The Pleiku campaign took place from 23 October to 26 November 1965.Kinnard, p.1 II Corps Command named it Pleime campaign, with a slightly different starting date of 20 October instead of 23 October,The 20th was the day II Corps launched Pleime campaign (Vĩnh Lộc, p. 68) and the 23rd was the first day the Air Cavalry troops joined the battle with the arrival of Task Force Ingram in Pleiku city (Kinnard, p. 18; Vinh Loc, p. 53) consisted of three operations:Vĩnh Lộc, p. 68
Operation Dân Thắng 21(20 to 26 October 1965), the first Pleime preparatory phase, was the relief operation of the besieged Pleime camp. Operation Long Reach, which was the Chu Pong phase, comprising two operations: Operation All the Way (27 October – 9 November 1965) conducted by the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade and Operation Silver Bayonet I (9–18 November 1965) conducted by the 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade against the NVA, which culminated in the Battle of Ia Drang occurring from 14 to 18 November 1965. Operation Than Phong 7 (18–26 November 1965) conducted by the ARVN Airborne Brigade in conjunction with the 2nd Air Cavalry Brigade conducting Operation Silver Bayonet II in the Ia Drang area. It was the final Ia Drang exploitation phase.Vinh Loc, p. 15Kinnard, p. i
This joint ARVN-US campaign was characterized by a special procedure of "common operational concept, common intelligence, common reserve, and separate command".Vinh Loc, p. 101
Background
NVA B3 Field Front Command In July 1965, General Chu Huy Man was assigned commander of B3 Field Front in preparation for the Winter–Spring 1965 campaign to conquer the Central Highlands.Nguyen Huy Toan, Pham Quang Dinh, The First Battles Against the American Troops, 304th Division Volume II, People's Army Publishing House, pp.19–42
The B3 Field Front Command employed three regiments in the effort to conquer the Central Highlands: the 32nd to set up the ambush to destroy the ARVN relief column; the 33rd to put a siege of the Pleime camps; and the 66th to join force with the 32nd and 33rd to overrun Pleiku city.Vĩnh Lộc, p.124
Chinese Communist aid The North Vietnamese Communist Government got help from the Chinese Communist Government in terms of military, financial aid, and Chinese advisors.Mohr, Charles (16 November 1965). "Three Prisoners Tell Of Aid From China North Vietnamese Also Say Cambodians Helped Them": Captured North Vietnamese soldiers said today that their units had received assistance from Cambodian "militiamen" during their infiltration into South Vietnam and that each infiltrated regiment had one Chinese Communist adviser. The New York Times.
A Chinese Advisors Group established its headquarters in Phnom Penh to coordinate the logistics aspect of the NVA Pleime attack.
Intelligence In the exercise of the campaign, II Corps Command had a unique source of intelligence.Vĩnh Lộc, p.94 This intelligence source consisted of radio intercepts of the communications between the Chinese Advisors that II Corps Command alluded to as "Special Agents".Kinnard, p.46Coleman, p.119 LTC Hal Moore got a sample of this type of intelligence in the Mandarin dialect on the eve of the LZ X-Ray air assault,Moore, page 64
It allowed the planning for every aspect of the operations on "current(real-time) intelligence". It also permitted the accurate scheduling of the B-52 strikes.McChristian, p.2
This source of intelligence was generated at J2/MACV level (Brigadier General McChristian) and disseminated to G2/ACDF (Brigadier General Knowles)McChristian, p.4 through the channel of G2/IFFV (Major General Larsen).Coleman, p.193
Ground/Air Counter-Attack In September 1965, prior to attack of the Pleime camp, a B-52 strike – to destroy the NVA B3 Field Front Forces comprising the three 32nd, 33rd and 66th Regiments as they assembled in the bases set up in the Chu Pong areas to stage the attack of the Pleime camp scheduled for December 1962,Nguyễn Nam Khanh – was in the planning on the desk of J2/MACV.McChristian, p.6
