The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (), referred to as the Hamas Covenant or Hamas Charter, was issued by Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement) on 18 August 1988 and outlines the organization's founding identity, positions, and aims. In 2017, Hamas unveiled a revised charter, without explicitly revoking the 1988 charter.
The original Charter identified Hamas as the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine and described its members to be god-fearing Muslims raising the banner of Jihad (armed struggle) in "the face of the oppressors". The 1988 charter defines the struggle to be against the Jews and calls for the eventual creation of an Islamic Palestinian state in all of former Mandatory Palestine, and the obliteration or dissolution of Israel.The Palestinian Hamas By Shaul Mishal, Avraham Sela. Google Books. Retrieved 9 February 2009. The charter has been criticized for its use of antisemitic language, which some commentators have characterized as incitement to genocide, with the charter explicitly calling for the killing of Jews. Hamas's 2017 charter removed explicitly antisemitic language and stated Hamas's struggle is with Zionists, not Jews. Multiple sources:
Since choosing to run candidates for office in elections, Hamas has downplayed the role of its charter. In direct contradiction of the Charter, in 2008 Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh stated that Hamas would agree to accept a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, and to offer a long-term truce with Israel."Haniyeh: Hamas willing to accept Palestinian state with 1967 borders ". Haaretz. (09-11-08) Retrieved 27 May 2011. In 2010, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal stated that the Charter is "a piece of history and no longer relevant, but cannot be changed for internal reasons".Mazin Qumsiyeh on the History and Practice Of Nonviolent Palestinian Resistance Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, May–June 2010, pp. 40-42. Meshaal also stated that Hamas was ending its association with the Muslim Brotherhood. The 2017 charter accepts a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, though it maintains Hamas's refusal to recognize Israel.
Background In 1987, twenty years after the Six-Day War, the First Intifada (1987–1993) began as a resistance of Israeli Occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. A popular uprising, the First Intifada was led by multiple groups including Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). After receiving official recognition as the de facto government, the PLO began to seek a negotiated solution with Israel in the form of a two-state solution. A two-state solution was deemed unacceptable to Hamas, the Palestinian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the charter was written to fill the ideological gap between the PLO and Muslim Brotherhood supporters.The Palestinian Hamas: vision, violence, and coexistence Shaul Mishal, Avraham Sela. According to Hamas's Deputy Foreign Minister Dr. Ahmed Yousef, the Charter "was ratified during the unique circumstances of the Uprising in 1988 as a necessary framework for dealing with a relentless occupation".Hamas Charter: Vision, Fact and Fiction Palestine Chronicle (23 January 2011)Retrieved 27 May 2011 However, where the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology proposed a universal Islamist vision, Hamas's charter sought to narrow its focus on Palestinian nationalism and a strategy of armed struggle, or violent jihad."So while al-Qaeda and Hamas have similar ideological roots, Hamas's interpretation of its role in the Islamic community is narrower and focused fundamentally on the Palestinian question. This narrow focus is an important element in Hamas's ideology."
While the PLO was nationalistic, its ideology was considerably more secular in nature compared to Hamas. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas subscribed to a neo-Salafi jihadi theology that sought national liberation by violence as permitted by divine decree."The text of the Charter is written in utterly religious and ideological language, starting off with a quotation from the Quran and from the founder of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna."
"In article 11 of the Charter we can find Hamas's argument that the right of the Palestinians to their homeland is a divine decree..." The PLO Charters of 1964 and 1968 and the Hamas Charter of 1988 By Philipp Holtmann While its language was far more religious, its political goals were identical to those of the PLO's charter and called for an armed struggle to retrieve the entire land of Palestine as an Islamic waqf.
The original charter's tone and portrayal of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a front in an eternal struggle between Muslims and Jews has been an obstacle for the organization's involvement in diplomatic forums involving Western nations. The updated charter published in 2017 walked back many of these assertions while adding questions regarding the ability of Fatah and its leader Mahmoud Abbas to act as the sole legitimate representative for the Palestinians. In addition, the 2017 charter removed many references to the Muslim Brotherhood as the ties had damaged the group's relationship with Egypt, as the government considers the group to be a terrorist organization.
Relevance of the charter to Hamas' policy Scholars have debated how relevant the 1988 charter was to Hamas' policies.
