In Indonesian historiography, the term Bersiap ("Get ready" or "Be prepared" in English) refers to the violent and chaotic beginning of the Indonesian National Revolution following the end of World War II in Asia. In Indonesia, the term Berdaulat ("Sovereign") is also used for this transitional period. It began after Sukarno's proclamation of Indonesian Independence on 17 August 1945 and culminated during the power vacuum between the withdrawal of Japanese occupational forces and the gradual buildup of a British military presence, before the official handover to a Dutch military presence in March 1946.
Thousands of European and Indo-European people were killed by native Indonesians. Many non-Europeans accused of anti-revolutionary or pro-Dutch sentiment also fell victim to violence, such as Chinese civilians, Japanese and Korean prisoners of war, as well as native Indonesians such as the Moluccans, Ambonese, Minahasans and Timorese along with Javanese people, Bantenese people, Malays, Minangkabau people and Batak people of higher social and economic standing. The violence led to forced repatriation and the proliferation of a worldwide Indo-European diaspora.
Instances of wanton violence had decreased by the time British forces withdrew in 1946 and after the Dutch had rebuilt their military capacity in the region, though revolutionary and intercommunal killings continued into 1947. Meanwhile, the Indonesian revolutionary fighters were well into the process of forming a formal military and stemming violent excesses. The last troops of the former Imperial Japanese Armed Forces had been evacuated by July 1946.
Term The term Bersiap is derived from the battle cry and perpetual call to arms ("Get ready!" or "Be prepared!"), uttered by Indonesian nationalists when potential enemies of the revolution entered pro-republican areas.Bayly, Christopher Harper, Tim Forgotten Wars, Freedom and revolution in Southeast Asia (Publisher: Harvard University Press, 2006) P.181 Googlebooks Originally coined by Dutch Indonesian survivors of the period, the term soon saw use in academic works in Dutch and English.
On Java, other terms aside from and are commonly used, such as in Depok, in Banten and surrounding West Java, and and in Central Java.
In 2022, Indonesian historian Bonnie Triyana sparked controversy when he published an editorial in the Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad regarding a Rijksmuseum exhibit about the Indonesian National Revolution. Triyana, who was a guest curator on the exhibit, stated that the term Bersiap had a strong racist connotation in the Netherlands, and that its use invoked stereotypes of Indonesians as "primitive and uncivilized", and claimed that the team of curators agreed that the term would not be used in the exhibition. As a response, Hans Moll, head of the Federation of Dutch Indos (, FIN), accused the Rijksmuseum of genocide denial, censorship, and falsifying history by ignoring that thousands of Dutch people had been brutally tortured, raped, and murdered by Indonesians because of their ethnicity. The museum later stated that the term would continue to be used in the exhibit and that Triyana had been expressing his personal opinion, not that of the curatorial team. Both Hans Moll of the FIN and Jeffry Pondaag of the Dutch Honorary Debts Committee Foundation filed police reports, but the police decided not to pursue charges.
Today, the term Bersiap killings is also used to avoid confusion.
Indonesian independence declared On 15 August 1945, the Japanese surrendered to the Allies. As there was, for the most part, no Allied re-conquest of the western part of the Dutch East Indies (The eastern islands were already occupied by the Allies), the Japanese were still in charge on Java and Sumatra and had received specific orders to maintain the status quo until Allied forces arrived on these islands. Sukarno, Hatta, and the older leadership were hesitant to act and did not want to provoke conflict with the Japanese.Ricklefs (1991), p. 210 Vice Admiral Tadashi Maeda, fearing volatile youth groups, and the demoralised Japanese troops, wanted a quick transfer of power to the older generation of Indonesian leaders.
