The Kyoto Protocol was an international treaty which extended the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
A 2007 study by Gupta et al. assessed the literature on climate change policy, which showed no authoritative assessments of the UNFCCC or its Protocol that assert these agreements have, or will, succeed in fully solving the climate problem., in It was assumed that the UNFCCC or its Protocol would not be changed. The Framework Convention and its Protocol include provisions for future policy actions to be taken.
Some environmentalists have supported the Kyoto Protocol because it is "the only game in town," and possibly because they expect that future emission reduction commitments may demand more stringent emission reductions (Aldy et al.., 2003, p. 9). Some environmentalists and scientists have criticized the existing commitments for being too weak (Grubb, 2000, p. 5). On the other hand, multiple economists think that the commitments are stronger than is justified. Particularly in the US, a number of economists have also been critical of the failure to include quantified commitments for developing countries (Grubb, 2000, p. 31).
Commentaries on negotiations
+ Level and timing of proposed targets Party Target level and date(reductions from 1990) Gas(es)covered Date proposed AOSISAlliance of Small Island States 20% by 2005 20 September 1994 Brazil 30% by 2020(differentiated) , , 28 May 1997 Canada 3% by 2010,additional 5% by 2015 All GHGs 2 December 1997 Czech Republic 5% by 2005,15% by 2010 , , 27 March 1997 DemocraticRepublic of the Congo(Zaire) 10% by 2005,15% by 2010,20% by 2020 All GHGs 23 October 1996 EU at least 7.5% by 2005,15% by 2010 , , 19 June 1997,applies to 2005 target4 March 1997applies to 2010 target France 7-10% inaverage per capitaemissions by 2010(differentiated) All GHGs 6 December 1996Withdrawn with advent of the common proposed EU target Germany 10% by 2005,15-20% by 2010 26 March 1996 G-77 and ChinaDuring negotiations, the G-77 represented 133 developing countries. China was not a member of the group but an associate . It has since become a member . at least 7.5% by 2005,15% by 2010,an additional 20% by 2020 , , (gas-by-gas) 22 October 1997 Hungary et al. Stabilization by 2005plus pledging ofdifferentiated targets , , 27 March 1997 Japan 5% by 2008-2012(differentiated) , , 6 October 1997 New Zealand 5% in a 5-year period,starting no earlierthan 2005 , , 2 December 1997 Peru 15% () by 2005,15-20% (all GHGs)by 2010 see previouscolumn 7 March 1997 Philippines 20% by 2005,20% by 2010 All GHGs 25 March 1997 Russian Federation Stabilization by 2010plus additionaldifferentiated targetsfor "Annex B" Parties All GHGs 26 February 1997 Switzerland 10% by 2010(differentiated) All GHGs 29 November 1996 UK 5-10% by 2010 All GHGs 16 April 1996
The choice of 1990 as the main base year remains in Kyoto, as it does in the original Framework Convention (UNFCCC). The importance of the choice of base year was discussed by Liverman (2008). According to Liverman (2008), the idea of using historical emissions as a basis for the Kyoto targets was rejected on the basis that good data was not available prior to 1990. Liverman (2008), however, commented that a 1990 base year favours several powerful interests including the UK, Germany and Russia. This is because these countries had high emissions in 1990.
In the UK following 1990, emissions had declined because of a switch from coal to gas ("Dash for Gas"), which has lower emissions than coal. This was due to the UK's privatization of coal mining and its switch to natural gas supported by North Sea reserves. Germany benefited from the 1990 base year because of its reunification between West and East Germany. East Germany's emissions fell dramatically following the collapse of East German industry after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Germany could therefore take credit for the resultant decline in emissions.
According to Liverman (2008), some of the former Soviet satellites wanted a base year to reflect their highest emissions prior to their industrial collapse. A high emissions baseline was an advantage for countries whose emissions had subsequently fallen due to economic collapse. On the other hand, some of the former Soviet countries regard their emissions surplus as compensation for the trauma of economic restructuring.
Japan promoted the idea of flexible baselines, and favoured a base year of 1995 for HFCs. Their HFC emissions had grown in the early 1990s as a substitute for CFCs banned in the Montreal Protocol.
Liverman (2008) argued that countries, such as the US, made suggestions during negotiations in order to lower their responsibility to cut emissions. These suggestions included the inclusion of carbon sinks (the carbon absorbed annually by forests and other land cover) and having net current emissions as the basis for responsibility, rather than historical emissions.
Another perspective on negotiations was provided by Grubb (2003). The final days of negotiation of the Protocol saw a clash between the EU and the US and Japan. The EU aimed for flat-rate reductions in the range of 10–15% below 1990 levels, while the US and Japan supported reductions of 0–5%.see Kyoto Protocol#Negotiations for more details on the original targets proposed by countries Countries that had supported differentiation of targets between countries had different ideas on how it should be calculated, and different indicators were proposed, e.g., targets that were related to GDP, energy intensity (energy use per unit of economic output), and so on. According to Grubb (2003), the only common theme of these indicators was that each proposal suited the interests of the country making the proposal.
