Lâm Văn Phát (1920 – 30 October 1998) was a Major general in the South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). He is best known for leading two coup attempts against General Nguyễn Khánh in September 1964 and February 1965. Although both failed to result in his taking power, the latter caused enough instability that it forced Khánh to resign and go into exile.
A member of the Roman Catholic minority, Phát joined the French-backed Vietnamese National Army which became the ARVN after the South Vietnam was established. After having been sent to the U.S. for further training in 1958, Phát returned home to head the Civil Guard, a paramilitary force then mostly used to protect the ruling family of President Ngô Đình Diệm, rather than to counteract the communist Viet Cong (VC) insurgency. Later commanding the 2nd Division, he was known for his loyalty to Diệm, who favored fellow Catholics. In 1963, Diệm knew some of the generals were about to launch a coup against him. He appointed Phát to command the 7th Division, located near the capital, Saigon, so he could help in the fighting, but the plotters successfully used delaying tactics so that the paperwork for the transfer of the division leadership could not occur before they proceeded to overthrow and execute Diệm. Despite Phát's pro-Diệm allegiance he was promoted to Brigadier general and given command of the 7th Division.
After the January 1964 coup against Dương Văn Minh, Phát was made the commander of III Corps and also Interior Minister for a time until he was dismissed in September 1964. This prompted him to join Dương Văn Đức, another general relieved of command, in launching a coup attempt against Khánh on 13 September. They initially took over the capital without a fight, but Khánh escaped, and after having received endorsements from the U.S., defeated Phát and Đức. At the military trial that followed, charges were dropped. In February 1965, Phát joined with fellow Catholic, Diệm protégé and Khánh opponent Phạm Ngọc Thảo – actually a communist agent intent on maximizing infighting in South Vietnam – in another coup attempt. After the forces deadlocked, Phát met with Republic of Vietnam Air Force chief Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, insisting on Khánh's assassination. After the meeting concluded, the coup collapsed, but Khánh was forced from office the next day. Phát and Thảo went into hiding and were sentenced to death in absentia by Kỳ's military tribunal. Thảo was killed under mysterious circumstances, but Phát evaded capture for three years until surrendering. By this time Kỳ's power had been eclipsed by another Catholic, General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, who freed Phát from prison.
Early military career
The President of South Vietnam, Ngô Đình Diệm, heavily favored Catholics, and, as a result, Phát rose quickly up the ranks. Having started his career in the French-backed Vietnamese National Army of the State of Vietnam, Phát became a member of the ARVN after the State of Vietnam became the Republic of Vietnam. In 1958, holding the rank of colonel, Phát was sent to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for officer training. Described as being tall for relatively short Vietnamese norms, Phát "spoke halting English". After returning to Vietnam, he served as the head of the Civil Guard, a paramilitary force that was mostly used at the time to protect the ruling family of Diệm rather than to counteract the communist VC insurgency.
Phát has been described as a "political Catholic", a term for those who practiced or converted to the religion to curry favor with Diệm, who made most military and political appointments and promotions on the basis of religion.Jacobs, pp. 85–95. Phát's habit of customarily being seen in public with a swagger stick and his reputation for autocratic leadership alienated most of his subordinate officers. He grew his pinky fingernail to great length, a practice observed by mandarins during Vietnam's imperial era to denote their status. Some observers claimed that the mandarin style of his fingernail spread to his general behavior, decrying him as "haughty" and "hawklike". U.S. military advisors regarded Phát as "mediocre". As a colonel, he served as the commander of 2nd Division, located in central Vietnam from 8 June 1961 until 18 June 1963, when he was replaced by Colonel Trương Văn Chương.Tucker, pp. 526–33.
Overthrow of Diệm in 1963
By late 1963, Diệm knew a coup was brewing and that the 7th Division at Mỹ Tho outside Saigon might be involved. As it was close to the capital, it would play a crucial role in either attacking or defending Diệm, or blocking outlying units from entering the city. Diệm put Phát in command of the 7th Division on 31 October. According to tradition, Phát had to pay the corps commander a courtesy visit before assuming control of the division. However, General Tôn Thất Đính, commander of the III Corps was part of the plot and deliberately refused to see Phát and told him to come back at 14:00 the following day, by which time the coup had already been scheduled to start. In the meantime, Đính had General Trần Văn Đôn sign a counter-order transferring command of the 7th Division to his deputy and co-conspirator Nguyễn Hữu Có.
Có then trapped and arrested the 7th Division's officers on the day of the coup.Karnow, p. 321. He then phoned General Huỳnh Văn Cao, further south in the Mekong Delta's largest town, Cần Thơ, where the IV Corps was headquartered. Có, a central Vietnamese, imitated Phát's southern accent and tricked Cao into thinking that nothing unusual was happening. Phát's removal had thus stopped Cao from sending loyalists to Saigon to save Diệm,Moyar, p. 270. who was captured and executed the following day.Karnow, pp. 323–26. Despite the fact that Đính saw Có as being more reliable for the purposes of staging the coup against Diệm, Minh promoted him to brigadier general immediately after the officers seized power. As a brigadier general, he served as the commander of the 7th Division, from 2 December 1963 until 2 February 1964.
