Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal – Gonobahini (JGB; ), better known as just Gonobahini (), was the armed wing of the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal. The group was mainly composed of former Mukti Bahini members from the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War.

History

Origins (1962–1972) In 1962, a group of student leaders at University of Dhaka, including Sirajul Alam Khan, formed an armed underground secessionist student political group Swadhin Bangla Biplobi Parishad or Free Bengal Revolutionary Council, also known as "Nucleus" within the East Pakistan Students' League. The group's central thesis was that the independence of East Bengal was a necessary condition for establishing a socialist party. They viewed the economic and political disparities between East and West Pakistan as the major political contradiction of that period.

During the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, an armed faction known as the Bangladesh Liberation Force (BLF), later known as the Mujib Bahini, was established. Political instruction was integrated into the training program within the BLF. Four Students' League leaders who were ideological followers of Sirajul Alam Khan, Hasanul Haq Inu, Sharif Nurul Ambia, A. F. M. Mahbubul Haq, and Masud Ahmed Rumi were selected to deliver regular political lectures to the BLF trainees.

A faction of military officers including Lieutenant Colonel Abu Taher and Lieutenant Colonel M. Ziauddin proposed alternative military strategies at the same time. Taher and Ziauddin rejected the conventional military structure. They advocated for dispersing military personnel into the districts to train guerrilla brigades drawn directly from the peasantry. Taher estimated that a productive peasant army of 100,000 men could be raised within a year. He argued that this approach would avoid reliance on foreign military assistance.

After the independence of Bangladesh, ideological divisions regarding the country's political and economic framework led to formal organizational splits within the Awami League's affiliated wings. The student wing (Bangladesh Chhatra League) divided in April 1972. The peasant wing (Bangladesh Krishak League) split in May 1972, and the workers' front (Bangladesh Jatiya Sramik League) split in June 1972. These breakaway factions formed the convening committee of the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (Jasad) on 21 October 1972. They officially described it as a socialist mass organization. Secret members, including Colonel Abu Taher, joined the Central Organizing Committee by December 1972.

Jasad leader Major (Retd.) M. A. Jalil formally introduced Colonel Abu Taher to Sirajul Alam Khan in the latter half of 1972. Taher had maintained contact with the underground Purba Banglar Sarbahara Party (Proletarian Party) and its leader, Siraj Sikder, before this introduction. Taher provided the Sarbahara Party with financial and material assistance, including weaponry, throughout 1972. He allowed Sikder to use his official military residence inside the Cumilla Cantonment as a periodic safe house. Taher also procured a wireless transmitter for the party, and his younger brother, Abu Sayeed, delivered it secretly. The Jasad central leadership was fully aware of Taher's communications with these underground factions as he integrated into their organization.

Emergence of Jasad and military dissent (late 1972–1973) On 21 October 1972, dissident factions split from the Awami League's student, peasant, and workers' wings formed the convening committee of a new political organization, the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (Jasad). The organization did not use the label of a formal political party at first. Instead, it positioned itself as a socialist mass organization. The founding members of this committee included Major (Retd.) M. A. Jalil, A. S. M. Abdur Rob, Shajahan Siraj, Bidhan Krishna Sen, Nur Alam Ziku, and Sultan Uddin Ahmed. Major Jalil served as the joint convenor when the organization started. On 26 December 1972, he was formally elected as the chairman of the party during its council session. Jasad functioned as an active anti-government opposition force under this new leadership. The party declared that its primary objective was the establishment of scientific socialism through a proletarian revolution. In December 1972, the initial convening committee expanded into the Central Organizing Committee of Jasad.

At the same time, profound dissent developed within the upper ranks of the Bangladesh military command. This disagreement regarded the structural and strategic future of the armed forces. Lieutenant Colonel Abu Taher and Lieutenant Colonel M. Ziauddin actively opposed government initiatives to rebuild the military as a traditional, colonial-style conventional army. They argued that a conventional standing army would act as a severe economic burden in a developing nation like Bangladesh. They believed it would drain the economic surplus required for national investment and production. They also contended that this military structure would force the country to rely heavily on foreign military assistance and imperialist loans, which would compromise national independence.

As an alternative, Taher and Ziauddin proposed a policy of absolute self-reliance. They advocated for a National Militia model. Soldiers under this framework would engage in military duties and perform daily physical labor alongside peasants and workers. Taher implemented this concept during his command of the 44th Brigade in Cumilla. Officers and soldiers there engaged in intensive crop cultivation and planted large pineapple orchards. They also formed specialized work teams to assist local villages with plowing, planting, irrigation, and flood control.

