Design 1047, also known as Project 1047,Noot (1980), p. 257 was a series of plans for a class of Dutch battlecruisers prior to the Second World War. These large capital ships were intended to counter the threat posed by Japanese aggression towards the Dutch colonies in the East Indies.
Dutch intelligence believed that if it came to war, the Imperial Japanese Navy would deploy its capital ships (aircraft carriers and battleships) against their counterparts of the United States Navy and the British Royal Navy. That would leave heavy and light cruisers, along with seaplane carriers, as the largest warships available for an advance into the East Indies.
To combat a force of these ships, in the 1930s the Koninklijke Marine (Royal Netherlands Navy) prepared designs for a new class of battlecruisers. Their work was shaped by the perceived need to fight their way through a fleet of those cruisers and smaller destroyers; the Dutch hoped that this would allow the battlecruisers to act as a fleet in being. However, the Dutch had never designed a modern capital ship, and this was reflected in a preliminary plan completed on 11 July 1939: it was missing many of the post-First World War advances in warship technology, and the armor protection was completely outmoded.
After an extended period of negotiations, Germany and the Netherlands reached an agreement where Germany would release plans and drawings based upon their ideas for a battlecruiser. In return, the Dutch would guarantee that all the required equipment would be ordered from German firms. With German assistance, a rough design was formulated by February 1940. A visit to Italy prompted a rethink of the internal layout, which led to a set of drawings dated 19 April 1940. This is the last known design produced prior to Germany's invasion and occupation of the Netherlands. Final plans for the ships were never completed, and the ships were never constructed.
Background
The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 marked a period of increasing belligerence from the Japanese Empire, and as the decade progressed the Dutch grew concerned about the security of their East Indies colonies.Worth (2002), p. 218 The islands, which included Java, Sumatra, Borneo and part of New Guinea, were enormously important both politically and strategically to the Dutch, who had lived and traded there for more than three centuries. Over 500,000 settlers had moved from the Netherlands to this "second homeland",Morison (1948), pp. 281–282 and the East Indies possessed abundant valuable resources, the most important of which were the rubber plantations and oilfields;Morison (1948), p. 280 the islands were the fourth-largest exporters of oil in the world, behind the United States, Iran, and Romania.The statistics given are for 1935. The top five oil exporters in this year were, in order, the United States, with 6,958 kt, Persia (Iran), with 6,860 kt, Romania, with 6,221 kt, the Dutch East Indies, with 5,139 kt, and the Soviet Union, with 3,369 kt. See: The Way to Pearl Harbor: US vs Japan , accessed 27 February 2009. Full citation given below.
The Koninklijke Marine had only one seagoing armored ship stationed in the East Indies, the coastal-defense ship (ex-). As this ship was considered to be "of little remaining combat value", three light cruisers (, and ), a few destroyers, and a large submarine fleet were charged with the main naval defense of the islands.Noot (1980), p 244
The Dutch believed that if war broke out, Japan's capital ships would be preoccupied with the battleships of the United States Navy and the British Royal Navy, meaning that the defenses of the East Indies would need to cope only with Japan's cruisers. However, the ships were more powerful than their Dutch equivalents and Japan would also have the advantage of numbers. It was estimated that by 1944, should no new vessels be ordered, the five light cruisers of the Koninklijke Marine (two of the , which were laid down during the First World War, , and two of the ) could be facing 18 heavy and 27 light Japanese cruisers.Gardiner and Chesneau (1980), pp. 174, 187–191, 387–389The last , , was not completed until 30 November 1944; 44 cruisers could have been assembled to attack the East Indies in early 1943 if need be. This count also includes two Chinese light cruisers that were captured in 1937 and a planned hermaphrodite cruiser–seaplane ship (although due to the war, she was completed with a normal catapult and two planes). See and Gardiner and Chesneau (1980), pp. 191–192
These factors forced the Koninklijke Marine to bolster this force, and so the construction of three "super cruisers" capable of overpowering cruisers of the Imperial Japanese Navy was contemplated. The Washington Naval Treaty and London Naval Treaty limited new cruisers of their signatory nations to not more than a 10,000-ton displacement and guns, but as a relatively minor naval power the Netherlands had not been party to the treaties and was not bound by their restrictions. According to Dutch naval intelligence, the Japanese cruisers did not participate in exercises with the main fleet of battleships and fleet carriers, instead operating with seaplane carriers, so it was assumed that the battlecruisers would not have to face overwhelming carrier-based air strikes. Moreover, the presence of these powerful ships—whose larger guns could easily out-range any escorting cruisers or destroyers—would give the Dutch a fleet in being in the East Indies that could delay or end plans for an amphibious assault for fear that the invasion would be disrupted or the attacking fleet destroyed.