Nguyễn Khánh
He was then promoted and served as the commander of III Corps, which oversaw the region of the country surrounding Saigon from 2 February until 4 April 1964, when he was replaced by Lieutenant General Tran Ngoc Tam. Phát's promotion coincided with a coup by General Nguyễn Khánh against the officers who removed Diệm. Many of these, such as Generals Trần Văn Đôn, Lê Văn Kim, Tôn Thất Đính and Mai Hữu Xuân were put under house arrest, opening up vacancies for other generals.Kahin, pp. 198–204.
Phát was regarded as a dour military tactician who persisted with his pre-devised battleplan once hostilities had commenced, refusing to change tactics even when difficulties arose. In one engagement in 1964 in Bến Tre Province in the Mekong Delta, Phát was blamed for the loss of an American helicopter in addition to heavy personnel losses after he proceeded with an attack despite advice to the contrary from his junior officers. U.S. military advisers who worked with Phát reportedly regarded him as competent, albeit dour and lacking in charisma. However a March 1964 assessment by III Corps' senior U.S. military advisor, Colonel Wilbur Wilson, described Phát as a "personally very charming" former French officer who spoke excellent English. "As a matter of protocol will almost always agree with a recommendation on most any subject, but this does not mean that the recommendation will be implemented." Politically ambitious but "professionally incompetent and emotionally unstable," Phát was known to "lash out with his swagger stick and give... a caning on the spot" to any soldier who displeased him. Yet at the same time, he exhibited what Wilson termed "almost a psychopathic horror of issuing a direct order to a subordinate."
September 1964 coup attempt
In September 1964, Phát was dismissed as Interior Minister, while General Dương Văn Đức was about to be removed as IV Corps commander. Both were removed partly due to pressure from Buddhist activists, who accused Khánh of accommodating too many Catholic pro-Diệm elements in leadership positions.Moyar, p. 327. This came after Khánh attempted to augment his power in August by declaring a state of emergency and introducing a new constitution, which resulted in mass unrest and calls for civilian rule, forcing Khánh to make concessions in an attempt to dampen discontent.Moyar, pp. 315–20. Disgruntled, the pair tried to launch a coup attempt of their own in the pre-dawn hours of 13 September, using 10 army battalions they had recruited.Moyar, p. 326. They gained the support of Colonel Lý Tòng Bá, head of the 7th Division's armored section. The coup was supported by Catholic and Đại Việt elements.Shaplen, p. 288. Another member of the conspiracy was Colonel Phạm Ngọc Thảo, who, while ostensibly a Catholic, was actually a communist double agent trying to maximize infighting at every possible opportunity.Kahin, p. 231.Karnow, pp. 39–40. General Trần Thiện Khiêm, a member of the ruling triumvirate along with Khánh and Minh, but a rival of the dominant Khánh, was also believed to have supported the plot.
Four battalions of rebel troops moved before dawn towards Saigon from the Mekong Delta, with armored personnel carriers and jeeps carrying machine guns. After cowing a police checkpoint on the edge of the capital, they put sentries in their place to seal off Saigon from incoming or outgoing traffic. They then captured communication facilities in the capital. As the rebel troops took over the city without any firing and sealed it off, Phát sat in a civilian vehicle and calmly said, "We'll be holding a press conference in town this afternoon at 4 pm" Claiming to represent The Council for the Liberation of the Nation, Phát proclaimed the deposal of Khánh's "junta" over national radio, and accused Khánh of promoting conflict within the nation's military and political leadership. He promised to capture Khánh and pursue a policy of increased anti-communism, stronger government and military. Phát stated he would return to the crypto-fascist, Catholic integrist ideology of the Ngô family to lay the foundation for his junta. According to historian George McTurnan Kahin, Phát's broadcast was "triumphant" and may have prompted senior officers who were neither part of the original conspiracy nor fully loyal to Khánh to conclude that Phát and Đức would not embrace them if they rallied to their side.Kahin, p. 232.
There was little reaction from most of the military commanders. Phát's rebels set up their command post in the Saigon home of General Dương Ngọc Lắm, a Diệm loyalist who had been removed from his post as Mayor of Saigon by Khánh.Shaplen, pp. 228–40. In contrast to Phát's serene demeanour, his incoming troops prompted worshippers at the Roman Catholic cathedral attending mass to flee in panic. The Buddhists, however, made no overt reaction to a coup that would dent their rights. Air Force commander Kỳ had promised two weeks earlier to use his planes against any coup attempt, but there was no reaction early in the morning. Đức mistakenly thought Kỳ and his subordinates would join the coup, but later realized that he was mistaken. After he found out that he had been tricked into thinking that the plotters had great strength, he defected. Several U.S. advisers were chased away by rebel officers who did not want interference in the coup. They thought the Americans would not approve of their actions, as both U.S. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor and President Lyndon Johnson had made optimistic comments about South Vietnam recently.