The United States battleship retirement debate was a debate among the United States Navy, Marine Corps, Congress, and independent groups over the effectiveness of naval gunfire support (NGFS) provided by Iowa-class battleships, and whether an alternative should be implemented. The debate centered on the best way to provide fire support for amphibious assault and other troops near a shoreline.
The debate at large traced its roots back to the end of World War II, but this round of the debate began in 1992 with the decommissioning of the last active battleship, , and ended when the last of these ships was finally completely retired in 2011. The Navy decommissioned Missouri after determining that her fire support function could be replaced by ship and submarine-launched missiles and aircraft-launched precision guided munitions. Many still viewed the battleships as essential for gunfire support, and questioned the Navy's decision. Congress required the Navy to retain at least two of the four remaining battleships on the Naval Vessel Register (NVR) instead of disposing of them.
The debate played out across a wide spectrum of media, including newspapers, magazines, web blogs, and congressional research arms including the Government Accountability Office. Many participants favored the continuation of the or the reinstatement of the Iowa-class battleships to the NVR. The Iowa-class battleships and the – and Zumwalt-class destroyers all entered the debate as options put forward for naval gunfire support, while others advocated the use of specifically designed close air support planes and newer missile systems which can loiter in an area as a replacement for naval gunfire.
The debate about retention of the battleships became completely academic in 2011 when the last battleship owned by the Navy, , was donated to a non-profit group to be used as a museum ship.
Background
By 1947, the United States had deactivated all of its remaining battleships (bar Missouri) and placed them in the United States Navy reserve fleets. By 1964, all but the four Iowa-class battleships had been stricken from the Naval Vessel Registry (NVR), but on several occasions one or more of those four battleships were reactivated to provide naval gunfire support. The U.S. Navy retained the four Iowa-class battleships long after other nations scrapped their big-gun fleets in favor of aircraft carriers and submarines. Congress was largely responsible for keeping the four Iowa-class battleships in the United States Navy reserve fleets and on the NVR as long as they did. The lawmakers argued that the battleships' large-caliber guns had a useful destructive power that was lacking in the smaller, cheaper, and faster guns mounted by U.S. cruisers and destroyers.*
In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan proposed creating a 600-ship navy as part of the overall defense department build-up to counter the threat of the armed forces of the Soviet Union; both the Soviet Army and Navy had grown in the aftermath of the unification of Vietnam in 1975 and the loss of faith that Americans had in their armed services. As part of this, all four Iowa-class battleships were modernized and reactivated. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the 600-ship navy was seen as unnecessary, and the navy made plans to return to its traditional 313-ship fleet. This led to the deactivation of many ships in the navy's fleet, including the four reactivated battleships; all were removed from service between 1990 and 1992. The navy struck all four ships and had made plans to donate them, but Congress intervened with the passing of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996. Section 1011 required the United States Navy to reinstate to the Naval Vessel Register two of the Iowa-class battleships that had been struck by the navy in 1995; these ships were to be maintained in the United States Navy Reserve Fleets. The Navy was to ensure that both of the reinstated battleships were in good condition and could be reactivated for use in Marine Corps' amphibious operations. Both battleships were to be maintained with the reserve fleet until such a time as the navy could certify that it had within its fleet the operational capacity to meet or exceed the gunfire support that both battleships could provide.104th Congress, House of Representatives. National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 . p. 237. Retrieved 17 December 2006. To comply with this requirement, the navy selected the battleships and for reinstatement to the Naval Vessel Register.
Replacing the battleships
The Navy saw the battleships as prohibitively expensive, and worked to persuade Congress to allow it to remove Iowa and Wisconsin from the Naval Vessel Register by developing extended-range guided munitions and a new ship to fulfill Marine Corps requirements for naval gunfire support (NGFS).
The navy plan originally called for the extension of the range of the gun on the guided missile destroyers with Extended Range Guided Munitions (ERGMs) that would enable the ships to fire precision guided projectiles about inland. The ERGM program was initiated in 1996, but cancelled in 2008 due to rising cost and disappointing results. The similar Ballistic Trajectory Extended Range Munition (BTERM) program was also cancelled in 2008 for the same reasons. These weapons were not intended or expected to satisfy the full range of the Marine Corps requirements.
