The sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse was a naval engagement in World War II, as part of the war in the Pacific, that took place on 10 December 1941 in the South China Sea off the east coast of the British colonies of Malaya (present-day Malaysia) and the Straits Settlements (present-day Singapore and its coastal towns), east of Kuantan, Pahang. Part of a British naval squadron known as Force Z, the Royal Navy battleship and battlecruiser were sunk by land-based bombers and torpedo bombers of the Imperial Japanese Navy. In Japan, the engagement was referred to as the .
The objective of Force Z, which consisted of one battleship, one battlecruiser and four destroyers, was to intercept the Japanese invasion fleet in the South China Sea north of Malaya. The task force sailed without air support. Although the British had a close encounter with Japanese heavy surface units, the force failed to find and destroy the main convoy. On their return to Singapore they were attacked in open waters and sunk by long-range torpedo bombers. The commander of Force Z, Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, maintained radio silence until an alert was sent (by the Repulse) one hour after the first Japanese attack.
With the attack on Pearl Harbor only two days earlier, on the other side of the International Date Line, the Malayan engagement illustrated the effectiveness of aerial attacks against even the heaviest of naval assets if they were without air cover. This added to the importance for the Allies of the three United States Navy aircraft carriers in the Pacific: , , and . The sinking of the two ships severely weakened the British Eastern Fleet in Singapore, and the Japanese fleet was engaged only by submarines until the Battle off Endau on 27 January 1942. Singapore itself fell to the Japanese on 15 February, leading to the largest surrender in British history.
Background
In meetings on 17 and 20 October, the British Defence Committee formally discussed Far East naval reinforcement in response to the fall of the Konoe government on 16 October. In agreement with August–September assessment of Japanese intentions, Winston Churchill and his cabinet favoured the deployment of a modern battleship for deterrent effect. The Royal Navy, as part of its offensive strategy, planned to send the and s to Singapore, but the Nelsons could not deploy. was damaged in the Mediterranean Sea in late-September.Boyd: page 281 Crew leave prevented from deploying until mid-December, and a gun refit scheduled from February to May 1942 was required before she could conduct further operations. With working up, the earliest either could reach the Far East was August 1942. The was, aside from the Revenges, the only worked-up battleship that could sail east before Spring 1942.Boyd: page 295 On 20 October, the Committee decided to send Prince of Wales to Cape Town, South Africa.Boyd: page 297 Once at Cape Town, a review would decide whether to send the ship onward to Singapore;Mahoney and Middlebrook: chapter 3 this would keep Prince of Wales available to respond to an emergency in home waters.Boyd: page 311
In December 1941, as a deterrent to Japanese territorial expansion which was recently demonstrated by the invasion of French Indochina, it was proposed that a force of Royal Navy warships be dispatched to the Far East with a view to providing reinforcement for Britain's possessions there, most notably Singapore. First Sea Lord Sir Dudley Pound represented that Singapore could be adequately defended only if the Royal Navy sent the majority of its capital ships there, to achieve parity with an estimated force of nine Japanese battleships. However, dispatching such a large British force was impractical as the British were at war with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy much closer to home. Nevertheless, Churchill appeared optimistic about the improving situation in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean; he advocated sending two capital ships along with an aircraft carrier to defend Malaya, Borneo and the Straits Settlements.
Churchill has been criticised for showing "considerable ignorance" and holding an "exaggerated belief in the power of the battleship," along with "a tendency to interfere in naval matters."Stephen, p. 102. This may have led him to propose a squadron of three modern ships: one battleship, one battlecruiser, and one carrier.Stephen, p. 104. His view was that using the Ultra decrypts that would give Japanese ship locations to the British, they could then use their own ships to form a "fleet in being" to deter Japanese action, as the , sister to the lost , was in the North Sea. However, there was no firm plan for such a task. The revised British proposal allocated the Prince of Wales, the veteran , and the for air cover, though the plan had to be revised when Indomitable ran aground in the Caribbean Sea.Stephen, p. 107.
The dispatch of capital ships to Singapore had been part of the Admiralty's strategic planning since the naval base had been expanded and fortified beginning in the early 1920s. The scale of this planned deployment had been reduced during the 1930s, since Germany and Italy presented new threats to British interests in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Nevertheless, it was still assumed that a significant force of capital ships would deter Japanese expansion. Churchill's plan presumedWillmott, H. P. Barrier and the Javelin (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1983). that the United States would agree to send its Pacific Fleet, including eight battleships, to Singapore in the event of hostilities with Japan, or that the British force would add to the deterrent value of the US fleet, should it stay at Pearl Harbor.Alan Matthews, 2006, "The sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse" (Force Z Survivors Association) . Access date: 13 October 2007. Admiral of the Home Fleet Sir John Tovey was opposed to sending any of the new King George V battleships as he believed that they were not suited to operating in tropical waters. Indeed the humid climate of Malaya would negatively affect the capabilities of the Prince of Wales, such as the breakdown of her surface search radars, deterioration of her anti-aircraft ammunition, and increased crew fatigue due to the lack of air conditioning.
