The Seventh Division was part of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the army of the nation state of South Vietnam that existed from 1955 to 1975. It was part of the IV Corps, which oversaw the Mekong Delta region of the country.

History The Division was originally established as the 4th Field Division and redesignated as the 7th Infantry Division in 1959.

On 8 July 1959 a Viet Cong (VC) attack on a Division camp at Bien Hoa killed two U.S. advisers, Major Dale R. Buis and Master Sergeant Chester M. Ovnand, among the first Americans killed in the Vietnam War.

The division was based in Mỹ Tho, and due to the division's close proximity to the capital Saigon was a key factor in the success or failure of the various coup attempts in the nation's history. As a result, the loyalty of the commanding officer of the division was crucial in maintaining power. In the coup attempt of 1960, the loyalist Colonel Huỳnh Văn Cao used the Division to storm into Saigon to save President Ngô Đình Diệm.

In 1962, Diem decided to split the command of the area in the south around Saigon into two, the former III Corps area being reduced in size to cover the area northeast of Saigon, and the newly created IV Corps taking over the west and southwest. Cao was promoted to general and assumed command of the new IV Corps, which included the area of operations of his 7th Infantry Division. Command of the 7th was given to Cao's chief of staff, Colonel Bùi Đình Đạm.

The division scored the biggest successes of the military campaigns of 1962, along with the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps, killing more than 2,000 VC fighters and leaving thousands of others cut off from supplies. However, South Vietnamese officers were often reluctant to absorb heavy casualties. On several occasions, Cao's forces were in an excellent position to trap and wipe out whole battalions of VC, but he would fail to close the trap on one pretext or another and allow the enemy to escape. This behavior initially mystified the division's US adviser Lieutenant colonel John Paul Vann, who directed much of the unit's activity, who was attempting to build Cao into an aggressive commander. Unknown to Vann, Diem would reprimand or demote any officer who lost too many men, no matter how successful the operation. Diem was more interested in using the military to protect his regime than to take on the VC. His solution was to fill the ARVN with Catholic political cronies and friends like Cao, Lê Quang Tung and Tôn Thất Đính, who had little military ability, but were very likely to help stop a coup attempt. After a skirmish on a highway that resulted in a small number of South Vietnamese casualties along with several trucks destroyed, Cao was called to Saigon and reprimanded by Diem. Upon his return, Vann and his group of advisers were forced to end the joint planning sessions that had been so successful earlier, and action essentially wound down in their region. Cao used the excellent military intelligence network they had developed to find areas devoid of VC, and planned operations only in those areas. In many other cases, operations were executed on paper only, in order to report an increasing tempo of operations that did not actually exist.

On 2 January 1963 the Division's 11th Regiment took part in the Battle of Ap Bac, a disastrous operation to trap a small VC force.

In the successful coup of November 1963, the plotters managed to have the division transferred temporarily to III Corps, with Diem unaware that III Corps commander Tôn Thất Đính was with the rebels. Đính then placed a rebel subordinate in command of the Division, preventing the rest of Cao's IV Corps from saving Diem.

1964 On 4 February the VC 504th Battalion and elements of the 261st Battalion successfully attacked the understrength 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, at Phú Mỹ. The VC killed 13 ARVN, wounded 25, and captured two 81mm mortars, 19 firearms, and six radios. The VC left behind six dead and two weapons. The VC also destroyed the homes of 300 people.

On 21 June elements of the division and the 9th Division massed eight battalions - five infantry, two airborne, and one Civil Guard, a battery of 105mm howitzers and two platoons of 155mm howitzers to encircle an area 15km in diameter centered on the village of My Thien in western Định Tường province. Inside were an estimated 1,000 VC regulars of the 261st, the 502nd, and 514th Battalions, plus two additional companies. The operation began inauspiciously when a Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF) A-1H fighter-bomber mistakenly attacked the 2nd Battalion, 15th Infantry, causing nine casualties. The major fighting started in the afternoon as the 3rd Airborne Battalion approached the hamlet of Bang Lang. The unit commander decided not to wait for artillery support and led his men in a bayonet charge across 137 meters of muddy paddy into the teeth of entrenched VC machine guns. The battle raged until dark, with fixed-wing aircraft conducting 14 strikes. VC gunners downed four US helicopters. The VC successfully eluded capture that night and two additional days of searching achieved little. The South Vietnamese lost 29 dead and 85 wounded, VC dead numbered almost 100.

On 10 July the division and the 5th Division launched an operation to clear two VC battalions from the heavily forested border of Hau Nghia and Long An provinces. The 5th Division thrust southward from Duc Hoa along the Vàm Cỏ Đông River, while the division drove north from Bến Lức. The object was to trap and destroy the VC between them. Late in the day, the two VC battalions pinned the 30th Ranger Battalion against the banks of the Varic Oriental River. The Rangers received air support throughout the night and at 06:30 on 11 July, 24 US Army helicopters delivered an infantry battalion, but the VC already had withdrawn. ARVN losses were nine killed and 27 wounded, US losses were two killed and three wounded. The allies killed 68 VC and captured 73 suspects.

