The Battle of Goose Green () was fought from the 28th to the 29th of May 1982 by British and Argentine forces during the Falklands War. Located on East Falkland's central isthmus, the settlement of Goose Green was the site of a tactically vital airfield. Argentine forces were located in a well-defended position within striking distance of San Carlos Water, where the British task force had positioned themselves after their amphibious landing.
The main body of the British assault force was composed of the 2nd Battalion, Parachute Regiment (2 PARA), commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Jones. BBC Radio broadcast news of the imminent attack on Goose Green. Knowing that this had likely forewarned the Argentinian defenders, the broadcast resulted in immediate criticism from Jones and other British personnel.
After the attack began in the early hours of 28 May, the 2 PARA advance was stalled by fixed trenches with interlocking fields of fire. Jones was killed during a solo charge on a machine-gun post. The Argentinian garrison agreed to a ceasefire and formally surrendered the following morning. As a result of his actions, Jones received a posthumous Victoria Cross.
Prelude
Terrain and conditions
Goose Green and Darwin are on a narrow isthmus connecting Lafonia to the south with Wickham Heights in the north. The isthmus has two settlements: Darwin to the north, and Goose Green to the south. The terrain is rolling and treeless, and is covered with grassy outcrops, as well as areas of thick gorse and peat bogs, making camouflage and concealment extremely difficult. The islands have a cold, damp climate. From May to August (which is winter in the southern hemisphere), the ground is saturated and frequently covered with salty water, making walking slow and exhausting, particularly at night. Drizzly rains occur two out of every three days, with continuous winds, and with periods of rain, snow, fog, and sun changing rapidly. Sunshine is minimal, leaving few opportunities for troops to warm up and dry off.
Background The bulk of the Argentine forces on the islands were in positions around Port Stanley, to the east of the isthmus and San Carlos, the site of the main British landings. An Argentinian force had been deployed to Goose Green and Darwin and was supported by artillery, mortars, 35 mm cannons, and machine guns. British intelligence incorrectly indicated that the Argentine force present possessed limited offensive capabilities and did not pose a major threat to the landing area at San Carlos. Consequently, the Goose Green garrison seemed to have no strategic military value for the British in their campaign to recapture the islands and the initial plans for land operations had called for Goose Green to be isolated and bypassed.
After the British landings at San Carlos on 21 May and while the bridgehead was being consolidated, British activities were limited to digging fortified positions, patrolling, and waiting; during this time Argentine air attacks caused significant damage to, and the loss of, British ships in the area around the landing grounds. These attacks and the lack of breakout by the landed forces out of the San Carlos area led to a feeling among senior commanders and politicians in the UK that the momentum of the campaign was waning. As a result, British Joint Headquarters in the UK came under increasing pressure from the British government for an early ground offensive for political and propaganda value. There was also UN pressure for a cease-fire and the UK government position was that the taking of the Darwin–Goose Green isthmus was imperative before any such cease-fire decision as it would allow British forces to control access to the entire Lafonia and thus a significant portion of East Falkland. On 25 May Brigadier Julian Thompson, commanding 3 Commando Brigade, was ordered to mount an attack on Argentine positions around Goose Green and Darwin.
Argentine defences The defending Argentine forces, known as Task Force Mercedes, consisted of two companies of Lieutenant-Colonel Ítalo Piaggi's 12th Infantry Regiment (RI 12). His third company (Company B) was still deployed on Mount Kent as "Combat Team Solari" and only re-joined RI 12 after the fall of Goose Green airfield. The task force also contained a company of the commando-type 25th "Special" Infantry Regiment (RI 25). Air defence was provided by a battery of six 20 mm Rheinmetall anti-aircraft guns, manned by air force personnel and two radar-guided Oerlikon 35 mm anti-aircraft guns from the 601st Anti-Aircraft Battalion. Both the 20mm and 35mm anti-aircraft cannon could also be used in a direct fire ground support role, and this was the case in the last stages of the fighting. There was also one battery of three OTO Melara Mod 56 105 mm pack howitzers from the 4th Airborne Artillery Regiment. Pucará aircraft, based at Stanley and armed with rockets and napalm could provide close air support. The total forces under Piaggi's command numbered 1,083 men.