Deployment
Force G, consisting of the modern battleship Prince of Wales, the First World War era battlecruiser Repulse, and the four destroyers HMS , , and , arrived at Singapore on 2 December 1941. They were then re-designated Force Z.
The new aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable was allocated to Force G, but whilst working up off Jamaica, she had run aground in the entrance to Kingston harbour on 3 November 1941.Martin Middlebrook & Patrick Mahoney, Battleship; The Loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, Penguin History, 1979, . Indomitable required 12 days of dry dock repairs in Norfolk, Virginia, and was not able to take part in the action. Indomitable carried one squadron each of Fairey Fulmars and Hawker Sea Hurricanes. Another aircraft carrier, (which was with Prince of Wales at Cape Town), was on passage to Singapore to join Force Z, but was not deployed due to lack of speed.
On 1 December, it was announced that Sir Tom Phillips had been promoted to full admiral and appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Fleet. A few days later, Repulse left for Australia with and , but the force was recalled to Singapore to assemble for possible operations against the Japanese.
Also at Singapore were the light cruisers HMS , , and , and the destroyers , Encounter and Jupiter. The heavy cruiser , Dutch light cruiser , two more British destroyers ( and ), and four United States Navy destroyers (, , and ) would be there within three days.
Although Durban and Stronghold were available, Admiral Phillips decided to leave them at Singapore because they were not as fast as the other ships. Additionally, Danae, Dragon, Mauritius, Encounter and Jupiter were also at Singapore, but were under repair and not ready to sail.
Japanese preparations Churchill publicly announced Prince of Wales and Repulse were being sent to Singapore to deter the Japanese. In response, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto sent 36 Mitsubishi G4M bombers to reinforce the existing Mitsubishi G3M-equipped Kanoya Air Group and Genzan Air Group, whose pilots began training for an attack on the two capital ships. The bomber crews, of the Kanoya Air Group of Kanoya Kōkūtai (751 Ku), Genzan Air Group of Genzan Kōkūtai (753 Ku), and the Mihoro Air Group of Mihoro Kōkūtai (701 Ku), trained in torpedo attacks at an altitude of less than 10 metres (30 ft), and in long-range over-ocean navigation, so they could attack naval targets moving quickly at sea. Genzan Air Group was commanded by Lt Cdr Niichi Nakanishi, Kanoya Air Group by Lt Cdr Shichizo Miyauchi and Mihoro Air Group by Lt Hachiro Shoji. This was the first time in the war that a force of bombers was specially trained and equipped for "ship killing", an unprecedented capacity, as around that time ordinary land-based bombers (particularly the Mediterranean theatre) had attacked ships at sea with limited success.
Hostilities commence
On 8 December 1941,7 December in Britain and the US early in the morning, bombers of Mihoro Air Group attacked Singapore. Prince of Wales and Repulse responded with anti-aircraft fire; no planes were shot down, and the ships sustained no damage. The Japanese made landings on Kota Bharu, Malaya, on 8 December (local time), commencing the Japanese invasion of Malaya.
News arrived that Pearl Harbor had been attacked and eight US battleships had been sunk or disabled. Pre-war planning had explored the possibility of the United States Pacific Fleet sending major units to Singapore to reinforce the British when war broke out. That was now impossible. Phillips had concluded in an earlier discussion with US General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Thomas C. Hart that his two capital ships were insufficient to confront the Japanese. However, with the Japanese threatening to overrun Malaya, Phillips was pressed to use his ships in an offensive role; he assembled his flotilla to try to intercept and destroy Japanese invasion convoys in the South China Sea.
Phillips did not believe that the RAF and other Allied air forces could guarantee air cover for his ships, as they had only limited numbers of fighters. Phillips had requested fighter protection before he left and was told it was not possible. However, the reply to his request did not make it clear that the reply only applied to the morning of the 10th off Singapore, and he may have had the mistaken impression that fighter protection would not be available generally. And two proposals to provide daylight fighter cover had previously been turned down by Phillips and his staff. (See Force Z § Air cover).