The String of Pearls is a geopolitical hypothesis proposed by United States political researchers in 2004. It is the network of Chinese military and commercial facilities and relationships along its sea lines of communication which extend from mainland China to Port Sudan in the Horn of Africa. The sea lines run through several major maritime choke points such as the Strait of Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Lombok Strait as well as other strategic maritime centres in Somalia and the littoral South Asian countries of Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives.
Many commentators in India believe this plan, together with the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor and other parts of China's Belt and Road Initiative under Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping, is a threat to India's national security. Such a system would encircle India and threaten its power projection, trade, and potentially territorial integrity. Furthermore, China's support for India's traditional enemy of Pakistan and its Gwadar Port is viewed as a threat, compounded by fears that China may develop an overseas naval military base in Gwadar, which could allow China to conduct expeditionary warfare in the Indian Ocean Region. From the east, the deep-water port of Kyaukpyu is also viewed with a similar concern. The first comprehensive academic analyses of Chinese plan and its security implications for New Delhi was undertaken in February 2008 by an active-duty Indian naval officer.Khurana, Gurpreet S China's 'String of Pearls' in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications Strategic Analysis 32 (1): February 2008, 1-39. Antedating China's anti-piracy naval deployment in the Indian Ocean beginning in December 2008, and the ensuing acquisition of its first overseas military base in Djibouti in August 2017, his analysis predicting China's "permanent military presence" in the Indian Ocean is viewed by Indian policymakers as prescient. Accordingly, India has since been making moves of various types to counter the threat.
The term as a geopolitical concept was first used in an internal US Department of Defense report, "Energy Futures in Asia" in 2005."China builds up strategic sea lanes" , The Washington Times, Washington, 17 January 2005. Retrieved on 4 May 2013. The term is also widely used in India's geopolitical and foreign policy narratives to highlight India's concerns over massive Chinese Belt and Road Initiative projects across southern Asia. According to the EUISS, the formation of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (consisting of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) is a direct result of China's assertive foreign and security policy in the Indo-Pacific region.
The emergence of the String of Pearls is indicative of China's growing geopolitical influence through concerted efforts to increase access to ports and airfields, expand and modernise military forces, and foster stronger diplomatic relationships with trading partners.Pehrson, Christopher J.String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China's Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral. , "Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy", July 2006. Retrieved on 4 May 2013. The Chinese government insists that China's burgeoning naval strategy is entirely peaceful and is only for the protection of regional trade interests.Hu: China Would Never Seek Hegemony , "Xinhua News Agency", Beijing, 23 April 2009. Retrieved on 4 May 2013. Chinese Communist Party general secretaries Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping have both asserted that China will never seek hegemony in foreign relations. by The Economist also found the Chinese moves to be commercial in nature. Although it has been claimed that China's actions are creating a security dilemma between China and India in the Indian Ocean, that has been questioned by some analysts, who point to China's fundamental strategic vulnerabilities.
Terminology In the theory, a "pearl" refers to a current or potential Chinese overseas military base, mega infrastructure project, economic corridor, port or other city or locale of Chinese geostrategic advantage in the region. These "pearls" are designated by U.S. and Indian strategists. The eponymous "string" of these pearls refers to the possibility of the Chinese Navy connecting these pearls via maritime routes. Chinese political researchers do not use the term String of Pearls to describe their own geopolitical and diplomatic strategy, instead called the term "malicious defamation" from the United States.
Origins In 2004, the U.S. consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton came up with the "string of pearls" hypothesis, which posits that China will try to expand its naval presence by building civilian maritime infrastructure along the Indian Ocean periphery. According to Pacific Forum researcher Virginia Marantidou, China held great anxiety toward its security environment in the Indian Ocean, due to potential U.S. and Indian blockade at the Malacca Strait. This situation, coined the "Malacca dilemma" by Chinese researchers, posed significant challenges to the government elites in Beijing. David H. Shinn predicted in 2008 that China will need to expand their naval capacities in order to protect supply lines of vital resources from Africa and the Middle East to China.David H. Shinn. "Military and Security Relations: China, Africa and the rest of the world." In: Robert I. Rotberg. "China into Africa: Aid, trade and influence". American, European, and Indian political strategists have used the term to designates China's point of influences in Indo-Pacific region.
China's rapid economic development over the course of the last quarter century has been heavily dependent on foreign sources of energy, and it is likely that foreign sources of energy will prove even more critical to the continued growth of the Chinese economy. The sea lines of communication that link the Chinese mainland with ports throughout the Middle East and coasts of Africa have become a major source of conflict with respect to China's energy security.
China is the world's largest oil consumer and the largest oil importer. Oil imported from the Gulf States and Africa comprises 70% of total Chinese oil imports, and remains China's most critical source of energy apart from domestic coal burning and nuclear power. To meet future demand, China has signed a number of long-term contracts to develop Iranian oil fields and to build a pipeline, refinery, and port in Sudan for oil export.
