Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) is an intelligence discipline that uses scientific and technical analysis of data from sensing instruments to detect, measure, identify, or characterize the distinctive features ("signatures") of targets. Some MASINT techniques use purpose-built sensors, while others analyze imagery or signals collected via other intelligence disciplines.
In MASINT terminology, measurement refers to the quantitative parameters of a target, while a signature is a distinctive feature of a phenomenon, object, or piece of equipment as detected by collection instruments.
The classification used by the Center for MASINT Studies and Research divides MASINT into six major disciplines: electro-optical, nuclear, geophysical, radar, materials, and radiofrequency MASINT. These disciplines overlap with one another and interact with other forms of intelligence, including HUMINT, IMINT, and SIGINT. It can also overlap with technical intelligence (TECHINT), although TECHINT often involves direct examination of equipment or materials, whereas MASINT aims to infer their characteristics through remote sensing and analysis.
MASINT was recognized by the United States Department of Defense as an intelligence discipline in 1986.
Discipline MASINT may have aspects of intelligence analysis management, since certain aspects of MASINT, such as the analysis of electromagnetic radiation received by signals intelligence, are more of an analysis technique than a collection method. Some MASINT techniques require purpose-built sensors.
MASINT was recognized by the United States Department of Defense as an intelligence discipline in 1986. MASINT is technically derived intelligence that—when collected, processed, and analyzed by dedicated MASINT systems—results in intelligence that detects and classifies targets, and identifies or describes signatures (distinctive characteristics) of fixed or dynamic target sources. In addition to MASINT, IMINT and HUMINT can subsequently be used to track or more precisely classify targets identified through the intelligence process. While traditional IMINT and SIGINT are not considered to be MASINT efforts, images and signals from other intelligence-gathering processes can be further examined through the MASINT discipline, such as determining the depth of buried assets in imagery gathered through the IMINT process.
William K. Moore described the discipline: "MASINT looks at every intelligence indicator with new eyes and makes available new indicators as well. It measures and identifies battlespace entities via multiple means that are difficult to spoof and it provides intelligence that confirms the more traditional sources, but is also robust enough to stand with spectrometry to differentiate between paint and foliage, or recognizing radar decoys because the signal lacks unintentional characteristics of the real radar system. At the same time, it can detect things that other sensors cannot sense, or sometimes it can be the first sensor to recognize a potentially critical datum."
It can be difficult to draw a line between tactical sensors and strategic MASINT sensors. Indeed, the same sensor may be used tactically or strategically. In a tactical role, a submarine might use acoustic sensors—active and passive sonar—to close in on a target or get away from a pursuer. Those same passive sonars may be used by a submarine, operating stealthily in a foreign harbor, to characterize the signature of a new submarine type.
MASINT and technical intelligence (TECHINT) can overlap. A good distinction is that a technical intelligence analyst often has possession of a piece of enemy equipment, such as an artillery round, which can be evaluated in a laboratory. MASINT, even MASINT materials intelligence, has to infer things about an object that it can only sense remotely. MASINT electro-optical and radar sensors could determine the muzzle velocity of the shell. MASINT chemical and spectroscopic sensors could determine its propellant. The two disciplines are complementary: consider that the technical intelligence analyst may not have the artillery piece to fire the round on a test range, while the MASINT analyst has multispectral recordings of it being used in the field.
As with many intelligence disciplines, it can be a challenge to integrate the technologies into the active services, so they can be used by warfighters.
Terminology In the context of MASINT, measurement relates to the finite metric parameters of targets and signature covers the distinctive features of phenomena, equipment, or objects as they are sensed by the collection instrument(s). The signature is used to recognize the phenomenon (the equipment or object) once its distinctive features are detected.
MASINT measurement searches for differences from known norms, and characterizes the signatures of new phenomena. For example, the first time a new rocket fuel exhaust is measured, it would be a deviation from a norm. When the properties of that exhaust are measured, such as its thermal energy, spectral analysis of its light (i.e., spectrometry), etc., those properties become a new signature in the MASINT database. MASINT has been described as a "non-literal" discipline. It feeds on a target's unintended emissive byproducts, or "trails"—the spectral, chemical or RF emissions an object leaves behind. These trails form distinctive signatures, which can be exploited as reliable discriminators to characterize specific events or disclose hidden targets."
While there are specialized MASINT sensors, much of the MASINT discipline involves analysis of information from other sensors. For example, a sensor may provide information on a radar beam, collected as part of Electronics intelligence (ELINT) gathering mission. Incidental characteristics recorded such as the "spillover" of the main beam (side lobes), or the interference its transmitter produces would come under MASINT.
