The British Army during the Victorian era served through a period of great technological and social change. Queen Victoria ascended the throne in 1837, and died in 1901. Her long reign was marked by the steady expansion and consolidation of the British Empire, rapid industrialisation and the enactment of liberal reforms by both Liberal and Conservative governments within Britain.
The British Army began the period with few differences from the British Army of the Napoleonic Wars that won at Waterloo. There were three main periods of the Army's development during the era. From the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the mid-1850s, the Duke of Wellington and his successors attempted to maintain its organisation and tactics as they had been in 1815, with only minor changes. In 1854, the Crimean War, and the Indian Rebellion of 1857 highlighted the shortcomings of the Army, but entrenched interests prevented major reforms from taking place. From 1868 to 1881, sweeping changes were made by Liberal governments, giving it the broad structure it retained until 1914.
Upon Victoria's death, the Army was still engaged in the Second Boer War, but other than expedients adopted for that war, it was recognisably the army that would enter the First World War. The Industrial Revolution had changed its weapons, transport and equipment, and social changes such as better education had prompted changes to the terms of service and outlook of many soldiers. Nevertheless, it retained many features inherited from the Duke of Wellington's army, and since its prime function was to maintain an empire which covered almost a quarter of the globe, it differed in many ways from the conscripted armies of continental Europe. Leadership, control and organisation The supreme commander of the British Army was the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces, based in Whitehall. The Commander-in-Chief was primarily responsible for military discipline, training, personnel matters, promotions (which until 1871 were often still obtained through the purchase of commissions) and the transfer of units. He was the Crown's central point of contact for military affairs. Until 1904, the British Army did not have its own General Staff. This led to profound structural paralysis, as there was no overarching body to reconcile military requirements with strategic and financial realities. Until the reforms of 1855, the Army was administered by a large number of separate departments and committees, each of which operated with a high degree of autonomy and often reported directly to the Crown or to various Cabinet ministers.
This fragmentation resulted in troop movements frequently taking place without consultation with the departments, which led to avoidable supply shortages. These shortcomings were particularly evident in the area of logistics, as the Commissariat, which was responsible for catering and transport, had long been subordinate to the Treasury and thus operated outside the direct authority of the military command.
The catastrophic logistical and administrative shortcomings that came to light during the Crimean War led to the realisation that the system was outdated and incapable of supporting a modern army. In response, the government initiated a comprehensive administrative reform. In 1855, the office of Secretary of State for War was created, consolidating many of the tasks that had previously been distributed among various ministries. The Secretary of State for War was now responsible to Parliament for the efficiency and administration of the army. The former independent departments, including the Commissariat, the Army Medical Department, the Paymaster General’s Office and the Board of Ordnance, were dissolved and placed under the War Office.
In practice, however, this led to a cumbersome and inefficient bureaucracy, which was particularly evident in the Board of Ordnance. Instead of simplifying procedures through the merger, the established administrative structures were transferred to the new ministry virtually unchanged. As a result, the individual departments continued to operate as isolated units, which prevented efficient coordination. Furthermore, the physical separation persisted, as the War Office moved into premises on Pall Mall, whilst the military leadership remained in Whitehall. This distance prevented direct communication and thus coordination between the civil administration and military planning. Additionally, the Commander-in-Chief retained considerable powers regarding command authority, discipline, appointments and promotions, operated in parallel with the War Office, and was subordinate to the Secretary of State for War only in name.
Recruitment and Training Rank and file Before the Cardwell reforms in the early 1870s, recruitment for the British Army was largely unregulated and often problematic. Enlistment was usually voluntary, but was encouraged by bounties, which were cash payments to recruits. This system led to widespread abuse, with recruits collecting the bounty, deserting and then repeating the process elsewhere. Recruitment took place in various ways, primarily through regimental recruiting parties, which actively sought out physically fit men in towns and villages, especially in poorer areas. Other recruitment options included pensioners, the regular personnel of militia units and direct recruitment in the individual regimental headquarters. Many recruits were driven to enlist by poverty, unemployment or the prospect of adventure, so that the quality of the new soldiers varied greatly.