The government rejected these alternative military concepts. It prioritized the development of the Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini instead, which was a paramilitary force organized with the direct involvement of Indian officers and advisors. In the late summer of 1972, Ziauddin expressed his deep political disillusionment by publishing a signed article in the opposition weekly, *Holiday*. He openly criticized the state of the country in the piece. He asserted that a secret treaty had been signed with India and demanded the public disclosure of its terms. Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman requested an official apology from Ziauddin after the publication to avoid formal recriminations. Ziauddin refused to apologize. In late 1972, this led to his dismissal from active military service. In November 1972, Taher also resigned from the army due to these disagreements over military structure and policy.

By December 1972, Colonel Abu Taher secretly joined the Central Organizing Committee of Jasad. Taher aligned with Jasad because he believed the organization was actively developing the mass base and political program required to establish a revolutionary socialist government. He operated as a leading, covert figure within the party's armed wing, the Biplopi Gono Bahini (People's Revolutionary Army). He submitted to the political direction of the party's National Committee.

Ziauddin was drawn to the Purba Banglar Sarbahara Party (East Bengal Proletarian Party) led by Siraj Sikder. He viewed it as the most militarily active force opposing a government he believed had betrayed the ideals of the Liberation War. Ziauddin started a process of intentional lifestyle changes to align with the working class after his dismissal. For half a year, he traveled in third-class train compartments, visited remote rural areas, and systematically altered his upper-class personal habits. In February 1974, Ziauddin severed contact with his closest associates. He left behind only a brief note stating that he had committed fully to the underground movement. In May 1974, clandestine leaflets distributed in Dhaka and military cantonments officially announced that the former brigade commander had joined the Sarbahara Party's Marxist underground. Taher maintained personal contact with Ziauddin and hoped to foster unity among the disparate underground factions. However, Taher remained critical of Sikder's movement, assessing that it lacked a solid mass base and a coherent socio-political analysis.

Formation of Gonobahini (1974) In late 1973 and early 1974, Bangladesh experienced a severe economic crisis and a major famine. The Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (Jasad) started a series of mass anti-government protests because of these deteriorating conditions. The party held large public rallies, drawing crowds of up to 100,000 people in December 1973. It also organized nationwide general strikes in January and February 1974.

On 17 March 1974, Jasad leaders directed a mass hunger march to surround the official residence of the home minister Mansur Ali. Hasanul Haq Inu led a group of armed men to attack the residence of home minister, which resulted in a massacre. This event became known as the Ramna Massacre. Official government announcements reported eight deaths, but medical personnel at the Dhaka Medical College Hospital estimated more than thirty. The Gonobahini is also accused of killing numerous Bangladesh Chhatra League and Awami League members.

The government launched a widespread crackdown on Jasad activists across the country right after the march. The party's offices and the premises of its daily newspaper, *Gonokantho*, were vandalized and burned. The top organizational leadership, including Jasad President Major (Retd.) M. A. Jalil and General Secretary A. S. M. Abdur Rob, were arrested and imprisoned.

The open political network of the party was severely disrupted. Jasad was forced to operate underground and changed its political strategy. The leadership decided to abandon public parliamentary politics and start an armed struggle against the government. In July 1974, Jasad officially established its militant wing, the Biplopi Gonobahini (People's Revolutionary Army), which became widely known as the Gonobahini. Colonel Abu Taher, who kept his secret affiliation with the party closely guarded, was appointed as the military commander of the armed force.

Following the formation of the Gonobahini, the armed cadres initiated an underground insurgency in the rural districts of Bangladesh, assuming local law enforcement functions and establishing parallel justice systems. In areas such as Tarapur village, Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (Jasad) cadres began moving openly during the daytime and conducted recruitment drives among the local peasantry for the armed wing. The cadres actively organized the village youth, giving literate members the responsibility of reading and explaining Marxist texts to illiterate peasants to build support for a socialist people's war.

The Gonobahini engaged in strict vigilante justice and the targeted assassination of notorious local bandits. The cadres executed thieves who had harassed the rural population, particularly prioritizing the execution of individuals who committed robberies while falsely claiming affiliation with Jasad. These vigilante actions garnered strong support from local villagers, who viewed state police and army forces as corrupt entities closely aligned with local elites who freely looted houses and made false arrests. The armed cadres systematically targeted local landlords and former Awami League officials accusing them of misappropriating state relief funds. Landlords were threatened with execution if they reported party activities to the police or obstructed the party's objectives. This strategy successfully forced rural elites to cooperate with the party's directives, effectively ceding administrative and law-and-order control of these localized areas to the insurgents.

In October 1974, the party's peasant front, the Jatiya Krishak League, published a booklet titled "Program for Socialist Agricultural Revolution" to establish a policy framework for the abolition of sharecropping and the creation of agricultural cooperatives.