The campaign at the China–Burma border () was a series of battles fought along the China–Burma border after the Chinese Civil War, with the Communist People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of Burma on one side and the Nationalist forces of the Republic of China (ROC) on the other. The Chinese government refers to the campaign as the China–Burma border demarcation and security operation ().
Background
After being defeated in the Chinese Civil War, parts of the Nationalist Army retreated south and crossed the border into Burma. The United States supported the Nationalist forces in the hope that they would harass the People's Republic of China from Southwestern China, thereby diverting Chinese resources from the Korean War.
To lead those troops better, the Nationalist government sent the original deputy commander-in-chief, Liu Yuanlin (), back to Burma to form the Yunnan People's Anti-communist Volunteer Army in June 1954. By the early 1960s, the Nationalist forces in northern Burma had reached their peak and totaled nearly 10,000 troops. Because there was a much higher proportion of officers among the Nationalist forces in the China–Burma border, the structure of the Nationalist forces in northern Burma differed from the ordinary military structure: the Yunnan People's Anti-communist Volunteer Army was organised into five armies, each consisting of two to three divisions. Each division consisted of two to three regiments, and the brigade-level structure was eliminated. The size of each regiment of Yunnan People's Anti-communist Volunteer Army varied greatly in size from two dozen troops to over 1000 troops. The Nationalist force controlled an area along the China–Burma border that was 300 km long and 100 km deep, which was typically mountainous jungle regions in which the rainy season lasted six months, and the area was covered by fog for the majority of the year. Because there were few roads and trails, and the natural environment was very harsh, it was extremely difficult to navigate in the region.
On 28 January 1960, Burmese Premier Ne Win visited China and signed a deal aimed at solving the historical territorial disputes between China and Burma (specifically Jiangxinpo and Namwan). In October 1960, Burmese Prime Minister U Nu and Burmese Chief-of-Staff Ne Win visited China once again. On 1 October 1960, they signed a new border treaty with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. Before the border treaty was signed, both sides agreed in May 1960 on jointly eradicating the Chinese Nationalists from the border region. The treaty's requirement to survey of the China–Burma border for demarcation provided a reason for the later military actions.
Prelude In October 1960, the Communist high command ordered the Kunming Military Region to prepare for the campaign. In early November 1960, the Communists and the Burmese government held a joint conference on the matter of the Communist forces fighting in Burma. The Burmese representatives were headed by Brigadier Generals Aung Gyi and San Yu, and the Chinese communist representatives were headed by Ding Rongchang (), the deputy commander-in-chief of the communist Yunnan Provincial Military Region, and Cheng Xueyu (), the director of the Border Defense Directorate of the War Department of the General Staff Ministry of the People's Liberation Army. By 4 November 1960, a deal was signed in which communist forces were allowed to fight in Burma in a region that was 20 km deep and 300 km long along the border.
On 14 November 1960, the Communist central military committee formally issued the order to cross the border to destroy the Nationalist troops in Burma, according to the personal direction of Zhou Enlai. The political implication of the campaign was especially emphasized, with failure not an option. Most Communist forces would be deployed in the Mengma (), Mengwa (), and Sandao () regions. The Communists intended to avoid scattering the enemy and instead wanted to annihilate the enemy completely by first cutting off the Nationalists' route of retreat by a surprise attack.
There were also restrictions placed on the Communists' actions: for example, if the nationalists were to retreat towards the Burma–Laos–Thailand border, the Communist forces could not give chase on their own but would have to co-ordinate with the Burmese government first, just as in any other unexpected situation. Local civilian casualties were to be avoided at all costs. After receiving the order, the Communist Kunming Military Region decided to mobilize five infantry regiments and militias, totaling over 6,500, for the campaign, including a regiment from the 39th Division of the 13th Army, a regiment of the 40th Division of the 14th Army, and three border defense regiments.
For better coordinating of their actions in Burma, the Communist forces formed a frontline command at Fohai () in early November 1960. Li Xifu (), the commander-in-chief of the Communist Yunnan Provincial Military Region, was named the commander-in-chief of the new frontline command. Ding Rongchang () and Cui Jiangong (), the deputy commander of the Communist 13th Army, were named as the deputy commanders-in-chief of the new frontline command.
Order of battle The surviving Nationalist force at the China–Burma border peaked in the early 1960s and totaled almost 10,000 troops, excluding their noncombatant family members. The Nationalist force was divided into five armies, each of which was responsible for an area. In addition to the five areas of responsibility of the five armies, there were also the Ximeng () Military Region and the Mengbailiao () Garrison Region. The Communists mobilized 6,500 troops, 4,500 of whom were deployed during the campaign.