On 20 August the VC overran Phu Tuc post in Kiến Hòa Province killing seven, wounding 15, and capturing the rest of the post's 36-man garrison and burning the post. An ARVN reaction force comprising 360 soldiers from the 41st Ranger Battalion and the 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry arrived too late. As they withdrew, the VC 514th Battalion attacked the column repeatedly for an hour. ARVN losses were 85 killed, 60 wounded, 91 missing and 122 weapons lost. All four American advisers were killed. Westmoreland was dismayed because no local South Vietnamese had informed the ARVN that the VC were setting up the ambush.

On 22 August seven ARVN battalions, two armored cavalry troops, and naval forces tried to encircle the VC in Kien Hoa province's Ham Long District. In the ensuing battle, division artillery fired 3,222 rounds, and the RVNAF flew 10 fighter-bomber sorties. The allies killed 98 VC and captured 43 prisoners and 37 weapons. Agents reported that the VC buried another 200 dead and evacuated 300 wounded. ARVN losses were 17 killed and 45 wounded.

In September Brigadier general Nguyễn Bảo Trị became the division commander.

On 5 September the Joint General Staff (JGS) abolished the Tien Giang Tactical Area. It transferred the 7th Division and four of the five provinces it supervised to IV Corps and assigned Long An province to III Corps. On the same day during a division operation in Dinh Tuong province, entrenched VC hit three of five UH–1B gunships from the 120th Aviation Company. The gunships in turn killed 60 VC and wounded an estimated 40 more, while 34 VC surrendered.

In the early morning hours of 13 September, Colonel Lý Tòng Bá, the head of the division's armored section to march on Saigon in an attempted coup. They seized Saigon without a fight, but failed to capture premier Nguyễn Khánh, who fled to Da Lat. Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, however, sent his planes into the skies above Saigon, threatening to strike the plotters if they did not back down. The coup leaders General Lâm Văn Phát and Dương Văn Đức ordered Ba to attack Tan Son Nhut Air Base with his armored squadron, but Ba telephoned MACV headquarters instead to learn what America thought about the coup. When he found that MACV opposed the rebellion, he called off the assault. The coup collapsed the following day and the division was purged by Khánh.

On 19 November the division encircled the VC 514th and 267th Battalions near the hamlet of Ba Dua, 7km south of Cai Lay town. The attack started well, but the advance bogged down among deep canals bordered by fortified embankments from which the VC fought until escaping the cordon at night. ARVN losses were eight killed and 38 wounded. The allies reportedly killed 106 VC and estimated that the VC had evacuated another 20 to 30 dead. The ARVN also took 55 prisoners, 18 suspects, and a handful of weapons.

On 27 November the division surrounded a VC force in a flooded rice paddy near Chợ Gạo. After an all-day battle, the ARVN lost eight killed and 19 wounded, and the VC lost 46 dead, seven prisoners, and 14 weapons, with the VC carrying off many more casualties.

On 11 December the VC 261st Battalion attacked Ba Dua hamlet which was defended by the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, and the division reconnaissance company. The VC penetrated the hamlet and airburst artillery fire was called in on the hamlet, following which the ARVN counterattacked. ARVN losses were 12 dead and 19 wounded. The VC left 15 dead and it was estimated that they had suffered a further 50 casualties.

On 27 December a VC battalion overran the 21-man garrison of Quoi Thanh post and the neighboring district town of Ham Long in Kien Hoa province. The division sent in a relief force. At 15:00, the 3rd Battalion, 10th Infantry walked into an L-shaped ambush in a palm forest. The battalion formed a defensive perimeter and awaited reinforcements, but was unable to be relieved until after the VC withdrew that night. The ARVN lost 52 killed, 36 wounded, and 31 missing along with 58 weapons. The allies captured tow VC and estimated VC casualties at 100.

1965 On 21 January the division attacked a VC force massing in Ba Tri district, Kien Hoa Province. An armored cavalry troop, an airborne battalion, and a ranger battalion advanced in line abreast northeast out of Ba Tri toward the village of Tan Xuan. A second armored cavalry troop and several infantry companies stood in reserve. After a bombardment by Vietnamese aircraft and artillery, US helicopters landed an infantry battalion to two landing zones northeast and northwest of Tan Xuan. As the troops swept toward the blocking forces at the landing zones, they had multiple contacts with the VC. When the VC fell back to prepared positions, air and artillery fire assisted M113 armored personnel carriers and soldiers in overrunning them. The attack continued until dark. The VC lost 50 killed, 61 captured and 58 suspects along with two 60mm mortars and 33 individual weapons. The prisoners revealed that the allies had caused 350 casualties. ARVN losses were seven dead and 20 wounded. The VC shot down two helicopters, one of which was destroyed.