The Navy initiated the SC-21 program in 1994 to design and build a ship that could provide effective fire support. This evolved into the DD(X) program and eventually resulted in the program. The ship was to mount a pair of Advanced Gun Systems capable of firing specially designed Long Range Land Attack Projectiles some inland. Originally, the navy had planned to build a total of 32 of these destroyers, but the increasing cost of the program led the navy to reduce the overall number of destroyers from 32 to 24."National Defense Authorization Act of 2007" (; PDF). 109th Congress, United States Senate and House of Representatives. pp. 69–70. Retrieved on 2008-08-01. In 2007 the total procurement of Zumwalt-class destroyers was further reduced to seven, before being discontinued at a total of three destroyers in July 2008 as a result of the high per-ship cost.
The discontinuation of the class was due in part to concerns that the Zumwalt-class ships would deprive other projects of needed funding, a concern that was raised by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Congressional Research Service (CRS), and the Government Accountability Office, all of which issued reports that suggested that total cost of each ship would be as high as $5 billion or more. In addition to the high cost, naval officials discussing the cancellation of the DD(X) program cited the inability of the DD(X) to fire the Standard missile or provide adequate air defense coverage, and a "classified threat" which the navy thought could be better handled by existing or new Arleigh Burke–class destroyers than by the Zumwalt-class destroyers. The article also reported that the Marine Corps no longer needed the long-range fire support from the Zumwalts' 155 mm Advanced Gun System because such fire support can be provided by much longer-ranged Tactical Tomahawk cruise missiles and precision airstrikes.
Striking the Iowa-class battleships
On 17 March 2006, while the ERGM and DD(X) programs were under development, the Secretary of the Navy exercised his authority to strike Iowa and Wisconsin from the Naval Vessel Register, which cleared the way for both ships to be donated for use as museum ships. The United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps had both certified that battleships would not be needed in any future war, and had turned their attention to completion of the next generation Zumwalt-class destroyers.
This move drew fire from sources familiar with the subject; among them were dissenting members of the United States Marine Corps. These dissenters argued that battleships were still a viable solution to naval gunfire support,The Marine Corps supported the strategic purpose of reactivating two battleships in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 and supported the Navy's modernization efforts to deliver a sufficient NGFS capability that would exceed that of the Iowa-class battleships. See: Government Accountability Office. Information on Options for Naval Surface Fire Support. including members of Congress who remained "deeply concerned" over the loss of naval surface gunfire support that the battleships provided, and a number of independent groups such as the United States' Naval Fire Support Association (USNFSA) whose ranks included former members of the armed service and fans of the battleships. Although the arguments presented from each group differed, they all agreed that the United States Navy had not in good faith considered the potential of reactivated battleships for use in the field, a position that was supported by a 1999 Government Accountability Office report regarding the United States Navy's gunfire support program.
In response, the Navy pointed to the cost of reactivating the two Iowa-class battleships to their decommissioned capability. The Navy estimated costs in excess of $500 million,This number was based on a 1999 estimate with a 4% annual inflation rate. See: Government Accountability Office. Information on Options for Naval Surface Fire Support.The U.S. Navy reported in the April 1987 edition of All Hands that the original cost of bringing the battleships back in the 1980s was $110 million per ship, but the actual cost after modernization and recommissioning was $455 million. See: Bureau of Naval Personnel, "Back on the battle line". but this did not include an additional $110 million needed to replenish the gunpowder for the guns, needed because a survey found the powder to be unsafe. In terms of schedule, the Navy's program management office estimated that reactivation would take 20 to 40 months, given the loss of corporate memory and the shipyard industrial base.
Reactivating the battleships would have required a wide range of battleship modernization improvements, according to the navy's program management office. At a minimum, these modernization improvements included command and control, communications, computers, and intelligence equipment; environmental protection (including ozone-depleting substances); a plastic-waste processor; pulper/shredder and wastewater alterations; firefighting/fire safety and women-at-sea alterations; a modernized sensor suite (air and surface search radar); and new combat and self-defense systems. The navy's program management office also identified other issues that would strongly discourage the Navy from reactivating and modernizing the battleships. For example, personnel needed to operate the battleships would have been extensive, and the skills needed might not have been available or easily reconstituted.The U.S. Navy reported in the April 1987 edition of All Hands that while battleships had larger crews than other vessels the level of training required and the criticality of that training were less than that required of a crew aboard an . See: Bureau of Naval Personnel, "Back on the battle line". Other issues included the age and unreliability of the battleships' propulsion systems and the fact that the navy no longer maintained the capability to manufacture their 16-inch gun system components and ordnance.