The oversea transport of oil from existing production areas will continue to remain the primary mode of energy importation for the foreseeable future. Efforts to secure new supply lines in Central Asia have proven difficult, with poor infrastructure, political instability, logistical challenges, and corruption hampering energy development there. Energy security also sits at the core of China's anti-piracy efforts, which figure into its larger maritime objectives. The expansion of Chinese naval patrols off the Coast of Somalia, and China's decision to join multi-nation defence patrols in 2010, indicate China's greater assertiveness in the policing of shipping corridors."China's anti-piracy role off Somalia expands". , BBC, 29 January 2010. Retrieved on 4 May 2013.
Facilities and relationships
South China Sea The critical sea lines of communication that connect China to Middle Eastern oil-producing states traverse the South China Sea, making it a key strategic region, and potential trouble spot, for the Chinese government. Chinese naval vessels heavily patrol South China Sea waters, and conflicting territorial claims in the region have periodically erupted in naval confrontations.Blasko, Dennis J. and M. Taylor Fravel. "'Much Ado About The Sansha Garrison." , "The Diplomat", 23 August 2012. Retrieved on 4 May 2013 Chinese efforts to control the South China Sea have therefore figured significantly in speculations about the wider ambitions of the Chinese central government in the construction of a power projection chain across Asia.
The central government's efforts to exercise greater control in the region began in earnest after the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of US forces from the Philippines in 1991.Kotani, Tetsuo. "'Why China Wants South China Sea." , "The Diplomat", 18 July 2011. Retrieved on 4 May 2013. Although skirmishes with neighbouring powers, most notably with Vietnam during the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, have been a fixture of post-war Chinese foreign relations, the Chinese government began aggressively asserting its territorial claims in the region only within the last two decades. Interest in the region has historically extended to the rich fishing and mineral resources known to exist there.Paal, Douglas H. "'Beware the South China Sea." , "The Diplomat", 15 July 2011. Retrieved on 4 May 2013. However, islets in the regions can also be used as air and sea bases for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities, as well as base points for Chinese ballistic missile submarines and potential aircraft carrier battle groups.
The Chinese naval base on Hainan Island is generally considered the first of the pearls or potential pearls. Recent construction of an underwater submarine base on Hainan, in addition to the sprawling facilities already located there, seems to further confirm the perceived importance of Hainan as a base of control for China's claims in the South China Sea. Woody Island, the largest of the Paracel Islands, hosts an upgraded Chinese airstrip and has also been identified as a pearl. Sansha, the prefecture-level city established on Woody Island, maintains a division-level garrison that also oversees Chinese claims in the Spratly Islands, extending a small but permanent military presence across Chinese claims in the South China Sea. A $20 billion Chinese proposal aimed at Thailand to fund the construction of a canal across the Kra Isthmus, which would allow ships to bypass the Strait of Malacca altogether, has also broached concerns of a Chinese-controlled corridor linking Chinese ports and facilities elsewhere in the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean.Sulong, Rini Suryati. 2012. "'The Kra Canal and Southeast Asian Relations." , "Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs", Hamburg, 31 (4): 110-125.
Indian Ocean Chinese possessions in the Indian Ocean consist primarily of commercial ports owned and operated by Chinese firms, as well as resupply stations operating in agreement with the Chinese central government. The two largest projects consist of a Chinese-financed commercial shipping center in Hambantota, Sri Lanka, and a Chinese-controlled deep-water port near the mouth of the Persian Gulf in Gwadar, Pakistan, which is also the crux of China's massive $62 billion China–Pakistan Economic Corridor project. Both sites have raised the concern of neighbouring powers, most significantly India, which fears the possibility of a string of Chinese bases situated just off its coast. Chinese investment in Hambantota, and Sri Lanka's dialogue partner status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), is seen by some Indian analysts as reflective of a wider encirclement strategy on the part of the Chinese (though India itself would join in 2017 as a full member).Joseph, Josy. "Delhi entangled in the Dragon's String of Pearls" , DNA, New Delhi, 11 May 2009. Retrieved on 4 May 2013.Samaranayake, Nilanthi. 2011. "Are Sri Lanka's Relations with China Deepening? An Analysis of Economic, Military, and Diplomatic Data" , Asian Security 7 (2): 119-146. The port at Gwadar, which is connected to the Karakoram Highway linking Western China and the Arabian Sea, is of even greater concern to the Indian government, which views it as powerful evidence of Chinese and Pakistani collusion against Indian security and economic interests.Eshel, David. "'String of Pearls' is Securing China's Sea Lanes". Defense Update, 20 December 2010.
Pakistan