Jagdish Sharan Verma (18 January 1933 – 22 April 2013) was an Indian jurist who served as the 27th Chief Justice of India from 25 March 1997 to 18 January 1998. He was the chairman of the National Human Rights Commission from 1999 to 2003, and chairman of the Justice Verma Committee Report on Amendments to Criminal Law after the 2012 Delhi gang rape case. He remains one of India's most highly regarded Chief Justices and eminent jurists in its history.
He was known for his judicial innovation through landmark judgements, which made him "the face of judicial activism" in India. His decisions were credited with the forging of powerful new judicial tools such as continuing mandamus, and the expanded protection of fundamental rights as in the Vishaka Judgement. Alongside judicial activism and fundamental rights protection, he was strongly associated with women's empowerment, probity in public life, judicial accountability, as well as enhancing social justice.
As Chief Justice of India, he also administered oath of office to 10th President of India K. R. Narayanan.
Early life, education and family Jagdish Sharan Verma was born in a Kayastha family in Satna, Madhya Pradesh. He had six brothers and three sisters. He completed his early education at Venkat High School in Satna (Govt. Venkat H.S. Excellence School No.1, Satna), followed by Government Jubilee Intercollege, Lucknow. He graduated from the University of Allahabad with a B.Sc. and LL.B.
He had two daughters with his wife, Pushpa.
High Court
Verma began his legal career in 1955, and enrolled as an advocate in the Madhya Pradesh High Court in August 1959. He was appointed as a judge there in June 1972. In the following year, he delivered a judgment arguing that a juvenile convicted of murder ought to be tried under separate procedures from an adult. This went on to form the basis for the Juvenile Justice Act in 1986.
After the declaration of state of emergency in India, he was one of the first judges to reject the government's proclamation that the emergency took precedence over rights to life and liberty. Before the Supreme Court stopped High Courts from entertaining habeas corpus petitions, Verma "stood out" as one of the few high court judges who released detainees arrested under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act.
He became Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court in June 1985 and also served as Chief Justice of Rajasthan High Court from September 1986 until his elevation to the Supreme Court in June 1989. He acted as the Governor of Rajasthan twice between 1986 and 1989.
Supreme Court
In June 1989, he was appointed Judge of the Supreme Court of India, and became Chief Justice of India in January 1998. During his time in the Supreme Court, Justice Verma gave numerous landmark judgments. Over the course of his Supreme Court tenure, Verma authored 149 judgments and sat on 639 benches.
Most notable cases
Kumari Shrileka Vidyarthi etc. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
The state terminated the appointment of all government counsel irrespective of whether the term of the incumbent had expired or not. At the same time, the government directed preparation of fresh panels to make appointments in the place of existing incumbents. The court strongly asserted the requirement that every state action must not be arbitrary even if that state action was in the field of contractual relations between the state and individuals. Justice Verma stated that the basic requirement of Article 14 in the Constitution of India is fairness in action by the state. It is difficult to accept that the state can be permitted to act otherwise in any field of its activity, irrespective of the nature of its function. This requirement must be satisfied by every action of the state or an instrumental body of the state in order for it to be valid.
K Veeraswami vs. Union of India
A petition was filed by a former high court chief justice in the Supreme Court, arguing that he could not be proceeded against under the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947. This was on the basis that he was not a public servant for the purposes of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The majority of the Supreme Court held that a former Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras could be proceeded against under the Act. This was on the basis that a judge belonging to the higher judiciary was a public servant for the purposes of the Act.
Justice Verma dissented, saying that Parliament had not intended a member of the higher judiciary to be designated a 'public servant' for the purposes of the Prevention of Corruption Act as amended. Justice Verma recognised the need for an appropriate mechanism to deal with corruption by members of the higher judiciary but stated that the difference is between the law as it is and the law as it should be. He said that "judicial activism can supply the deficiencies and fill gaps in an already existing structure found deficient in some ways, but it must stop short of building a new edifice where there is none." The majority position would also prove problematic to the principles of independence of the judiciary and the constitutional scheme of the hierarchy of the courts.
Smt. Nilabati Behera Vs. State of Orissa & Ors
A mother of a 22-year-old man who had died in police custody wrote a letter to the Supreme Court which the court treated as a writ petition. A Rs 1.5 lakh compensation was awarded by the Supreme Court to the mother, as Justice Verma held that compensation was a public law remedy distinct from and in addition to the private law remedy in tort for damages. Justice Verma stated that the award of compensation in a proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution of India or by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a public law remedy which is based on strict liability for the breach of fundamental rights.
