The 67th Guards Rifle Division was formed as an elite infantry division of the Red Army in January, 1943, based on the 1st formation of the 304th Rifle Division, and served in that role until after the end of the Great Patriotic War. It was officially redesignated in the 65th Army of Don Front, in recognition of that division's leading role in reducing the German 6th Army during Operation Ring, the destruction of the encircled German and Romanian forces at Stalingrad. During the following months it was substantially rebuilt while moving north during the spring of the year. The division put up a very strong defense in the Battle of Kursk, facing some of the main elements of Army Group South, and then attacked through the western Ukraine after the German defeat. Along with the rest of 6th Guards Army it moved further north to join 2nd Baltic and later 1st Baltic Front in the buildup to the summer offensive against Army Group Center, winning a battle honor and shortly after the Order of the Red Banner in the process. During the rest of 1944 it advanced through the Baltic states and ended the war near the Baltic Sea, helping to besiege Army Group Courland in 1945. The 67th Guards was disbanded in 1946.
Formation The 67th Guards was one of two Guards rifle divisions (the other being the 66th Guards) created prior to the German surrender during the Battle of Stalingrad. When formed, its order of battle was as follows: 196th Guards Rifle Regiment from 807th Rifle Regiment 199th Guards Rifle Regiment from 809th Rifle Regiment 201st Guards Rifle Regiment from 812th Rifle Regiment 138th Guards Artillery Regiment from 404th Artillery Regiment 73rd Guards Antitank Battalion from 336th Antitank BattalionCharles C. Sharp, "Red Guards", Soviet Guards Rifle and Airborne Units 1941 to 1945, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Vol. IV, 1995, p. 71 83rd Guards Antiaircraft Battery (until April 24, 1943) 68th Guards Reconnaissance Company 76th Guards Sapper Battalion 96th Guards Signal Battalion 71st Guards Medical/Sanitation Battalion 66th Guards Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Company 69th Guards Motor Transport Company 70th Guards Field Bakery 72nd Guards Divisional Veterinary Hospital 799th Field Postal Station 892nd Field Office of the State Bank
Col. Serafim Pavlovich Merkulov, who had commanded the 304th prior to its redesignation, remained in command and was promoted to the rank of major general on January 27.
Operation Ring The final stage of Operation Ring was scheduled to begin on January 22, but in the event began in earnest the day before with a strong reconnaissance-in-force by elements of the 24th, 65th and 21st Armies against the entire northwestern corner of 6th Army's defenses beginning just before 1000 hours. During the day this attack shattered the defenses of the VIII Army Corps' 113th, 76th and 44th Infantry Divisions in the 10 km-wide sector from just south of Novaya Nadezhda State Farm southward to Hill 134.4. The 76th was seriously damaged and Army Group Don reported in the evening that "the 44th ID seems to be crushed." Furthermore a gap 6 km wide had been carved into 6th Army's western front with no hope of being closed and Gumrak airfield was now within range of Soviet medium artillery. These successes were enough to secure Guards status for the 293rd and 304th Rifle Divisions by the end of the day.David M. Glantz, Endgame at Stalingrad, Book Two, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2014, pp. 506-09
During January 25 the 65th Army pressed forward with the 27th and 67th Guards, 23rd and 233rd Rifle Divisions, converging on Aleksandrova and the western half of Gorodishche, capturing both towns as well as Razgulaevka Station. As they advanced these divisions pushed the 76th and 113th Infantry back toward the Vishnevaia Balka and the western end of the Barrikady workers' settlement. The 67th Guards, 233rd and 24th Rifle Divisions then oriented their assault to the western edge of the Krasny Oktyabr village with the goal of linking up with the left wing of 62nd Army, specifically the 13th Guards and 284th Rifle Divisions. This was intended to chop 6th Army's pocket in two and succeeded just after dawn on January 26, catching the German defenders disorganized and demoralized by the previous day's combat. During the day the 67th Guards, with the 24th and 233rd, faced tough fighting against the remnants of the 76th Infantry, advancing 3–5 km. The division made the best progress, reaching and capturing Marker 73.6, less than 1000m from the western edge of the two factory villages.Glantz, Endgame at Stalingrad, Book Two, pp. 525-26, 530, 536
The southern German pocket, including Field Marshal F. Paulus, surrendered on January 31. The next day Don Front concentrated its artillery and airpower, along with the 62nd, 65th and 66th Armies against the roughly 50,000 men remaining in the northern pocket. The attack began at 0830 hours with a 90-minute artillery preparation with about 1,000 guns directly supporting 65th Army. The division gave support to the main attack by the 23rd and 24th Divisions across the Vishnevaia Balka which soon gained anywhere from 600-1,200m and resulted in the capture of up to 20,000 German soldiers and the through demoralization of the remainder. All but a few holdouts surrendered on February 2, and the 67th Guards and 214th Rifle Divisions drew the duty of clearing these from the factory district:Within days the division was transferred to 21st Army along with the 23rd Division, which became the 71st Guards Rifle Division on March 1.Glantz, Endgame at Stalingrad, Book Two, pp. 564-67, 575
