The Samlaut Uprising, also called the Samlaut rebellion or Battambang revolts, consisted of two significant phases of revolt that first broke out near Samlaut in Battambang Province and subsequently spread into surrounding provinces of Cambodia in 19671968. The movement was largely made up of dissident rural peasantry led by a group of discontented leftist intellectuals against Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s political organization, the Sangkum regime.
The rebellion first erupted in early 1967 in the Samlaut subdistrict when hundreds of frustrated peasants, tired of government policies, mistreatment by local military, land displacement, and other poor socio-economic conditions. They then revolted against the government, killing two soldiers on the morning of April 2.Hinton, 2004, p.53 In the following weeks, the revolt expanded with more destruction of government property and personnel.
By June 1967, four thousand or more villagers had fled their homes in southern Battambang Province into the forest to join the growing group of rebels and escape the military troops sent by Sihanouk.Kiernan, 1982, p.166 In early 1968, Cambodia experienced a more organized second uprising that expanded both geographically and politically through months of re-grouping, recruitment and propaganda processes, and was much more widespread and destructive than the first.Kiernan, 1982, p.166
Some academics such as Ben Kiernan and Donald Kirk, see the Samlaut rebellion as the beginnings of the Cambodian revolutionary movement (the Cambodian Civil War) that eventually led to the victory of the Khmer Rouge and the establishment of Democratic Kampuchea.
Kiernan says that the rebellion was the “baptism of fire for the small but steadily growing Cambodian revolutionary movement”Kiernan, 1982, p.166 and Kirk mentions that it was “a prelude, in a microcosm, of the conflict that would sweep across the country three years later.”Kirk, p.78
Causes, background and origins
Narratives of this rebellion differ due to the problematic political alignments involved in the Cambodian struggle. The Republican government wanted to portray the Cambodian revolutionary movement as largely a foreign (mainly Vietnamese) transplant and preferred to gloss over the significance of indigenous leftist activity from 1967.Kiernan, 1975, p.ii Alternatively, F.U.N.K.(National United Front of Kampuchea) wanted to demonstrate unity between Sihanouk supporters and the Khmer Rouge, understating the extent of the development of the revolutionary opposition to Sihanouk before his overthrow.Kiernan, 1975, p.ii
Historians such as David Chandler and Milton Osborne understand the rebellion as primarily a localized action. According to Chandler, the revolt “sprang from local grievances against injustice and social change, corruption, and ham-fisted government behavior” and the participants “did not respond to orders from the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) central committee”.Chandler, 1991, p.166 Milton Osborne writes that the rebellion “was more an outbreak of largely spontaneous resistance to government actions than the first orchestrated challenge from the radicals”.Osborne, 1994
Apart from Sihanouk's Sangkum regime, other diverging strands contributed to this rebellion. For instance, the rebellion was identified to have communist roots as it was the first part of Pol Pot's social and political two-phased strategy executed by the CPK.Chindawongse, 1991, p.138 Furthermore, even Sihanouk himself was ignorant of this highly internalized and localized conflict, believing it result from foreign instigation.Kiernan, 1982
Political and socio-economic conditions With the escalation of the war in South Vietnam in 1965, the colonization of Battambang entered a new phase as thousands of Khmer Krom families began to cross the Vietnam-Cambodia border. The main government settlements were established in Kampot, Kirirom, Kompong Chhnang (Chriev) and Ratanakiri, with Battambang having the largest settlement.Kiernan, 1982, p.175-176 Sihanouk's generosity towards them increasingly became a source of grievance for the local inhabitants as they found themselves displaced from their land (many of whom did not even own their land) with unfavorable economic conditions.Tyner, 2008, p.66
Political conditions Following the September 1966 election, the National Assembly was dominated by right wing politicians with a minority of left leaning politicians, namely, Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn and Hu Nim, all of whom played highly influential roles in leading the revolts to come. As the newly elected Government asserted its control over Cambodia's provinces, it penetrated the village level. It was supported by the Prime Minister Lon Nol and the Royal Cambodian Army, cracking down heavily on many peasants and pushing the Left towards the defensive.Kiernan, 1982, p.168 Furthermore, Sihanouk's wavering stance between the Right and Left appeared to be leaning towards the Right as he had imprisoned several Pracheachon party members. It announced his non-endorsement for the September elections.Kiernan, 1982, p.168
Sihanouk's allegedly neutralist policy had its roots in the independence struggle against French colonialism where Sihanouk formed alliances with several anti-French guerilla groups, on both the Left and Right. After independence, this neutrality started to diverge as Sihanouk allied himself principally with politicians on the right. He did attempt to ally himself with certain members of the political left, such as Khieu Samphan. However, according to Etcheson, his relations with his domestic left were perfunctory and at most tactical. “The Prince encouraged his security forces to persecute the mass organizations of the Left, especially the main Leftist one, the Pracheachon, and its covert sister organizations in the countryside and the cities.”Etcheson, 2007, p.191
Progressively, there appeared to be increasingly visible cracks within the political sphere as respective sides strengthened and consolidated. As the Left gradually co-ordinated its activities, holding demonstrations in the towns, attacking the government, and conducting propaganda in the countryside, the predominantly right-winged government upped its military and economic regulations.Kiernan, 1982, p.168
Economic conditions While Sihanouk was away in France, Lon Nol had considerable autonomy in effecting his economic policies. Often identified as the main driver of the rebellion, the rammassage du paddy was an efficient system imposed by Lon Nol in early 1967 whereby the government channels (mainly the military) took charge of buying and collecting the rice crops from the peasants.Heder, 1979 1982, p.8Weltig, 2008, p.53 This was in response to the rise of a large rice export black market that greatly affected Cambodia's economy as it was heavily dependent on its taxation of rice exports. Here, farmers illegally sold much of Cambodia's rice to the Viet Cong (VC) across the borders as they paid more as compared to the Cambodian government.