1987–1993 In 1987–88, during the initial phase of the First Intifada, the 1988 Hamas Charter was written by one older Hamas leader and ratified by Hamas in a slight hurry, as instrument to "maintain the momentum" of the newly risen Palestinian "resistance generation", giving them broad strokes direction, partly expressed in religious Islamic and partly in political terminology; thus the explanation of the charter’s origins and purpose, given by Ahmed Yousef, former senior Political Adviser to Prime Minister Haniyeh, in 2011. The charter, Yousef further added, in those early days reflected the views of the Elders in the face of a "relentless occupation". The details of its religious and political language had not been examined within the framework of international law, and an internal committee review to amend it was shelved out of concern not to offer concessions to Israel on a silver platter, as Fatah had done in the Oslo Accords (1993–95).; page 41
1994–2005 Dutch researcher Floor Janssen compared the 1988 charter (and other documents from that period) to Hamas's documents dated 1994-2005. Janssen found a significant shift in Hamas positions from 1988 to 1994-2005: In contrast to 1988, Hamas no longer referred to the enemy as "Jews" Hamas began introducing its positions on a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (a likely consequence of the Oslo Accords), including its offer of a long-term ceasefire or hudna and its openness to negotiations with Israel on its own terms Hamas retained its goal of "liberating" Palestine in its entirety
2005 until 2010 In January 2006, Hamas took part for the first time in elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council. This implied writing an electoral program in March 2005 and, after winning those elections, writing a government program in March 2006. Both programs have generally been perceived as more pragmatic and flexible (not mentioning Hamas’ claim to all of mandatory Palestine but just claiming sovereignty for the Palestinian territories), and 'de-emphasizing' Islam, compared to the 1988 charter. Page 115. Page 677.
The contrast of those 2005–2006 documents with the 1988 charter raised discussions in Palestine and elsewhere, about whether Hamas had changed its objectives and about how valid their original 1988 charter still was. Khaled Hroub, Palestinian academic, argued (2006) that those 2005–2006 documents "represent (...) an evolution in Hamas’s political thinking toward pragmatism" and that Hamas had "genuinely" changed, but conceded that probably many were still highly skeptical about that idea. Mahmoud al-Zahar, co-founder of Hamas and Foreign Minister of the Palestinian Authority from 2006 until 2007, on the contrary stated in 2006 that Hamas "will not change a single word in its covenant". Similarly, in 2007, Mousa Abu Marzook, Deputy Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, stated that the 1988 charter could not be altered because it would look like a compromise not acceptable to the 'street' and risk fracturing the party's unity.
In 2009, Paul Scham and Osama Abu-Irshaid wrote: Indeed, judging from the organization’s lack of reference to the charter and from the statements since made by Hamas’s leaders, the charter does not appear to be a major influence on Hamas’s actions.
In 2010, Mahmoud al-Zahar, co-founder of Hamas, again indirectly defended the 1988 charter, saying: "Our ultimate plan is [to have] Palestine in its entirety." Yet, at the same time, Hamas offered to negotiate with Israel on the basis of the 1967 borders, indicating a willingness to set aside the refugees issue until some future undetermined date. Thus while Hamas had, at this time, not repudiated the 1988 charter, it was evolving away from it at a rapid pace.
Also in 2010, in a discussion with U.S. Professor Robert Pastor, Hamas leader Khaled Mashal voiced a different perspective: the Charter is "a piece of history and no longer relevant, but cannot be changed for internal reasons". This answer prompted Professor Pastor to surmise that the Quartet on the Middle East (U.S., EU, UN, Russia) deliberately kept referring to the Hamas 1988 Charter instead of to more recent Hamas statements, to have an excuse to ignore and not seriously deal with Hamas.
2011 until 2016 Ahmed Yousef, former Political Adviser to Prime Minister Haniyeh, in January 2011 stated that the 1988 charter must not be read as "a constitution drafted as law" and not any longer be interpreted literally: the Hamas movement "has moved on" from the charter’s content, "accepting a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and publicly declaring a readiness to explore political solutions", Yousef argued. In May 2011, Mahmoud al-Zahar, co-founder of Hamas, on the contrary, again stressed and explained why Hamas would and could not “recognize” Israel: such a move would counter Hamas' aim to liberate all of Palestine, and deprive future Palestinian generations of the possibility to “liberate” their lands.'Hamas Accepts 1967 Borders, but Will Never Recognize Israel, Top Official Says’. Haaretz, 11 May 2011. Retrieved 26 January 2024.
A young Hamas analyst stated in 2015: Fatah in the process of the Oslo Accords (1993–95) had changed its charter (towards nonviolence) but received very little in return; therefore, Hamas' most militant elements around 2015 were very reluctant about the then-current process within Hamas to moderate their own charter towards a less martial rhetoric.Matthew Duss, 'Remember Gaza? ,' Tablet Magazine May 8, 2015. Similarly, American political scientist Richard Davis analysed in 2016 that the Hamas leadership felt opposite pressures from two sides: international powers urged Hamas to dismiss the relevance of their charter, while the Palestinian domestic constituency dissuaded the Hamas leaders from rewriting their charter.
Since 2017 The day after Khaled Mashal, Chairman of Hamas' Political Bureau, on 1 May 2017 had presented a new “political document” (often referred to as ‘new charter’), he was asked: "Will it replace Hamas’ old charter?" Mashal answered: This "new document has been in the making for four years (...) This document reflects our position for now (...) The old charter was a product of its era, 30 years ago. We live in a different world today". Other Hamas leaders since then have repeated Mashal's message: the old Charter should be viewed as "a historical document and part of an earlier stage in [Hamas's] evolution".
Summary of the 1988 charter Article 1 describes Hamas as an Islamic Resistance Movement with an ideological programme of Islam.