Aldy et al. (2003) commented on the Kyoto targets and how they related to economic growth. Considering the growth of some economies and the collapse of others since 1990, the range of implicit targets is much greater than that suggested by the Kyoto targets. According to Aldy et al. (2003), the US faced a cut of about 30% below "business-as-usual" (BAU) emissions (i.e., projected emissions in the absence of measures to limit emissions), which is more stringent than that implied by its Kyoto target (a 7% reduction in emissions compared to 1990 levels). This contrasts with Russia and other Kyoto "economies in transition" (EITs), who, according to Aldy et al. (2003), faced Kyoto targets that allowed substantial increases in their emissions above BAU.
Grubb (2003), however, commented that the US, having per-capita emissions twice that of most other OECD countries, was vulnerable to the suggestion that it had huge potential for making reductions. From this viewpoint, the US was obliged to cut emissions back more than other countries. Grubb (2003) also commented that for two or three years after the Kyoto agreement, the usual economic perspective was that emissions from the EITs would rise sharply as their economies recovered. In reality, however, emissions of the EITs failed to grow as multiple models had predicted.
In August 2012, in a speech given at his alma mater, Todd Stern — the US Climate Change envoy — expressed the challenges of the UNFCCC process as follows, "Climate change is not a conventional environmental issue...It implicates virtually every aspect of a state's economy, so it makes countries nervous about growth and development. This is an economic issue every bit as it is an environmental one." He went on to explain that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is a multilateral body concerned with climate change and can be an inefficient system for enacting international policy. Because the framework system includes over 190 countries and because negotiations are governed by consensus, small groups of countries can often block progress.
General comments
Baylis et al. (2011) Baylis, John, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens. The Globalization of World Politics. 5th ed. Oxford: 2011. p.358. argued that a successful international climate policy would require additional emission reductions from developing countries such as China and India.
As the first legally binding climate treaty, the Kyoto Protocol (signed 11 December 1997, effective 16 February 2005) was the most prominent international agreement on climate change prior to the Paris Agreement of 2015. Highly controversial, it was criticized both for going too far and not nearly far enough in restricting emissions of greenhouse gases. (Niue, The Cook Islands, Nauru consider reductions "inadequate") A major flaw of the agreement, in terms of its potential to meet its goals, was that the two leading emitters of greenhouse gases in the world, China and the United States, were not bound by the protocol.
The United States and Australia were the only major developed nations to sign but not ratify the Kyoto protocol (see signatories). The agreement was brokered by then-Vice President Al Gore and signed by then-President Bill Clinton on 12 November 1998 but it was never ratified by the US Senate. Soon after taking office, in March 2001, then-President George W. Bush withdrew the US as a signatory. Australia refused to ratify the agreement until 2007. Canada, under the Harper government, withdrew from the protocol on 15 December 2012.
The Kyoto protocol established a two-tier system, of Annex I (developed) and Annex II (developing) countries, who were differentially affected as signatories. Both China and India, the world's two most populous countries, were ranked as "developing countries". As a result, although both ratified the protocol, they were not required to reduce or even limit the growth of carbon emissions under the agreement. As listed by greenhouse gas emissions per capita, they had rankings of 121st largest per capita emitter at 3.9 Tonnes of e and 162nd largest per capita emitter at 1.8 Tonnes of e respectively, compared with for example the U.S. at position of the 14th largest per capita e emitter at 22.9 Tonnes of e. Nevertheless, China was the world's second largest producer of greenhouse gas emissions, and India the 4th (see: countries by greenhouse emissions).
Additionally, as predicted by Fred Singer, high costs of decreasing emissions caused significant production to move to countries that were not covered under the treaty, such as India and China. The outsourcing of carbon-intensive parts of the production chain from traditionally wealthier countries to countries like China and India who were considered developing countries, has displaced emissions rather than reducing overall emissions.
In May 2010 the Hartwell Paper was published by academics and policy makers from the London School of Economics and the University of Oxford. The paper argued that the Kyoto Protocol crashed in late 2009 and "has failed to produce any discernable real world reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases in fifteen years." They criticized the Kyoto Protocols for focusing too much on carbon emissions. Their paper advocated a controversial and piecemeal approach to decarbonization of the global economy that would broaden the range of approaches taken. The Hartwell paper proposed that "the organising principle of our effort should be the raising up of human dignity via three overarching objectives: ensuring energy access for all; ensuring that we develop in a manner that does not undermine the essential functioning of the Earth system; ensuring that our societies are adequately equipped to withstand the risks and dangers that come from all the vagaries of climate, whatever their cause may be". They preferred not to suggest specific structural steps for achieving such changes.