Justice Verma argued that the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply as a defence in relation to compensation as a public law remedy, even though it may be available as a defence in a private law action based on tort. Justice Verma stated that compensation is an acknowledged constitutional remedy for enforcement and protection of fundamental rights. The award of monetary compensation is a justifiable remedy when it is the only practical method of redress available for contraventions of fundamental rights by the state or its servants in the purported exercise of its powers. The Supreme Court relied on Article 9 (5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as an additional ground in order to award compensation as a mode of enforcement of the fundamental 'right to life' when no other mode of enforcement was available.
The Second Judges Case The Second Judges Case (Advocates-On-Record Association & Ors. v. Union of India 3) was the foundation for the collegium system for the appointment of the judiciary in India. The court held that the executive and the judiciary are to reach their decision together, given that both have a vital role in the joint venture. It is only if there is an irresolvable disagreement between them which cannot be resolved by joint effort that the Chief Justice of India would have primacy. It was only in this situation that the question of primacy should arise.
This was on the basis that the opinion of the Chief Justice of India is formed collectively after taking into account the views of his senior colleagues who are required to be consulted by him.
In the First Judges Case (S. P Gupta et al. v Union of India et al.), the majority took the view that the opinion of the judiciary does not have primacy in the matter of appointments of judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts. The primacy is with the central government, which is to take the decision after consulting all the constitutional functionaries. The central government is not bound to act in accordance with the opinion of all the constitutional functionaries consulted even if their opinion is the same.
In the Second Judges case, the court felt that the approach in the First Judges case threatened the principles of independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers with danger of the politicisation of judicial appointments. The court also felt that this approach potentially minimised the role of the judiciary in appointments when the judiciary would have best knowledge of the legal calibre and acumen of potential appointees in comparison to the executive.
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India
This case related to a presidential proclamation issued under Section 356 (1) of the Emergency Provisions of the Constitution of India dissolving the Karnataka Legislative Assembly. Article 365 of the Indian Constitution empowers the President of India, on his being satisfied that, "a situation has arisen" in which the state government cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution to take action. This enables the state to come under the direct control of the central government.
The court held that whilst it could review whether a proclamation which imposed the president's rule was ultra vires, under Article 356 the scope of such review would be limited. There was a narrow area which was justiciable by the court with deference awarded to the decision of the executive. This was on the basis that the exercise of the power of proclamation was a political one with a wide area of discretion which would often involve a great deal of political judgment. It is difficult to evolve judicially manageable norms on the basis of which to scrutinise decisions which are often highly subjective and based on a wide array of socio-political and economic factors. Justice Verma stated that only cases which permit application of totally objective standards for deciding whether the constitutional machinery has failed are amenable to judicial review and the remaining cases where there is any significant area of subjective satisfaction are not justiciable because of a lack of judicially manageable standards for resolving the controversy. The latter cases are subject only to political scrutiny i.e. through elections.
Ayodhya Judgement
The Ayodhya Judgement is formally known as Dr. M Ismail Furuqui vs Union of India. After the demolition of Babri Masjid the disputed area had been acquired and was under the control of the central government until the adjudication of the dispute in relation to the property. The Court struck down provisions which diminished the pending suits in relation to this disputed property without providing an alternative judicial mechanism for deciding the legal dispute. The provisions through which the property came to be acquired by the centre were upheld.
The Supreme Court elucidated the meaning of Indian secularism in this case, stating: it is clear from the constitutional scheme that it guarantees equality in the matter of religion to all individuals and groups irrespective of their faith emphasising that there is no religion of the state itself. The Preamble of the Constitution read in particular with Articles 25 to 28 emphasises this aspect and indicates that it is in this manner the concept of secularism embodied in the Constitutional scheme as a creed adopted by the Indian people has to be understood whilst examining the constitutional validity of any legislation on the touchstone of the Constitution. The concept of secularism is one facet of the right to equality woven as the central golden thread in the fabric depicting the pattern of the scheme in the Constitution.
Jamaat-e-Islami Hind vs. Union of India
In this case, Justice Verma upheld the principles of natural justice and judicial protections of freedom of association, freedom of expression under the Indian Constitution in the face of strong political pressure.