Lon Nol was seriously concerned about the sale of large proportions of the rice crop to the VC or on the Saigon black market, where clandestine sales were handled by local Chinese middlemen who had found friends and worked in conjunction with cells of former Viet Minh sympathizers acting on behalf of the VC.Kiernan, 1982, p.168-169Chindawongse, 2008, p.139 This system provoked an uproar by the rural population in Battambang Province where it was first introduced as many households not only saw their earnings being severely reduced due to the low prices offered for the crops but were also forcibly made to surrender their produce at gunpoint.Osborne, 1979Chandler, 1991, p.164-165
Furthermore, the strong intervention and presence of the army in Battambang involved forming co-operatives, forcing villagers to regroup while bearing the obligation of being a co-operative member in paying subscriptions to finance loans that fell into the hands of corrupt officials.Kiernan, 1982, p.176 In turn, they were given insecticides that were often mediocre quality or even false substitutes. Also, army officials could engage in illegal smuggling across the borders. Generally, activities of the army in Battambang prior to the revolt were heavy-handed and often brutal, alienating and enraging the inhabitants.Kiernan, 1982, p.177
Another cause of growing peasant resentment and unrest would be attributed to the severe exploitation or confiscation of villagers by landowners.Martin, 2004, p.112 For instance, in Pailin Province, arable land was bought from the villages and converted into plantations for the expanding fruit industry, dominated by the Chinese and Burmese. The Khmer peasants had to work for them as unskilled laborers or were displaced from their homeland.Blanadet, 1970, p.374 In other areas like the Andoeuk Hep district, peasants faced harsh conditions due to the unsustainability and unproductivity of the cotton industry – due to the high cost of labour and materials in intensive cotton cultivation, peasants cultivated large areas of land with low yields per hectare.Kiernan, 1982, p.178 The situation was further exacerbated by the increasing susceptibility to encroaching weeds and insects, greatly decreasing the yields. This caused large areas of land to lose their value, many peasants had to find other jobs while facing high indebtedness and landlessness.
Peasant discontent was contributed by the growing domination by the Chinese and other landowners, including Government officials. The continual buying and selling of land due to failed crops produced increasing impoverishment and a class conflict. Centered on rapidly growing fruit plantations, it was a conflict between a ‘rich and enterprising Chinese bourgeoisie which has taken possession of the land, and the alienated, indebted, and already semi-independent village communities.”Blanadet, 1971, p.192
According to Kiernan, it was clear that “corruption, the misuse of the military and other authority, and increasing impoverishment, in the Samlaut, Pailin and Andoeuk Hep districts, for example, created a vast reservoir of peasant unrest that lacked only a reasonably sophisticated leadership. By early 1967, that leadership had begun to take shape and it provided, as well as a sympathetic and purposeful ideology, the guidance to enable an already disaffected peasantry to carry out a serious and effective rebellion.”Kiernan, 1982, p.180
Khmer Rouge rebels Vietnamese and Chinese communists played a small role in planting the seeds of rural revolt. For instance, after 1945, the Vietnamese Communists were active in their Cambodian oriented efforts, sending cadres into the country to encourage, encadred and attempt to establish Communist hegemony over the independence movement.Heder, 1979, p.2 In September 1960, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) was founded.
The rebellion was not simply a result of plotting by the radical left, though small pro-communist groups had been established in Battambang for years. CPK agitators like Khieu Samphan did play a part in fanning peasant discontent. They were aided by widespread resentment at falling crop prices, bankruptcy, and military actions.
Some historians, such as Ben Kiernan, have stated that evidence points to the fact that the clandestine CPK was in fact planning an uprising across the country, citing the fact that the demonstrations rapidly spread to other, widely separated provinces. It is argued that some of the disturbances in 1967 were part of a coordinated effort by the leftists to destabilise Sihanouk's regime, though the official Khmer Rouge historiography given by Pol Pot later sought to deny this, stating its open rebellion only occurred in January 1968 and that the Samlaut incident was "premature"Kiernan, 2004, p.267-267 and surprised the communist partyJackson, 2014, p.19
Rebellion
1967 uprising