Design
In 1938, a number of high-ranking naval officers within the Koninklijke Marine gathered to discuss possible improvements to the navy. They concluded that the Dutch should have a navy strong enough to force an enemy to "use such a large part of his military potential that there would be an unacceptable weakening of his capabilities in other theaters". At this, and a note from the Chief of Naval Staff, the Minister of Defence J.C.C. van Dijk ordered the navy on to begin planning and estimating costs for two or possibly three battlecruisers.Noot (1980), p. 243 The ships formed a key part of a naval rearmament program which was generally called the "Dutch Battlecruiser Plan 1939". This was to also include the acquisition of at least two destroyers, seven submarines and several motor torpedo boats. Most of these vessels were to be deployed to the East Indies upon completion.Spek (1988), pp. 69, 71, 79
Requirements for the new battlecruiser design were laid down by the navy a day before the order from van Dijk was made; they included the ability to steam for 12 hours at 32 knots, an endurance of 4,500 nautical miles at 20 knots, a maximum of fifteen minutes for the ship to go from 20 to 30 knots, protection for the engine room that would allow the ship to take hits in that area without being slowed, a draft not to exceed 9 meters, and capacity for six weeks' worth of supplies. Desired weaponry was nine 280 mm guns in three triple turrets for the main armament, with each gun capable of firing independently, a dual-purpose secondary armament of 120 mm guns in four twin mounts, and an anti-aircraft battery of fourteen in pairs with centralized fire control. Aircraft were to be two fighters and two reconnaissance aircraft. Specific values were given for each aspect of the design's armor, which featured substantial anti-torpedo and mine protectionThis included "anti-torpedo bulkheads extending to double bottom" that were "able to absorb 53 cm torpedo hits". See: Noot (1980), p. 243 and a defense against 28 cm shells and 300 kg bombs.Specific armor values were given in Noot (1980), p. 243; the following is directly quoted from him: Main belt from aft to forward turret: 250 mm Remaining waterline belt: 80 mm Main armored belt: 125 mm Splinter deck on top of armored deck: 30 mm Control tower: sides: 300 mm, roof: 150 mm 28 cm turrets: barbette: 250 mm, front: 300 mm, roof: 150 mm, sides: 100 mm 12 cm mounts: barbette: 80 mm, front: 80 mm, roof: 125 mm to be protected against the effect of 200 kg aircraft bombs and 14 cm shell hits
Preliminary designs As 1913 plans for 24,650-ton dreadnoughts were never brought to fruition due to the First World War,No orders were placed nor were any plans for financing the battleships ever made, mostly due to the First World War. The ships were designed by foreign shipbuilders including Friedrich Krupp Germaniawerft, Blohm & Voss, and Vickers were invited to submit designs to specifications set by the government. See: Gardiner and Gray (1984), p. 366 the Dutch had no prior experience in building such large ships. Moreover, they lacked any significant source of information on more modern vessels; the only material available was unclassified and public sources like Jane's Fighting Ships. Facing these constraints, the Dutch turned to foreign sources for technical assistance.Noot (1980), p. 245Garzke and Dulin (1985), p. 154Gardiner and Gray (1984), pp. 363 and 366
Although they hoped that the French would release plans for their of 'fast battleships', they decided to focus their effort on Hitler's Germany. Informal talks had already been held in Berlin on 24–25 April 1939 where the Dutch proposed that, in return for the complete plans for the , they would order all of the necessary equipment for their construction program from Germany.Garzke and Dulin (1985), p. 153
A draft design was completed without foreign assistance by the Construction Department on 11 July 1939,Noot (1980), p. 247 in Table 1 give the characteristics of this preliminary design as follows:
Displacement: 26,000 t Draft: 7.45 m Machinery: Eight boilers (4 × 2), four propellers, 160,000 shp able to push the ship at 33 kn Endurance: 4500 nmi at 20 kn Side belt: 250 mm tapering upwards to 150 mm and 100 mm Side belt forward and aft: 100 mm Main traverse bulkheads: not indicated Main Armored deck: 125 mm Upper deck: 15 mm 28 cm turrets: barbette: 250 mm, front: 300 mm, roof: 130 mm, sides: 100 mm Underwater protection: double bottom, depth of 100 mm, depth of side protection system: 700 mm, depth of main side belt: 600 mm, longitudinal anti-torpedo bulkheads: 30 mm, one on each side of the ship Armament was the same as the preliminary and final designs Two aircraft but it did not reflect the numerous technical developments that had entered capital ship designs after the First World War. In particular, its armor scheme was utterly obsolete, as it lacked any substantial amount of deck armor or good underwater protection; it came closer to the designs of 20 to 25 years previous than to that of a modern warship.
Despite German interest in the battlecruiser project, the two sides could not agree on terms. The German delegation insisted that orders placed in their country be guaranteed, with financial compensation to be paid to German companies if the Dutch did not construct the ships. They also refused to release a complete set of plans for the Scharnhorsts. Further complicating negotiations, the Dutch Cabinet, which would have to approve any deal, did not convene during the summer of 1939.
While awaiting official approval, Dutch planning went ahead. A contract with Ferrostaal A.G. Essen was drawn up, and on a list of products for purchase in Germany was submitted.Noot (1980), p. 249 gives a full list: 37,500 tons of armor, which would be delivered between June 1940 and January 1944 (the majority of this to be delivered prior to January 1943) 18,000 tons of construction material, to be delivered June 1940 through June 1943 (the majority of this to be delivered prior to January 1942) Nine 28 cm triple turrets and twelve 12 cm twin mounts, to be delivered from spring to late 1943 Ammunition for both the 28 cm and 12 cm guns, to be delivered from late 1943 through late 1944