When the B3 Field Command decided for an earlier attack on 19 October with only the 32nd and the 33rd, the plan was modified with the introduction of Operation Dân Thắng 21 (Pleime) and Operation Long Reach (Chupong) with the purpose to allowing the three 32nd, 33rd and 66th to regroup as available targets for B-52 bombers. The plan was code-named "Plei Me/Chupong Campaign" and narrated in Brigadier General McChristian's report, "Intelligence Aspect of Plei Me/Chu Pong Campaign".McChristian, pp.1–72
A target becomes available for B-52 strike when it can be pinpointed in a one square kilometer spot.Melyan, p.56 On November 11, intelligence source notified Brigadier Knowles all three NVA regiments had assembled within one square kilometer area with the 66th being the last one reaching that condition (center of mass Vic YA 9104), and the 32nd (YA 820070) and the 33rd (YA 940010) less than one square kilometer.Kinnard, p.76McChristian, p.44 It was on that day that Brigadier General Knowles presented the original B-52 strike plan of J2/MACV through Major General Larsen to Brigadier General DePuy in order for the chief J3/MACV to execute the B-52 strike.Kinnard, p.9
A particularity of the B-52 strike operation at Chu Pong, is that 3AC/SAC was able to reduce the reaction strike time down to 14 hours and 17 minutes from the normal required 24 hoursMelyan, p.9 DePuy "stated that this is the fastest a strike of this nature ".G3 Journal.IFFV, 11/15 entry
After three consecutive days of B-52 strikes, II Corps Command estimated the B3 Field Front Forces had lost 2/3 of its strength and after 5 consecutive days, its rear bases with trenches and bunkers were destroyed and the back door into was Cambodia closed. The ARVN Airborne Brigade was brought in to "finish' em'".Vinh Loc, page 97
Air Cavalry Division Upon its arrival in Viet Nam in September 1965, the 1st Air Cavalry Division was put under the command of I Field Force Viet Nam (IFFV) and to operate in the II Corps areas of responsibility. The 1st Air Cavalry immediately established its headquarters named Camp Halloway in pleiku Central Highlands, while its newly arrived troops started to conduct operations in the Bong Son coastal area of Qui Nhon.Coleman, pp.68–74
The Air Cavalry participated in the campaign in two steps: Operation Ingram (from 23 to 26 October)Kinnard, p.18 then Operation Long Reach (from 27 October to 26 November).Kinnard, p.28
Operation Long Reach derives from trường chinh (in Vietnamese). It was assigned – on 26 October – by the II Corps Command to the 1st Air Cavalry Division with the mission to pursue the enemy into the Ia Drang-Chu Pong complex. The ARVN Airborne Brigade was put on the standby as reserved force during the Chu Pong phase, until it became the main force during the Ia Drang phase. Vĩnh Lộc, p.101
USAF's role The U.S. Air Force had a decisive role in repulsing the attacking troops at the camp Porter, The Siege of Pleime: For the next ten days [following October 19], air power played a key role in breaking the attack. In 696 day and night strike sorties, B-57s, AIEs, F-100s, and F-8s rained 866,300 pounds of GP bombs, 250,380 pounds of frag bombs, 485,880 pounds of napalm, plus rockets, CBUs and cannon fire on VC positions as close as 35 meters from the outpost walls. and the ambush Porter, Silver Bayonet : The airborne FAC in the flare ships on station directed 74 strike sorties, with the fighters using napalm, general purpose, frags, CBU, 2.75 rockets and 20 mm cannon in support of the column. "Puff", the AC-47, dropped 25 flares and expended 4,000 rounds of 7.62 mm minigun fire against the attackers. By 0930, 24 October, fire on the convoy had dwindled to small arms, and by 1300 the VC broke contact because of the air strikes. sites, with 696 day and night strike sorties and with 74 strike sorties, respectively.
