The Soviet Union issued an ultimatum to Lithuania before midnight of 14 June 1940. The Soviets, using a formal pretext, demanded that an unspecified number of Soviet soldiers be allowed to enter the Lithuanian territory and that a new pro-Soviet government (later known as the "People's Government") be formed. The ultimatum and subsequent incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union stemmed from the division of Eastern Europe into the German and Soviet spheres of influence agreed in the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939. Lithuania, along with Latvia and Estonia, fell into the Soviet sphere. According to the Soviet–Lithuanian Mutual Assistance Treaty of October 1939, Lithuania agreed to allow some 20,000 Soviets troops to be stationed at bases within Lithuania in exchange for receiving a portion of the Vilnius Region (previously Polish territory). Further Soviet actions to establish its dominance in its sphere of influence were delayed by the Winter War with Finland and resumed in spring 1940 when Germany was making rapid advances in western Europe. Despite the threat to the country's independence, Lithuanian authorities did little to plan for contingencies and were unprepared for the ultimatum.
With Soviet troops already stationed in the country in accordance with to the Mutual Assistance Treaty, it was impossible to mount effective military resistance. On 15 June, Lithuania unconditionally accepted the ultimatum and lost its independence. The Soviets sought to show the world that this was not a military occupation and annexation, but a socialist revolution initiated by the local population demanding to join the Soviet Union.Vardys (1997), p. 50 In conformity with this, the Soviets followed semi-legal procedures; they took control of the governmental institutions, installed a puppet government, and carried out show elections to the People's Seimas. During its first session, the Seimas proclaimed the creation of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and petitioned to be admitted into the Soviet Union. The petition was officially accepted by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union on 3 August 1940. At the same time, almost identical processes took place in Latvia and Estonia. Lithuania would not regain its independence until the proclamation of the Act of the Re-Establishment of the State of Lithuania on 11 March 1990.
Background
The Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were part of the Russian Empire during the 19th century, achieving independence in the aftermath of World War I. The rise of Nazi Germany during the 1930s created Soviet fears of a German invasion, further aggravated by German expansion to the East, such as the ultimatum to Lithuania in March 1939, as a result of which the nation was forced to cede its most industrially developed region, Klaipėda, to the Reich.
The Soviet Union signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact with Germany in August 1939, in part as an attempt to delay the possibility of invasion. Germany shortly initiated World War II by invading Poland on 1 September. Lithuania at first was found to be in Nazi Germany's sphere of influence according to the secret protocol of Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, but later, the German–Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty of 28 September divided large portions of northeastern Europe between the two powers, and assigned Lithuania to the Soviet sphere of influence.Eidintas (1999), p. 170 A Lithuanian delegation was invited to Moscow, where it signed the Soviet–Lithuanian Mutual Assistance Treaty on 10 October 1939. According to the treaty, the Soviet Union would cede a portion of the Vilnius Region, including the important city of Vilnius, which it had gained during the invasion of Poland, to Lithuania in exchange for the right to station up to 20,000 (the original bargaining point was 50,000) Soviet troops in Lithuania on a permanent basis.Snyder (2004), p. 82 Official Soviet sources claimed that the presence of the Soviet military was necessary to strengthen defenses of a weak nation against possible attacks by Nazi Germany. In reality, it was the first step toward the eventual occupation of Lithuania and was described by The New York Times as a "virtual sacrifice of independence."
Despite the pacts, the Soviet Union's fears continued. Russian military theorists had long held that control of the Baltic Sea was crucial to the defense of St. Petersburg, the Soviet Union's second-largest city, and the Baltic states offered a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and Germany. Pursuing this strategy, the Soviet Union initiated the Winter War in Finland after the country rejected a similar Moscow-offered mutual assistance treaty.Shtromas (2003), p. 246 Stalin was unnerved by German successes in Europe, since they had taken Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg by spring of 1940. According to Nikita Khrushchev, after the fall of France in May, Joseph Stalin expressed the concern that Adolf Hitler would 'beat our brains in'.
The political situation in Lithuania, however, remained stable between October 1939 and March 1940. The Soviets did not interfere with Lithuania's domestic affairsVardys (1997), p. 47 and the Soviet soldiers were well-behaved in their bases.Sabaliūnas (1972), p. 158 As late as 29 March 1940, Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov delivered a speech before the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union expressing his satisfaction with the execution of the mutual assistance treaties with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.Eidintas (1999), p. 174 While Lithuanian politicians publicly praised the Soviet Union for its generosity and touted the "traditional Soviet–Lithuanian friendship", in private, they understood this treaty was a serious threat to Lithuanian independence.Sabaliūnas (1972), pp. 156–157 The popular attitude was reflected in the slogan "Vilnius – mūsų, Lietuva – rusų" (Vilnius is ours, but Lithuania is Russia's).Anušauskas (2005), p. 43
The Lithuanian government had been debating its options and discussing the possibility of occupation since November 1939. At that time, the Lithuanian envoys Stasys Lozoraitis, Petras Klimas, and Bronius Kazys Balutis prepared a memorandum containing contingency plans. They advised strengthening the army, depositing funds abroad, reinforcing the 1934 Baltic Entente alliance with Latvia and Estonia, and investigating the establishment of a government-in-exile.Anušauskas (2005), p. 50 Although various resolutions were forwarded, nothing tangible was accomplished. During winter 1940, the Baltic Entente nations discussed greater cooperation.Rauch (2006), p. 217 Mindful of their circumstances, the three governments worded their communications carefully, but the talks would be used as evidence that Lithuania was conspiring with Latvia and Estonia in violation of the mutual assistance treaty.