National and multinational There has been work on developing standardized MASINT terminology and architecture in NATO. Other work addresses the disappointments of Non-Cooperative Target Recognition. For this function, infrared beacons (infrared MASINT) proved disappointing, but millimeter-wave recognition shows more promise. Still, cooperative, network-based position exchange may be crucial in preventing fratricide. The bottom line is that MASINT cannot identify who is inside a tank or aircraft of interest.
Numerous countries produce their own antisubmarine warfare sensors, such as hydrophones, active sonar, magnetic anomaly detectors, and other hydrographic sensors that are frequently considered too "ordinary" to be called MASINT.
China
As of 2004, China was reported not to be pursuing the more specialized MASINT technologies, although it does produce its antisubmarine sensors.
Germany Following the first successful launch on December 19, 2006, about a year after the intended launch date, further satellites were launched at roughly six-month intervals, and the entire system of this five-satellite SAR Lupe synthetic aperture radar constellation achieved full operational readiness on 22 July 2008. Spaceflight now—Radar reconnaissance spacecraft launched
Italy Italy and France are cooperating on the deployment of the dual-use Orfeo civilian and military satellite system.
Orfeo is a dual-use (civilian and military) earth observation satellite network developed jointly between France and Italy. Italy is developing the Cosmo-Skymed X-band polarimetric synthetic aperture radar, to fly on two of the satellites.
Russia Russia does have nonimaging infrared satellites to detect missile launches. Russia produces a wide range of antisubmarine warfare sensors.
United Kingdom UK developed the first successful acoustic system, sound ranging to detect hostile artillery and anti-submarine acoustic detection in World War I. In the 1990s, an improved acoustic system for artillery location acoustic artillery location system was introduced, which complements Counter-battery radar.
United States Within the US Intelligence Community the Directorate of MASINT and Technical Collections office of the Defense Intelligence Agency is the central agency for MASINT. This was formerly called the Central MASINT Office. For education and research, there is the Center for MASINT Studies and Research of the Air Force Institute of Technology.
Clearly, the National Reconnaissance Office and National Security Agency work in collecting MASINT, especially with military components. Other intelligence community organizations also have a collection role and possibly an analytic role. In 1962, the Central Intelligence Agency, Deputy Directorate for Research (now the Deputy Directorate for Science and Technology), formally took on ELINT and COMINT responsibilities.
The consolidation of the ELINT program was one of the major goals of the reorganization. ... it is responsible for: Research, development, testing, and production of ELINT and COMINT collection equipment for all Agency operations. Technical operation and maintenance of CIA deployed non-agent ELINT systems. Training and maintenance of agent ELINT equipment Technical support to the Third Party Agreements. Data reduction of Agency-collected ELINT signals. ELINT support peculiar to the penetration problems associated with the Agent's reconnaissance program under NRO. Maintain a quick reaction capability for ELINT and COMINT equipment.
CIA's Office of Research and Development was formed to stimulate research and innovation testing leading to the exploitation of non-agent intelligence collection methods. ... All non-agent technical collection systems will be considered by this office and those appropriate for field deployment will be so deployed. The Agency's missile detection system, Project [deleted] based on backscatter radar is an example. This office will also provide integrated systems analysis of all possible collection methods against the Soviet antiballistic missile program is an example.
It is not clear where ELINT would end and MASINT would begin for some of these projects, but the role of both is potentially present. MASINT, in any event, was not formalized as a US-defined intelligence discipline until 1986.
MASINT from clandestinely placed sensors CIA took on a more distinct MASINT responsibility in 1987. The National Security Archive commented, "In 1987, deputy director for Science and Technology Evan Hineman established ... a new Office for Special Projects, concerned not with satellites, but with emplaced sensors—sensors that could be placed in a fixed location to collect signals intelligence or measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) about a specific target. Such sensors had been used to monitor Chinese missile tests, Soviet laser activity, military movements, and foreign nuclear programs. The office was established to bring together scientists from the DS&T's Office of SIGINT Operations, who designed such systems, with operators from the Directorate of Operations, who were responsible for transporting the devices to their clandestine locations and installing them.
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency plays a role in geophysical MASINT.
Multinational counterproliferation All nuclear testing, of any level, was forbidden under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (which has not entered into force), but there is controversy over whether the preparatory commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) or the Treaty Organization itself will be able to detect sufficiently small events. It is possible to gain valuable data from a nuclear test that has an extremely low yield, useless as a weapon but sufficient to test weapons technology. CTBT does not recognize the threshold principle and assumes all tests are detectable.