Madhyamaka (; ; , chữ Nôm: ; ) also known as Madhyamika () refers to a tradition of Buddhist philosophy and practice founded by the Indian Buddhist monk and philosopher Nāgārjuna ().Wynne, Alexander (2015) Early Buddhist Teaching as Proto-śūnyavāda. Journal of the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies, 6. pp. 213-241. The foundational text of the Mādhyamaka tradition is Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā ("Root Verses on the Middle Way"). More broadly, Madhyamaka also refers to the ultimate nature of phenomena as well as the non-conceptual realization of ultimate reality that is experienced in meditation.
Since the 4th century CE onwards, Madhyamaka philosophy had a major influence on the subsequent development of the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition, especially following the spread of Buddhism throughout Asia. It is the dominant interpretation of Buddhist philosophy in Tibetan Buddhism and has also been influential in East Asian Buddhist thought.
According to the classical Indian Madhyamika thinkers, all phenomena (dharmas) are empty (śūnya) of "nature", of any "substance" or "essence" (svabhāva) which could give them "solid and independent existence", because they are dependently co-arisen. But this "emptiness" itself is also "empty": it does not have an existence on its own, nor does it refer to a transcendental reality beyond or above phenomenal reality.
Etymology
Madhya is a Sanskrit word meaning "middle". The -ma suffix is a superlative, giving madhyama the meaning of "mid-most" or "medium". The -ka suffix is used to form adjectives, thus madhyamaka means "middling". The -ika suffix is used to form possessives, with a collective sense, thus mādhyamika mean "belonging to the mid-most" (the -ika suffix regularly causes a lengthening of the first vowel and elision of the final -a).
In a Buddhist context, these terms refer to the "middle path" (madhyamā pratipad), which refers to right view (samyagdṛṣṭi) which steers clear of the metaphysical extremes of annihilationism (ucchedavāda) and eternalism (śāsvatavāda). For example, the Sanskrit Kātyāyanasūtra states that though the world "relies on a duality of existence and non-existence", the Buddha teaches a correct view which understands that:Discourse to Katyāyana - Kātyāyana SF 168. Tripathi 1962: 167–170 (19). Translated by Jayarava. suttacentral.netArising in the world, Kātyayana, seen and correctly understood just as it is, shows there is no non-existence in the world. Cessation in the world, Kātyāyana, seen and correctly understood just as it is, shows there is no permanent existence in the world. Thus avoiding both extremes the Tathāgata teaches a dharma by the middle path (madhyamayā pratipadā). That is: this being, that becomes; with the arising of this, that arises. With ignorance as condition there is volition ... [to be expanded with the standard formula of the 12 links of dependent origination]Sanskrit: lokasamudayaṁ kātyāyana yathābhūtaṁ samyakprajñayā paśyato yā loke nāstitā sā na bhavati | lokanirodhaṁ yathābhūtaṁ samyakprajñayā paśyato yā loke ’stitā sā na bhavati | ity etāv ubhāv antāv anupagamya madhyamayā pratipadā tathāgato dharmaṁ deśayati | yad utāsmin satīdaṁ bhavaty asyotpādād idam utpadyate | yad utāvidyāpratyayāḥ saṁskārā iti pūrvavad yāvat samudayo nirodhaś ca bhavati |Though all Buddhist schools saw themselves as defending a middle path in accord with the Buddhist teachings, the name Madhyamaka refers to a school of Mahayana philosophy associated with Nāgārjuna and his commentators. The term Mādhyamika refers to adherents of the Madhyamaka school. Note that in both words the stress is on the first syllable.
Philosophical overview
Svabhāva, what Madhyamaka denies
Central to Madhyamaka philosophy is śūnyatā, "emptiness", which refers to the idea that dharmas are empty of svabhāva. This term has been translated variously as essence, intrinsic nature, inherent existence, own being, and substance.Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as philosophy, p. 180. According to Richard P. Hayes, svabhāva can be interpreted as either "identity" or as "causal independence". Likewise, Westerhoff notes that svabhāva is a complex concept with both ontological and cognitive aspects. The ontological aspects include svabhāva as essence (a property which makes an object what it is) and as substance. As the Madhyamaka thinker Candrakīrti defines it, substance is something that does "not depend on anything else".
It is substance-svabhāva, the objective and independent existence of any object or concept that the Madhyamaka arguments mostly focus on refuting. A common structure that Madhyamaka uses to negate svabhāva is the catuṣkoṭi ("four corners" or tetralemma), which consists of four alternatives: a proposition is true; a proposition is false; a proposition is both true and false; a proposition is neither true nor false. Some of the major topics discussed by classical Madhyamaka include causality, change, and personal identity.
Madhyamaka's denial of svabhāva does not mean a nihilistic denial of all things, for in a conventional everyday sense, Madhyamaka does accept that one can speak of "things", and yet ultimately these things are empty of inherent existence. Furthermore, "emptiness" itself is also "empty": it does not have an existence on its own, nor does it refer to a transcendental reality beyond or above phenomenal reality.
