The unilateral declarations of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain controversial, as these entities are only recognized by a few countries after Russia issued its recognition shortly after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. Other countries recognize the regions as part of Georgia. Russia's recognition occurred six months after the Western recognition of the unilateral declaration of independence by Serbia's breakaway Republic of Kosovo in February 2008, which was opposed by Russia. This, and resultant non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the West, has led to claims of hypocrisy and double standards on the part of both sides of the recognition divide. However, the recognition of Kosovo was based on recommendations of the UN and followed the principle of "standards before status", unlike in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Legitimacy under international law Georgia restored its independence in 1991 on the basis of the principle of state continuity, asserting that the newly independent state was the legal successor of the Georgian Democratic Republic (1918–1921), of which Abkhazia had formed a part under the 1921 Constitution. The international community, including the United Nations and the UN Security Council, recognized Georgia's territorial integrity. Prior to the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, no UN member state, including Russia, recognized Abkhazia or South Ossetia as independent states. Under the principle of uti possidetis juris, Abkhazia and South Ossetia did not possess a right to independence. The principle was developed to ensure that the independence and stability of newly independent states would not be undermined by fratricidal conflicts over borders. During the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it did not extend a right of external self-determination to the subnational entities of the constituent Soviet republics. Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia held the status of autonomous entities within Georgia.
The Abkhazians are ethnically, linguistically, and culturally distinct from the Georgians and are related to the peoples of the North Caucasus in Russia. They may constitute a "people" for the purposes of exercising the right to self-determination, but this does not automatically grant them a right to external self-determination. One of the proposed doctrines justifying external self-determination is remedial secession, although its status under international law remains contested. Under this doctrine, a right to external self-determination may arise for an "oppressed people" as a "measure of last resort", or "self-help," in response to serious and persistent violations of their fundamental rights.
One of the criteria for a legitimate claim to remedial secession is that the claimant people should constitute a clear majority within the territory concerned. Some scholars have suggested that this threshold should be at least 80% of the population. According to the last internationally recognized census, however, Abkhazia's population consisted of 45.7% Georgians and only 17.8% Abkhazians, while Armenians, Russians, and Greeks also constituted significant minorities. Following the 1992–1993 war, the demographic composition of Abkhazia changed dramatically, primarily as a result of the forced displacement of most ethnic Georgians. Abkhazia formally declared independence in 1999 following a referendum, after a significant change in the demographic composition of the region. According to the 2003 census, the Georgian share of the population had fallen to approximately 20%, while the Abkhaz share had risen to 44.1%. Under the "clear majority" criterion, the Abkhazians would not have possessed a valid claim to remedial secession.
Moreover, there was considerable scope for internal self-determination within Georgia. Following the restoration of Georgia's independence, the Georgian government offered Abkhazia the broadest possible autonomous status within a federal framework, while reserving core sovereign functions for the central government. The Abkhaz leadership rejected the proposal, insisting instead on a confederal arrangement that would have recognized Abkhazia as a sovereign entity with a right to secede. Georgia also demonstrated its willingness to accommodate Abkhaz autonomy through the August 1991 compromise, which established ethnic quotas in the Abkhaz parliament that disproportionately favored Abkhaz representation despite their demographic minority status. Consequently, Abkhazia did not exhaust the available avenues for internal self-determination before pursuing secession.
During the 1992–1993 conflict, Russia maintained an extensive military presence in the region. Russia transferred military equipment to the Abkhaz side, including T-72 tanks, Grad multiple rocket launchers, more than 100,000 landmines, and other heavy weapons. Russian forces provided Abkhaz forces with at least some heavy weaponry, transportation, and fuel. While a third state may provide assistance to the de jure or de facto legitimate government of a state during an internal conflict, international law does not permit the supply of weapons and military assistance to internal armed opposition groups, such as the Abkhaz forces. Russia financed, trained, and provided logistical and military support to Abkhaz armed groups. In the first half of 1993, Russia also directly used force against Georgia. Russian air strikes in Abkhazia constituted an unlawful use of force against Georgian territory. Throughout the conflict, Russia operated in a demonstrably covert manner, a pattern that has been compared to its later involvement in the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Russian involvement in the conflict constituted a violation of Georgia's sovereignty. Kosovo as a precedent
The Assembly of the Serbian Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, under administration of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo since 1999, unilaterally declared independence as the Republic of Kosovo on 17 February 2008. The Republic of Kosovo was soon recognised by the United States and the EU three.