While the older nationalist leadership group, including Sukarno and Hatta, were reluctant, younger members of the new elite, the 'youth' (), believed they had a duty to push for revolution. A group associated with Menteng 31 kidnapped both Sukarno and Hatta and forced them to agree to declaring Indonesian independence. On 17 August 1945, two days after the surrender, Sukarno and Hatta declared independence at Sukarno's house in Jakarta.Ricklefs (1991), page 213; ; Reid (1973), page 30; Vickers (2005), p. 95 Indonesian staff briefly seized Jakarta radio from their Japanese supervisors and broadcast the news of the declaration across Java.Taylor (2003), p. 323
The start of the revolution It was mid-September before news of the declaration of independence spread across the island of Java, and many Indonesians far from the capital Jakarta did not believe it. As the news spread, most Indonesians came to regard themselves as pro-Republican, and a mood of revolution swept across the country.Ricklefs (1991), pages 214 – 215 External power had shifted; it would be weeks before the Allied Forces entered the island of Java, and the Dutch were too weakened by World War II. The Japanese, on the other hand, were required by the terms of the surrender to both lay down their arms and maintain order; a contradiction that some resolved by handing weapons to Japanese-trained Indonesians.Friend (2003), page 32; Robert Cribb, 'A revolution delayed: the Indonesian Republic and the Netherlands Indies, August–November 1945', Australian Journal of Politics and History 32 no. 1 (1986), pp. 72–85. At the time of the surrender, there were 70,000 Japanese troops in Java and Sukarno and Hatta were concerned that celebratory independence rallies would result in the guns of Japanese troops being turned on Indonesian crowds.Taylor (2003), p. 324 While the older leadership set about constructing a government on paper, they could do little to curb younger mobs who attacked sultans and other members of the Indonesian elite, retaliated violently against those village heads who had assisted Japanese oppression of Indonesian peasants, attacked other alleged "traitors", and fought for turf and weapons.Taylor (2003), p. 324, 326
The resulting power vacuums in the weeks following the Japanese surrender created an atmosphere of uncertainty, but also one of opportunity for the Republicans.Friend (2003), page 32 Many pemuda joined pro-Republic struggle groups (). The most disciplined were soldiers from the Japanese-formed but disbanded Giyūgun (PETA) and Heiho groups. Many groups were undisciplined, due to both the circumstances of their formation and what they perceived as revolutionary spirit. In the first weeks, Japanese troops often withdrew from urban areas to avoid confrontations. However, as Republican youths fought to secure the cities and take arms, attacks on the Japanese did occur, usually following Allied orders for the Japanese to disarm Indonesian troops. Many of the Indonesian militia and some Japanese troops had no intention of allowing Indonesian disarmament, and in places like Bandung open conflict broke out.Vickers (2005), p. 97
By September 1945, control of major infrastructure installations, including railway stations and trams in Java's largest cities, had been taken over by Republican pemuda.Ricklefs (1991), pages 215 – 216 To spread the revolutionary message, pemuda set up their own radio stations and newspapers, and graffiti proclaimed the nationalist sentiment. On most islands, struggle committees and militia were set up.Vickers (2005), page 97 Republican newspapers and journals were common in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Surakarta. They fostered a generation of writers known as angkatan 45 ('generation of 45') many of whom believed their work could be part of the revolution. In southern Kalimantan, Australian Communist soldiers spread the word of the Indonesian independence declaration.VIckers (2005), p. 97
Republican leaders struggled to come to terms with popular sentiment; some wanted passionate armed struggle; others a more reasoned approach. Some leaders, such as the leftist Tan Malaka, spread the idea that this was a revolutionary struggle to be led and won by the Indonesian pemuda. Sukarno and Hatta, in contrast, were more interested in planning out a government and institutions to achieve independence through diplomacy. Pro-revolution demonstrations took place in large cities, including one led by Tan Malaka in Jakarta with over 200,000 people, which Sukarno and Hatta, fearing violence, successfully quelled.Vickers (2005), p. 97; Ricklefs (1991).
By September 1945, many of the self-proclaimed pemuda, who were ready to die for '100% freedom', were becoming impatient.Vickers (2005), p. 98 It was common for ethnic 'out-groups' — Dutch internees, Eurasians, Ambonese and Chinese — and anyone considered to be a spy, to be subjected to intimidation, kidnap, robbery, and sometimes murder, even organised massacres. Such attacks would continue to some extent for the course of the revolution.Reid (1974), page 49; Mochtar Lubis, Jalan Tak Ada (Jakarta: Yayasan Obot Indonesia, 2002) [originally published 1952], p.78; Anthony Reid, Indonesian National Revolution (Hawthorn, Vic.: Longman, 1974), chs. 2 and 3; Shirley Fenton-Huie, The Forgotten Ones: Women and Children Under Nippon (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1992); Anthony Reid, 'Indonesia: revolution without socialism', in Robin Jeffrey (ed.), Asia: the Winning of Independence (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1981), pp. 107–57. As the level of violence increased across the country, the Sukarno- and Hatta-led Republican government in Jakarta urged calm. However, pemuda, in favour of armed struggle, saw the older leadership as dithering and betraying the revolution, which often led to conflict amongst Indonesians.
Formation of the Republican government
By the end of August, a central Republican government had been established in Jakarta. It adopted a constitution drafted during the Japanese occupation by the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence.Ricklefs (1991), p. 213 Following Japanese navy advice that Christian Indonesians in its area would disapprove and internal discussions and debates in Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence as well as personal lobby of Mohammad Hatta and Teuku Mohammad Hasan toward Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, provisions for a special role for Islam, such as the Jakarta Charter and a mandatory Muslim head of state, were not enacted. With general elections yet to be held, a Central Indonesian National Committee (KINP) was appointed to assist the president, however, elections were not held for 10 years. Similar committees were established at provincial and regency levels. Indonesian administrative advisors (sanyo), who had been appointed by the Japanese, and vice regents were appointed as Republican officials. This allowed for an efficient and discreet handover of power from the Japanese that minimised violation of the terms of the Japanese surrender.