Svabhāva'''s cognitive aspect is merely a superimposition (samāropa) that beings make when they perceive and conceive of things. In this sense then, emptiness does not exist as some kind of primordial reality, but it is simply a corrective to a mistaken conception of how things exist. This idea of svabhāva that Madhyamaka denies is then not just a conceptual philosophical theory, but it is a cognitive distortion that beings automatically impose on the world, such as when we regard the five aggregates as constituting a single self. Candrakirti compares it to someone who suffers from vitreous floaters that cause the illusion of hairs appearing in their visual field. This cognitive dimension of svabhāva means that just understanding and assenting to Madhyamaka reasoning is not enough to end the suffering caused by our reification of the world, just like understanding how an optical illusion works does not make it stop functioning. What is required is a kind of cognitive shift (termed realization) in the way the world appears and therefore some kind of practice to lead to this shift. As Candrakirti says:
For one on the road of cyclic existence who pursues an inverted view due to ignorance, a mistaken object such as the superimposition (samāropa) on the aggregates appears as real, but it does not appear to one who is close to the view of the real nature of things.
Much of Madhyamaka philosophy centers on showing how various essentialist ideas have absurd conclusions through reductio ad absurdum arguments (known as prasanga in Sanskrit). Chapter 15 of Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā centers on the words svabhāva, parabhāva, bhāva and abhāva. According to Peter Harvey:
An important element of Madhyamaka refutation is that the classical Buddhist doctrine of dependent arising (the idea that every phenomenon is dependent on other phenomena) cannot be reconciled with "a conception of self-nature or substance" and that therefore essence theories are contrary not only to the Buddhist scriptures but to the very ideas of causality and change. Any enduring essential nature would prevent any causal interaction, or any kind of origination. For things would simply always have been, and will always continue to be, without any change. As Nāgārjuna writes in the MMK:
We state that conditioned origination is emptiness. It is mere designation depending on something, and it is the middle path. (24.18)
Since nothing has arisen without depending on something, there is nothing that is not empty. (24.19)
However, Westerhoff observes that while causal relations imply lack of svabhāva in some way, Nāgārjuna's argument does not stop there. After all, Ābhidharmikas saw no conflict between causation and svabhāva, and the dependence of effects upon causes alone is not sufficient to demonstrate their dependence on conceptualization, which is to be empty in the most profound sense. As such, for Nāgārjuna, emptiness does not merely mean that phenomena are situated in causal relations, but more importantly, these causal relations themselves do not exist independently of human cognition and conceptualization. As Westerhoff explains, "since the causal relation does not exist from its own side, is conceptually constructed, and therefore empty, each causally related object must be so constructed and therefore empty in the most profound sense of being conceptually constructed."Westerhoff, Jan Christoph, "Nāgārjuna", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.)
According to Nāgārjuna, svabhāva is incompatible with causation since a causally produced object can only exist in a dependence relation to other phenomena, thereby lacking svabhāva. At the same time, Nāgārjuna also argues that, since all things lack svabhāva, causation cannot be objectively established either. As Westerhoff explains, objects "owe their existence to a partly habitual, partly deliberate process of cutting up the complex flow of phenomena into cognitively manageable bits." They thus do not exist independently of our conceptualizations, or "from their own side." In the absence of any truly objective things, there can be no objective relation (i.e. causation) linking objects and events.Westerhoff, Jan. Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka, a Philosophical Introduction, pages 98-99. Oxford University Press, 2009. In this way, several Madhyamaka arguments are concerned to demonstrate with reasoning that "Whatever is produced from causal conditions is not produced; it does not have the nature of a produced thing."Kunzang Pelden. The Nectar of Manjushri's Speech, a Detailed Commentary on Shantideva's Way of the Bodhisattva, page 381. Shambhala Publications, 2007.
Madhyamaka arguments Madhyamaka philosophers formulated many arguments which aim to demonstrate that phenomena do not inherently arise or exist. These arguments target various classes of things that make up important aspects of the human worldview, including causation, motion, the self, epistemology, and language.Westerhoff, Jan. Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka, a Philosophical Introduction, page 91. Oxford University Press, 2009. Madhyamaka criticisms of causation and other categories seek to prove that such things are "riddled with contradiction," as they are ultimately "mere ascriptions" (vikalpa).Murti, T.R.V., The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, a Study of Mādhyamika System, page 167. Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 2006.
No arising from the four possibilities
This argument, which is also sometimes called the "Diamond Splinters Argument," is presented as an investigation of causes.Kunzang Pelden. The Nectar of Manjushri's Speech, a Detailed Commentary on Shantideva's Way of the Bodhisattva, page 371. Shambhala Publications, 2007. According to this argument, there are four possible ways in which something could arise from causes. However, since none of these possibilities is valid, nothing truly arises. The four possibilities are that something may: arise from itself, from something other than itself, from both, or without any cause at all.Gyamtso, Khenpo Tsültrim. The Sun of Wisdom, Teachings on the Noble Nagarjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, page 6. Shambhala Publications, 2003.