At an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, Serbian President Boris Tadić asked the Council, "Are we all aware of the precedent that is being set and are we aware of the catastrophic consequences that it may lead to?" The Permanent Representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and France presented their opinion that the Kosovo case was sui generis in nature and could not be perceived as a precedent.
The setting of a precedent was mentioned by many countries. Among them were Argentina, and Cuba. India stated that Kosovo "can set a very dangerous precedent for similar cases around the world." The then Russian President Vladimir Putin described the recognition by Western powers of Kosovo independence as "terrible precedent, which will de facto blow apart the whole system of international relations, developed not over decades, but over centuries." He then went on to say, "They have not thought through the results of what they are doing. At the end of the day it is a two-ended stick and the second end will come back and hit them in the face."
Some analysts at the time called ignoring Russian objections and the move by the United States and the EU-3 a mistake, with Ted Galen Carpenter of the Cato Institute stating that their view of Kosovo being sui generis and setting no precedent as "extraordinarily naïve". It was also suggested that Russia could use the case of Kosovo as pretext for recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia or annexing Crimea in the future.
On 19 February 2008, Georgia's Foreign Minister Davit Bakradze stated that Georgia would not recognize Kosovo's independence. He said there was a consensus in Georgia on this issue, "regardless of political orientation." Bakradze added that Russia viewed the West's recognition of Kosovo as a challenge and planned to respond by taking similar steps in the former Soviet Union, which posed a "high degree of risk" for Georgia.
The Heritage Foundation suggested that Kosovo was no precedent because it was administrated by the United Nations as a protectorate for seven years and was blocked from being admitted to the United Nations only due to Russia being able to use its veto in the United Nations Security Council.
In July 2008, in a speech to Russian Ambassadors on Russian foreign policy, Dmitry Medvedev opined that "for the European Union, Kosovo is almost what Iraq has proved to be for the United States" and that they acted unilaterally in pursuit of their own self-interests and undermined international law in the process.
In September 2008 hearings before the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs, California Republican Congressman and member of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, Dana Rohrabacher, compared the situation in Georgia to Kosovo.
"Now, we can talk until we are blue in the face, trying to say there is no analogy here, but it does not cover up the obvious analogy between Kosovo and what is going on in Georgia, where you have breakaway republics similar to what the Serbs faced. Now, the only difference is, of course, we are Americans, and they are Russians, and the people trying to break away there were pro-Russian. Either we are for democracy, either we are for those people in Kosovo and in Ossetia and elsewhere and, I might say, in Georgia for their right to be separate from Russia, to begin with, and if we lose that, we have lost the high ground. We are already losing our credibility right now. Let us not lose the high ground."
In December 2008, Martti Ahtisaari, author of Kosovo peace plan, said that Kosovo was not a precedent for the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Former advisor to Vladimir Putin Andrey Illarionov argued that Kosovo can not serve as a precedent for recognizing Abkhazia. He emphasized that the Abkhaz independence was established through the ethnic cleansing, primarily of Georgians, which were a majority of the region's population, diminishing their number by 81 percent, with the ethnic cleansing being recognized by the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and other international organizations. He also noted that there was no prosecution of those responsible for these crimes by the Abkhaz secessionist authorities, instead, they "were rewarded with fame, medals, and stolen property", while the politicians refused to even acknowledge the ethnic cleansing. He observed that not only are Georgians prevented from returning to Abkhazia, but most ethnic Georgians still remaining there are not allowed to vote. In Abkhazia, it was Abkhaz separatists who rejected peace plans; while in case of Kosovo, it was Serbia that thwarted peace process. Kosovo was ruled by U.N. administration before the declaration of independence; while Abkhazia does not admit international organizations. Illarionov pointed out three factors underpinning the illegitimacy of the Abkhaz independence: actions of the Abkhaz leaders, their ideology of ethnic supremacy and Russian military occupation.
"The differences between the two cases are stark. First, the most heinous crimes in Kosovo were committed by Serbians, the adversaries of secession; in Abkhazia, they were committed by the secessionists and their Russian allies. Second, the right of return of refugees to Kosovo was a precondition for self-determination; in Abkhazia, the so-called self-determination is linked with the refusal to allow the return of internally displaced people.
Put simply, Kosovo's independence was a way of punishing ethnic cleansing. In Abkhazia, such recognition would represent a chilling validation of ethnic cleansing, and a reward to its authors."