Rising tension
Initial accusations Tensions between the Soviet Union and Lithuania escalated along with Germany's successes. By mid-March 1940, the Winter War with Finland was over and the Soviets could concentrate their attention on gaining control of the Baltic states.Anušauskas (2005), p. 52 In April, after Germany occupied Denmark, a Lithuanian envoy in Moscow reported rising hostility from Soviet diplomats. During May, while the Battle of France was in full swing, the Soviets intensified their rhetoric and diplomatic pressure.Lane (2001), pp. 37–38 On 16 May, shortly after the German invasion of Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands, Soviet official newspaper Izvestia published an article warning that it was naive for a small country to attempt neutrality while giants were fighting for survival.Rauch (2006), p. 218 Between 18 and 25 May, Soviet soldiers moved some military equipment from Vilnius to Gaižiūnai, a location much closer to the government seat in Kaunas. The action's proximity to the then-capital carried symbolic weight.Senn (2007), p. 90
On 25 May, the day before the Dunkirk evacuation, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov presented a diplomatic note that accused the Lithuanian government of abducting three Soviet soldiers stationed in Lithuania in accordance with the terms of the mutual assistance treaty.Misiunas (1993), p. 18 The note alleged that two soldiers had been tortured to obtain Soviet military secrets but managed to escape, and that the third, Butayev, was murdered. Earlier in May, Butayev had deserted his unit and was searched by the Lithuanian police. When found, he committed suicide. The Lithuanian government replied that the accusations were baseless, but promised a full investigation of the incident and convened a special commission. However, the commission's requests for detailed information, including interviews, photographs, physical descriptions, or other data that could further the investigation, went unanswered. The official Soviet stance was that Lithuania needed to carry out the investigation on its own and that its requests were an attempt to shift responsibility to the Soviets.
Direct negotiations On 30 May, the accusations were restated, in an official communique, published by TASS, the official Soviet news agency.Senn (2007), p. 91 The same day, Stasys Lozoraitis—the Lithuanian envoy in Rome—was authorized to form a government in exile in case of the Soviet occupation.Misiunas (1993), p. 17 The Lithuanian police tightened security around Soviet bases and arrested 272 suspicious individuals, but that only drew additional criticism of harassment. Foreign Minister Juozas Urbšys offered to settle the matter in direct negotiations in Moscow. Molotov agreed to talk, but only with Prime Minister Antanas Merkys. On 7 June, Merkys arrived in Moscow. The Soviets repeated the accusations of kidnapping. Other charges were leveled, including the allegation that Minister of the Interior Kazys Skučas and Director of State Security Department Augustinas Povilaitis had provoked Soviet soldiers.Senn (2007), p. 92 During the second meeting on 9 June, Molotov also accused the Lithuanian government of conspiring with Latvia and Estonia to establish a secret military union (in reference to the Baltic Entente), thereby violating the mutual assistance pact.Rauch (2006), p. 219
On 10 June, the Lithuanian government discussed the new developments. It decided that Merkys should return to Kaunas and Urbšys should deliver a note offering withdrawal from the Baltic Entente, a full investigation of the incident, and dismissal of Skučas and Povilaitis.Anušauskas (2005), p. 54 A personal letter from President Antanas Smetona to Chairman of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Mikhail Kalinin repeated assurances that Lithuania always honored the mutual assistance pact.Sabaliūnas (1972), p. 178 The third and final meeting between Merkys, Urbšys, and Molotov on 11 June brought no resolution. The Soviets continued to press charges which the Lithuanians could not meaningfully answer and made no more actionable requests. On 12 June, Merkys returned to Lithuania and informed the government of the situation.Sabaliūnas (1972), p. 179 It was decided that Skučas should resign and Povilaitis would be immediately dismissed. The Lithuanian Army was ordered to be alert, but no orders were issued regarding mobilization or preparedness. Lithuanian politicians did not fully understand the gravity of the situation and did not think the results would be catastrophic. Urbšys reported that the Soviets strongly disapproved of Merkys and his cabinet; he suggested that a new government be installed, possibly led by Stasys Raštikis, former Commander-in-Chief of the Lithuanian Army.Senn (2007), p. 94 Such suggestion interfered with Lithuania's domestic affairs.
Internal crisis