The al-Fakhura school shelling was an Israeli military strike that took place during the Gaza War on 6 January 2009 near a United Nations-run school in the Jabalia Camp in the Gaza Strip. According to the UN and several non-governmental organizations (NGOs), more than 40 people were killed. Israel reported the death toll as nine Hamas militants and three noncombatants with senior IDF officers stating that the death toll published by Hamas was "grossly exaggerated". Israel stated it fired on the school in response to militant gunfire believed to be coming from al-Fakhura. A UN inquiry said that there was no firing from within the school and there were no explosives within the school, but could not establish if militants fired from the vicinity of the school.

Overview On 6 January 2009, Palestinians were using the al-Fakhura school run by UNRWA as a shelter.. Jerusalem Post, 5 February 2009Grief and Rage at Stricken Gaza School . The New York Times. Published January 7, 2009. Most were from northern Gaza near Beit Lahiya, after being ordered to leave by the IDF for their own safety. Two Israeli tanks fired shells which exploded outside the school.Gaza's day of carnage - 40 dead as Israelis bomb two UN schools . Chris McGreal and Hazem Balousha, The Guardian, 7 January 2009.

Accounts of the shelling Israeli accounts Initial Israeli accounts The IDF originally said that Hamas militants were inside the school, firing rockets and mortars.Why UN 'reversal' over Gaza school should be treated with caution . Jonathan Miller, Channel 4 News, 5 February 2009At least 30 Gazans killed in strike on UN school; IDF: Troops fired in self-defense . Haaretz, 6 Jan 2009. The next day, it was said that a mortar was fired from the playground. The IDF stated that among the Hamas gunmen inside the school were Imad and Hassan Abu-Askar, known to the IDF as Hamas rocket-launching operatives, and said to have found their bodies following the attack. The Israeli military declared that it responded with a single shell at the school, resulting in an explosion because Hamas had booby-trapped the school.

An Israeli government spokesman said that "the incident was a 'very extreme example of how Hamas operates, and "If you take over – I presume with guns – a UN facility. If you hold the people there as hostages, you shoot out of that facility at Israeli soldiers in the neighbourhood, then you receive incoming fire". An Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson said that a Hamas squad was firing mortar shells from the immediate vicinity of the school.

On 6 January, the IDF released a video footage from 2007, showing Palestinian militants firing from the school compound and carrying a rocket launcher with them as they flee the scene.UN rejects IDF claim Gaza militants operated from bombed-out school . Haaretz, 7 January 2009

According to Haaretz, a preliminary investigation found that the army's location system to pinpoint launch sites indicated that Hamas militants had launched a Qassam rocket into Israel from within a yard adjacent to the schoolyard. The troops had intended to launch a smart missile but a technical malfunction made this impossible. Instead mortar shells were used. Due to a GPS error margin of 30 meters, one of three rounds hit the UNRWA building. Two of the rounds hit the yard used to launch rockets into Israel, killing two members of Hamas' military wing.IDF denies errant shell hit UNRWA school. By Tovah Lazaroff. The Jerusalem Post. Published January 12, 2009,

Subsequent Israeli account On April 22, 2009, the IDF announced the results of its internal investigation on Operation Cast Lead. The report found that Hamas had fired mortar shells at a position 80 meters from the school and that the IDF used "minimal and proportionate retaliatory fire" afterward. It also concluded that the IDF "did not, at any time, fire with the deliberate intention to hit a UN vehicle or facility" at any point in the conflict.IDF Releases Information Regarding Operation Cast Lead Military Investigations . Israel Defense Forces. Published 22 April 2009.

Palestinian accounts A Hamas spokesman said allegations that militants had used the school to attack Israeli forces were baseless. Abdel Minaim Hasan who lost his eldest daughter, Lina, 11, wept by her body wrapped in a Hamas flag. The New York Times reported that he cried out: "From now on I am Hamas! ... I choose resistance!" He also cursed the Arab nations, shouting, "The Arabs are doing nothing to protect us!" Huda Deed who lost nine members of her extended family, ages 3 to 25, was also weeping and standing before the bodies of the dead remarked, "Look, they've lined them up like a ruler!" When asked for an interview by Al-Aqsa TV, the Hamas channel, she refused. Mushir al-Masri, a senior Hamas official who emerged from hiding to attend the funeral, commended the dead and called them martyrs. According to The New York Times, some parents greeted him by shaking his hand while others stared at him coldly.