Piaggi's role was to provide a reserve battle group (Task Force Mercedes) in support of other forces deployed to the west of Stanley and secondly to occupy and defend the Darwin isthmus as well as the Military Air Base Cóndor at Goose Green. He deployed the two companies in an all-round defence with A Company, RI12 the key to his defence; they were deployed along a gorse hedge running across the Darwin isthmus from Darwin Hill to Boca House. He deployed his reconnaissance platoon (under Lieutenant Carlos Marcelo Morales) as an advance screen forward of RI 12's A Company, towards Coronation Ridge, while RI 12's C Company were deployed south of Goose Green to cover the approaches from Lafonia. To substitute for the absent B Company, he created a composite company from headquarters and other staff and deployed them in Goose Green hamlet. RI 25's C (Ranger) Company (under paratroop-trained First Lieutenant Carlos Daniel Esteban) provided a mobile reserve, from the schoolhouse in Goose Green. Elements were also deployed to Darwin settlement, Salinas Beach, and Boca House and the air force security cadets, together with the anti-aircraft elements, were charged with protecting the airfield. Minefields had been laid in areas deemed tactically important, to provide further defence against attack.
On paper Piaggi had a full regiment, but it consisted of units from three separate regiments from two different brigades, none of whom had ever worked together. RI 12 consisted mostly of conscripts from the northern, sub-tropical province of Corrientes, while the RI 25 Company was considered an elite formation and had received commando training. Some elements were well trained and displayed a high degree of morale and motivation (C Company RI 25 and A Battery 4th Airborne Artillery Group); with Lieutenant Ignacio Gorriti of B Company RI 12 remarking that "there was no need for speeches. From the beginning, we knew how important the Malvinas were. It was a kind of love; we were going to defend something that was ours." Other units were less well-motivated, with the 12th Regiment chaplain, Santiago Mora, writing: The conscripts of 25th Infantry wanted to fight and cover themselves in glory. The conscripts of the 12th Infantry Regiment fought because they were told to do so. This did not make them any less brave. On the whole, they remained admirably calm.
Private Esteban Roberto Avalos fought in the Falklands as a sniper in RI 12's B Company. In all, some fifty hand-picked 12th Regiment conscripts and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) had received Ranger-type training from visiting Halcón 8 (Falcon 8) army commandos in 1981, and then returned to their respective companies: In my particular case, I ended up being a sharpshooter for which I had been preparing since the time we were out in the field, where I had the opportunity to shoot with a FAL. During the 45 days we spent there, we had to practice shooting three or four times a week, and those moments were taken advantage of to learn the shooting positions and familiarize ourselves with the weapon. The dealings with the superiors, in general, were excellent, although if somebody screwed up, we all paid the price. The most common punishments were taking us to the showers at night, forcing us to do push-ups or demand from us heaps of frog leaps and crawling. If someone took the wrong step, for example, it was reasonable to be pulled out of training, and they would make you 'dance' a little with push-ups on the thistles or the mud. Now, going back to the subject of instruction, I would say that it was generally satisfactory, at least as far as our group was concerned, since we had basic training in the use of explosives and we were even given some classes in self-defence."
The Argentine positions were well selected, and officers well briefed. In the weeks before the British invasion, airstrikes, naval bombardment, their own poor logistic support and inclement conditions had contributed to the erosion of morale amongst conscripts. On 19 May, an Argentine Air Force C-130 Hercules parachuted in eight tons of tinned provisions that significantly boosted the morale of Task Force Mercedes. This parachute drop of supplies, according to Private Domingo Víctor Álamo of the 25th Special (Ranger) Regiment's C Company allowed fellow Rangers like himself to get two servings of rations and soft drinks on 25 May while celebrating Argentine independence day.According to Private José Apolonio López from A Company 12th Regiment, these newly arrived provisions allowed Task Force Mercedes to request 2 Argentine Air Force Chinook helicopters to arrive in BAM Cóndor from Stanley and deliver 100 much-needed large ration boxes (containing such luxuries like canned tuna in olive oil and packets of premium cigarettes) to the forward rifle company (under First Lieutenant Jorge Manresa) defending Darwin Parks on 23 May and these boxes were equally distributed among the officers, NCOs and conscripts of A/RI 12.Voces de Malvinas - José Apolonio López (YouTube)
At the start of the battle, the Argentinian forces had about the same number of effective combatants as the British paratroopers.
British forces Thompson ordered the 2nd Battalion, Parachute Regiment, (2 PARA) to conduct an attack on Goose Green, as they were the unit closest to the isthmus in the San Carlos defensive perimeter. He ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert "H" Jones, the commanding officer of 2 PARA, to "carry out a raid on Goose Green isthmus and capture the settlements before withdrawing to be in reserve for the main thrust to the north." The "capture" component appealed more to Jones than the "raid" component, although Thompson later acknowledged that he had assigned insufficient forces to rapidly execute the "capture" part of the orders.
2 PARA comprised three rifle companies, a patrol company, a support company and a headquarters company. Thompson allocated three of 29 Commando Regiments, 105 mm artillery pieces, with 960 rounds, a MILAN anti-tank missile platoon; and Scout helicopters for resupply and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC). Close air support was available from three Royal Air Force Harrier jets, while naval gunfire support was scheduled to be provided by at the start of the battle.
Attack plan