By the beginning of March, Don Front had become Central Front and at about the same time the 21st Army was re-designated as 6th Guards Army, joining Voronezh Front later that month. Along with nearly all of the Stalingrad divisions, the 67th Guards required extensive rebuilding during these months. During April it was assigned to 22nd Guards Rifle Corps and 6th Guards Army moved inside the Kursk salient, helping to fortify the south face of the bulge.Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1943, pp. 63, 87, 111Sharp, "Red Guards", p. 72 On June 23 General Merkulov handed his command over to Col. Aleksei Ivanovich Baksov, who would be promoted to major general on June 3, 1944.http://www.generals.dk states that Merkulov left command of the division on February 2: http://generals.dk/general/Merkulov/Serafim_Petrovich/Soviet_Union.html. Zamulin gives the date of Baksov's command as June 30; Zamulin, The Battle of Kursk - Controversial and Neglected Aspects, p. 231
Battle of Kursk As of July 1 the 22nd Guards Corps had the 67th and 71st Guards deployed in the first echelon and the 90th Guards Rifle Division in second echelon. The boundary between the 67th and 71st was secured with assets of the latter including a battery of its 151st Guards Artillery Regiment, a battery of regimental guns, two batteries of 82mm mortars, 11 antitank guns, 14 antitank rifles, three heavy and nine light machine guns. The 67th Guards disposed of somewhat fewer weapons. These were located southwest and south of the village of Cherkasskoe which was roughly the boundary between the divisions although held by the 67th. A minefield and an antitank ditch barred the approaches to its forward edge.Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, ed. & trans. R. W. Harrison, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2016, Kindle ed., Book 1, ch. 1, 2 As a further part of the plan of defense Voronezh Front was committed to a counter-artillery preparation at such time it became clear that the German attack was imminent. The 67th Guards was to employ its 138th Guards Artillery Regiment, its regimental guns, and its 82mm and 120mm mortars on the approaches to Cherkasskoe. In the event this plan was preempted by forward detachments of 4th Panzer Army which attacked at 1610 hours on July 4, following bombing attacks and a 10-minute artillery preparation, with the goals of destroying the division's security outposts and seizing high ground for observation, but made only limited progress.Valeriy Zamulin, The Battle of Kursk - Controversial and Neglected Aspects, ed. & trans. S. Britton, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2017, pp. 207, 210
Both divisions were struck at 0600 hours on the opening day of the German offensive by XXXXVIII Panzer Corps. This powerful formation included the 11th Panzer Division, Großdeutschland Panzer-Grenadier Division and the 10th Panzer Brigade, which was equipped with the first Panther tanks to enter service. The main German thrust came from the Gertsovka to Butovo area toward Korovino and Cherkasskoe with the 67th Guards facing an infantry regiment reinforced by 70 tanks and supported by 70 aircraft; this first effort was beaten off. Even before the attack began the German forces encountered serious problems due to minefields and other Soviet fixed defenses, as well as overcrowding on a very narrow attack sector. The Panthers became stuck in the minefields, blocking the tanks of Großdeutschland and forcing the infantry to go in without direct armor support. A marshy gully in front of the 196th Guards Rifle Regiment, which had been skilfully strengthened with a system of anti-tank obstacles, proved to be a difficult and time-consuming barrier. A second attack followed at 0710, this time with two infantry regiments and up to 100 tanks. Thanks to artillery fire from an antitank strongpoint which had been prepared near Cherkasskoe, as well as divisional and army artillery, this attack was also beaten back to its start line. Further attacks followed at 0800 and 1030 with no better results. Soviet observers recorded 25 tanks and up to 300 infantrymen blown up on the minefields in front of the village. By late in the morning the 27th Antitank Brigade arrived from 6th Guards Army reserve to help secure the boundary between the two Guards divisions.Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, ed. & trans. S. Britton, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2011, p. 103Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, Kindle ed., Book 1, ch. 3
As the day wore on elements of the 3rd Panzer Division and Großdeutschland struck at the boundary between the two divisions, attempting to overrun the village strongpoints and also to outflank Cherkasskoe from the east. Successive bombing attacks cleared a path for their tanks and the infantry following; the armor advanced at low speed (no more than 5–10 km/h) with frequent stops while waiting for the infantry to come up. At noon an infantry regiment supported by 30 tanks attacked from Butovo toward heights 244.5 and 237.8, finally penetrating into the 67th Guards' defense. Despite this partial success the panzers became stuck between the two villages for the rest of the day, in heavy fighting, only establishing a tenuous hold on part of Cherkasskoe by midnight, a very poor showing for what was planned to be a major breakthrough of the Soviet defenses. The Soviet engineering technical service (TOS) had played an important role in assisting the defense, accounting for up to 200 German infantry and five tanks using delayed-action mines and booby traps near height 244.5 and on the approaches to Cherkasskoe.Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 103-04Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, Kindle ed., Book 1, ch. 3