Pleime, the first preparatory phase (20–26 October) On 19 October, the NVA 33rd Regiment launched the attack of the Pleime camp. The attack was a luring tactic aiming to attract the II Corps main force out of Pleiku to destroy it with an ambush. II Corps Command took up the challenge.Vinh Loc, p.55 At the beginning of the siege, IFFV Commander in Nhatrang inquired who in the II Corps Headquarters was in charge of the counter-attack in the absence of the Commanding General and got the answer that it was the II Corps Chief of Staff.G3 Journal/IFFV, 19 October 1965 entry
On 20 October, he immediately reacted by establishing a relief Armored Task Force to rescue the campVinh Loc, p.61 and at the same time dispatched a two ARVN-US Special Forces company team to reinforce the camp.Vinh Loc, p.57
On 22 October the ARVN-US Special Forces team entered the camp after being helilifted to a location North East Pleime.Vinh Loc, p.59 Meanwhile, to counter the NVA mobile ambush tactic, the Relief Armored Task Force was ordered to linger around Phu My as to give the appearance of conducting a patrol operation while waiting for more reinforcement.
On 23 October, II Corps Command made a request for reinforcement from IFFV (General Stanley R.Larsen) to replace the 22nd Ranger Battalion that was needed to reinforce the relief column in the task of securing the Pleiku Airfield and Pleiku city. At 1300 hours the US reinforcement (Ingram Task Force comprising 1/12 Air Cavalry Infantry Battalion and the one battery 2/19 Arty) arrived in Pleiku.Vinh Loc, p.63
On 24 October, the Relief Armored Task Force received order to push toward the camp, and the 2/19 Air Cavalry Arty battery moved from Pleiku Airfield to position at 10 km South of Phu My to provide artillery support to the relief column. After failing to achieve the ambush, the 32nd Regiment received the order to retreat with 120 killed and 75 crew-served and individual weapons captured.Vinh Loc, p.67
On 25 October, the Relief Armored Task Force pushed through the ambush site and entered the camp at dusk.
On 26 October, Operation Dân Thắng 21 ended with the retreat of the 33rd Regiment and with about 400 casualties on the NVA side.Vinh Loc, p.69
Repulsing Force II Corps Command relied on the USAF's firepower of B-57s, AIEs, F-100s, F-8s and AC-47s in repulsing the enemy attacking troops both at the Pleime camp and at the ambush sites.Porter, the Siege of Pleime
Chu Pong, the main phase (27 October-17 November) On 26 October, while the relief of the Pleime camp was wrapping up, II Corps Command requested I Field Force Vietnam (IFFV) Command have the 1st Air Cavalry Division pursue the withdrawing troops of the 32nd and 33rd Regiments. It was approved and the operation was named Operation Long Reach (Trường Chinh in Vietnamese).Vĩnh Lộc, p.101Vinh Loc, pp. 74–76 To entice the B3 Field Front to wanting to attack the Pleime camp again with its three 32nd, 33rd and 66th Regiments together this time, while expanding the Tactical Operational Area of Responsibility of the Air Cavalry, the Pleime Camp was maintained under the responsibility of II Corps.G3 Journal/IFFV, 10/30 entry To enhance the ability to work closely with the ARVN in the execution of Operation Long Reach, Brigadier General Knowles set up his tactical Command Post, co-located with II Corps Headquarters in Pleiku.Kinnard, p.ii
Operation All the Way On 27 October, the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade commenced Operation All the Way as the first part of Operation Long Reach while the lead elements of the 33rd had closed on it assembly area at the village Kro.Kinnard, p.31McChristian, p.16
On 28 October, the 32nd Regiment had nearly reached its base on the north bank of Ia Drang.Kinnard, p.34McChristian, p.17
On 29 October, the 33rd Regiment closed on it base at Anta Village.Kinnard, p.37McChristian, p.18
On 1 November, units of the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade had the first engagement with battalion size enemy force at the 33rd Regiment aid station.Kinnard, p.46.McChristian, p.26