United Nations accounts John Ging, Director of UNRWA operations, said that three shells had landed "at the perimeter of the school". He said Israel knew it was targeting a UN facility. OCHA reported on 6 January that the missile strikes had been outside the school. The report stated that UNRWA had rejected Israeli statements that the school was being used to fire mortars at the Israeli army.Situation report from the humanitarian coordinator 6 January 2009, 1800 hours . United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs In its report of the following day, however, OCHA said the school itself had been shelled.Situation report from the humanitarian coordinator 7 January 2009, 1700 hours . United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs On 2 February, OCHA corrected the statement, clarifying that the shelling, and all of the fatalities, took place outside rather than inside the school.Situation report from the humanitarian coordinator 30 January – 2 February 2009, 1700 hours . United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OCHA and UNRWA denied that they had ever verbally accused Israel of hitting the school. Several news agencies said that the UN had backtracked from its original statement that the strike had hit the school.

On 8 January, a UNRWA spokesman said that the IDF admitted that they had not responded to shelling originating from the school, and said that the attack on the UN site was unintentional. They also said that all the video footage released by the IDF of militants firing from inside the school was from 2007 and not from the incident itself.UN: IDF officers admitted there was no gunfire from Gaza school which was shelled . Akiva Eldar and Barak Ravid, Haaretz, 9 January 2009

According to an Israeli Government report published in July 2009, the UN Board of Inquiry was unable to reach any conclusion whether or not mortars were being fired and directed against the IDF from near to the school...[the Board] was not in a position to assess whether [more precise] means of response was available to the IDF at the time and, if it was not, the length and consequences of any delay until it might have become available.

The UNHRC fact-finding mission report in September 2009 criticized the choice of weapons for the counterstrike, saying that the use of mortars in this setting would have brought about certainty that civilians would be injured and killed. The report stated that the IDF had violated Article 57, Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, in excess of proportionality, finding in conclusion:"... the Mission is of the view the deployment of at least four mortar shells to attempt to kill a small number of specified individuals in a setting where large numbers of civilians were going about their daily business and 1,368 people were sheltering nearby cannot meet the test of what a reasonable commander would have determined to be an acceptable loss of civilian life for the military advantage sought."Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict , UNHCR report, September 25, 2009, para. 696–698, late submission (advanced version released on Sep. 15)The same report expanded on the identities of two fatalities of the attack named by the IDF as Hamas operatives: Imad Abu Askar and Hassan Abu Askar. Both were sons of Muhammed Fouad Abu Askar, identified by the report as a Hamas member and holding the civilian position of Director-General for Religious Affairs. He denies involvement in armed militant activities. Mr. Abu Askar says that no person named Hassan exists in his family tree. The report speculates that it is a misidentification by the IDF of Khaled Abu Askar, Mr. Abu Askar's 19-year-old son and confirmed fatality in the attack. This person does not appear to be mentioned in any official IDF communications. The other, Imad Abu Askar, alleged by numerous Israeli officials to be "a well-known member" of Hamas and "of some significance in rocket launching operations", was reported to be a 13-year-old boy.

The report admits the possibility of Palestinian militant activity in the area, but states that the credibility of Israel's government was "damaged by the series of inconsistencies and factual inaccuracies", citing "erroneous allegations of who specifically was hit". The report regards the government's version of events on January 6 as being "erroneous" and "a result of the immediate outcry", factually conflicting with later official Israeli investigations published on April 22. It also points out the incorrect identities of the dead, and that none of the seven names made available by the CLA through the press corroborate with the identities produced by the investigation's findings. Citing these and other incongruities, it describes the version stated by Israeli authorities as giving "the impression of either profound confusion or obfuscation".

In the initial response to the UNHRC fact-finding mission report, Israeli Government replied that the committee findings reflect the oversimplistic approach to complex military challenges during the fighting, implying that the mission members did not possess the information that was known to the force's commander at the time of the attack regarding the immediate threat, weapon's availability and potential risks to civilians.Initial Response to Report of the Fact Finding Mission on Gaza , IMFA, September 24, 2009

According to a UN Board of Inquiry there was no firing from within the school and no explosives within the school. The Board could not establish with certainty whether there had been any firing from the vicinity of the school.Operation Cast Lead: 16-year-old killed while playing nearby UNRWA school shelled by Israeli tanks , DCI-Palestine, 28 May 2009

Eyewitness accounts According to Mouin Gasser, a 45-year-old teacher, the area around the school was hit four times in about two minutes by the shells that landed just outside the school. Gasser said that he did not see any militants in the area.

Hanan Abu Khajib said that Hamas militants fired just outside the school compound, likely from the secluded courtyard of a house across the street some 25 yards from the school, and that Israeli return fire minutes later landed outside the school along its southwest wall, killing two Hamas fighters.