Nationalist order of battle Yunnan People's Anticommunist Volunteer Army (commander-in-chief: Liu Yuanlin, ()) 1st Army headquartered at Mengwa (), commanded by Wu Yunnuan () 2nd Army headquartered at Suoyong (), commanded by Wu Zubo () 3rd Army headquartered at Laidong (), commanded by Li Wenhuan () 4th Army headquartered at Mengma (), commanded by Zhang Weicheng () 5th Army headquartered at Menglong (), commanded by Duan Xiwen ()
Communist order of battle 117th Regiment of the 39th Division of the 13th Army 118th Regiment of the 40th Division of the 14th Army 116th Regiment 9th Border Defense Regiment of Yunnan Simao Military Sub-region 10th Border Defense Regiment of Yunnan Simao Military Sub-region 11th Border Defense Regiment of Yunnan Simao Military Sub-region Militia units
Strategies Both sides were limited by various factors. Their low numbers caused the Nationalists to adopt the strategy of avoiding fighting any large-scale battles and of instead concentrating on preserving their own strength. In the event of a Communist offensive, they would quickly withdraw away from the China–Burma border. The Communists, however, were limited by the red line that restricted their actions, which eventually resulted in the successful escape of most of the Nationalist forces to the Laos–Thailand border.
Nationalist strategy The Nationalist frontline bordering China was 300 km long and 20 km deep and was the main target of the Communist offensive. There was a total of 22 Nationalist strongholds in the region, which comprised the headquarters of the nationalist 1st and 4th Armies, 2nd Division, 3rd Division, 5th Division, 6th Division, eight regimental headquarters, and eight guerrilla strike teams. The Nationalist force in the region totaled more than 800 troops and was divided into three lines of defense.
The first line of defense was manned by the 1st Army and its 3rd Division, totaled over 150 troops, and was stationed in various Nationalist strongholds, including Mengwa (), Mengyu (), Mengjing (), and Jingkang (). With the exception of Jingkang (), all of the Nationalist strongholds in the first line of defense faced the Southern Luo () River and had hilly forest to their rear. All of the roads and trails to and from China in the region were heavily mined. The Nationalist 4th Army was deployed to the south and the east of Mengyong () and was the backbone of the Nationalist' second line of defense, and its 35th Regimentm totaling over 200 soldiers, was stationed at the critical peak 1404. The Mengbailiao () and Jiangle () regions were the Nationalist third line of defense; the general headquarters of Nationalist Commander-in-Chief Liu Yuanlin () were set up in Mengbailiao (), with the training group, garrison regiment, and communication battalion totaling over 450 troops. The Jiangle () region was the Nationalist logistic headquarters and totaled over 200 troops, including the 1st Training Group.
Communist strategy The Communists divided the combat zone into smaller individual areas and planned to cut off the Nationalists' retreating routes. The 117th Regiment and a portion of the 116th Regiment of the 39th Division of the Communist 13th Army were tasked with destroying the headquarters of the Nationalist 4th Army at Mengma (), the Nationalist 6th Division, 2nd Division, 5th Regiment, 17th Regiment and four guerrilla strike teams, totaling 439 troops. In reality, the Communists overestimated the Nationalist strength, which totaled only 334 troops. The 118th Regiment of the 40th Division of the Communist 14th Army was tasked with destroying the headquarters of the Nationalist 1st Army at Mengwa (孟瓦), the garrison battalion, the headquarters of the Nationalist 3rd Division, the 8th Regiment, the 9th Regiment, and a guerrilla strike team totaling 265 troops. Once again, the Communists overestimated the Nationalist strength, which totaled only 156 troops.
The 11th Border Defense Regiment of the Communist Yunnan Simao Military Sub-region was tasked with destroying the Nationalist 7th Regiment and a guerrilla strike team totaling 59 troops, but the Communist intelligence had underestimated the nationalist strength, which totaled 81 troops. The 9th and 10th Border Defense Regiments of the Communist Yunnan Simao Military Sub-region were tasked with destroying the headquarters of the Nationalist 5th Division at Barbarians' Nest (Manwo, ), the 14th Regiment, the 1st Regiment and two guerrilla strike teams totaling 159 troops. The Communist intelligence had again underestimated the nationalist strength, which actually totaled 171 troops. The Communists mobilized a total of 6,639 troops of their own though not all of them had crossed the border. They divided their forces into 22 routes and would cross the border to attack in the early morning of 22 November 1960.
First stage The communist 2nd Company of the 9th Regiment of Border Defense and the 2nd Company of the 10th Regiment of Border Defense, who were tasked to attack Nationalist strongholds at Man'enai (), reached their target by 5:00 a.m. on 22 November 1960. However, the numerically inferior Nationalist troops had just learned of the upcoming attack and retreated and abandoned the stronghold. The Communists' main force immediately sent out four companies to chase the retreating nationalists and caught up with them around ten kilometres south of the stronghold. After the ensuing battles (including mopping-up operations), thirty-three nationalist troops, including Li Tai (), the commander of the nationalist 5th Division, were killed, which destroyed the Nationalist garrison of the Man'enai () stronghold.