The recruitment authorities were paid for every man they recruited. This naturally led recruiters to use all kinds of tricks to find new people. Even thieves, vagrants and other undesirable individuals could be recruited. False promises of high salaries and luxurious living conditions were used. Many recruitments took place in pubs, where dishonest recruiters persuaded men under the influence of alcohol to sign up (‘taking the Queen's shilling’).
The term of service was long (often 21 years), and the living conditions in the ranks, as well as the strict discipline and reputation of the army, deterred many potential volunteers. The army was also not considered a particularly prestigious profession, and the desertion rate was high. The Cardwell reforms, which began in 1870, fundamentally changed the recruitment of the British Army. The system of long service was replaced by short service and the call-up of reservists. Soldiers now typically enlisted for twelve years, spending the first six years on active duty and the remaining six years in the reserves.In 1881, short service for the infantry was increased to seven years with the colours, and five with the reserve, of the twelve-year enlistment period.
After 1870, the terms of service were formulated more clearly in recruitment advertisements, and recruitment officers were instructed to behave appropriately and to keep their offices away from public drinking establishments such as inns. Any recruit who could prove that he had been deceived during recruitment was immediately discharged, and the recruiting officer had to bear the associated costs. In 1870, recruitment bonuses that encouraged desertion and false enlistments were abolished, and measures were taken to make medical examinations more rigorous and thorough. In the following years, greater emphasis was placed on public relations and advertising. Cardwell also introduced local recruitment depots, linking regiments to specific geographical areas, which promoted local identity and made recruitment more systematic and efficient. In total, there were sixty-six brigade districts (later renamed regimental districts) spread across England, Scotland and Wales. Officers Between 1815 and 1914, the training and selection of officers in the British Army were largely determined by social background, with the majority of officers hailing from the nobility and the gentry. The officers’ authority rested more on their character and social status than on their professional competence or military training. Their social background enabled them to lead troops who mostly came from more modest, rural backgrounds, so that many officers regarded military service as a natural extension of their authority over the lower classes. Until the Crimean War, there were minimal requirements regarding the training or education of officers, as personal character was valued more highly than military skills. The system of purchase, which allowed officers to acquire their commissions and promotions, contributed to a further decline in the importance of professional qualifications.
Prior to 1849, there were no requirements regarding education or professional competence; most officers had received only a limited, often private, education. Whilst officer cadets in the Artillery and Engineers received their basic training at the Royal Military Academy in Woolwich, attendance at the Royal Military College in Sandhurst was optional for aspiring infantry and cavalry officers. In the 1850s, the Royal Engineers were the first branch of the armed forces to introduce systematic specialist training for newly commissioned officers at Chatham; the course, which lasted around two years, included instruction in surveying, reconnaissance and field fortifications, amongst other subjects. The Royal Artillery soon followed suit with its own course, which involved a 6- to 8-week stay at the Artillery School in Shoeburyness, with the option of further courses upon passing the examination.
In contrast, new officers in the infantry and cavalry were required only to pass a drill examination within two years of their appointment and received no further specialist training. The abolition of the purchase system in 1871 led to the introduction of standardised selection examinations for candidates for an officer’s career. The paths to becoming an officer became more varied: alongside Sandhurst, service in the militia developed into a significant alternative route to an officer’s commission; in 1874, systematic recruitment began at universities; and after 1894, university graduates could be appointed directly as officers. After restructuring and closing cadet training in the early 1870s, it was resumed in 1877, with the number of cadets fluctuating due to reforms and emergencies. From 1889, the training programme at Sandhurst comprised 360 cadets in six companies, who undertook a one-year basic course. By 1892, the training programme had been expanded to a three-semester system, with 120 cadets admitted annually. The curriculum, which was expanded to include French and German by 1897, covered various subject areas such as military engineering, tactics, law and sport, and met the need for professional military expertise within the officer corps. To meet the demand for better training of staff officers, the General Staff College in Camberley was founded in 1857, emerging from the Senior Department. By the beginning of the 20th century, the training system for British Army officers had evolved from a largely informal, socially oriented process into a more structured and professionalised system that placed greater efforts on education, selection procedures and specialised training.
Training Infantry Rather than focusing on strict discipline and repetitive drills to ensure soldiers responded quickly and precisely to orders on the battlefield, the priority shifted to joint training that encouraged initiative in loose formations. The aim of the training was to understand and implement the changing tactics required by advances in weaponry and technology.