with 2./JG 5, 10.(Z)/JG 5, 1./StG 5 (Dive Bomber Wing 5) and 1. 124 [1./(F) 124] (1 Squadron, Long Range Reconnaissance Wing 124) charged with attacks on Murmansk and Archangelsk as well as attacks on convoys.
Part of was based at Petsamo (5./JG 5, 6./JG 5 and 3./Kampfgeschwader 26 (3./KG 26), Banak (2./KG 30, 3./KG 30 and 1./(F) 22) and Billefjord (1./Kü.Fl.Gr. 125). ( Hans Roth) was based at Bardufoss but had no permanently attached units, which were added according to events. At the start of the anti-shipping campaign only the coastal patrol squadrons 3./ 906 at Trondheim and 1./1./Kü.Fl.Gr. 123 at Tromsø were attached to . was based at Sola and was responsible for the early detection of convoys and attacks south of a line from Trondheim westwards to Shetland and Iceland, with 1./(F) 22, the of 1./KG 40, short-range coastal reconnaissance squadrons 1./ 406 (1./Kü.Fl.Gr. 406), 2./ 406 (2./Kü.Fl.Gr. 406) and a weather reconnaissance squadron.
Luftwaffe tactics As soon as information was received about the assembly of a convoy, would send long-range reconnaissance aircraft to search Iceland and northern Scotland. Once a convoy was spotted aircraft were to keep contact as far as possible in the extreme weather of the area. If contact was lost its course at the last sighting would be extrapolated and overlapping sorties would be flown to regain contact. All three were to co-operate as the convoy moved through their operational areas. would begin the anti-convoy operation west of a line from the North Cape to Spitzbergen Island, whence would take over further eastwards, using his and 's aircraft, which would fly to Kirkenes or Petsamo to stay in range. was not allowed to divert aircraft to ground support during the operation. As soon as the convoy came into range, the aircraft were to keep up a continuous attack until the convoy docked at Murmansk or Arkhangelsk.
Air-sea rescue
The Luftwaffe Sea Rescue Service () along with the , the Norwegian Society for Sea Rescue (RS) and ships on passage, recovered aircrew and shipwrecked sailors. The service comprised at Stavanger covering Stavanger, Bergen and Trondheim and at Kirkenes for Tromsø, Billefjord and Kirkenes. Co-operation was as important in rescues as it was in anti-shipping operations if people were to be saved before they succumbed to the climate and severe weather. The sea rescue aircraft comprised Heinkel He 59 floatplanes, Dornier Do 18 and Dornier Do 24 seaplanes.