Diplomatic relations between Canada and China officially date back to when Canada first established a foreign ministry on January 9, 1909, at which point Canada was still part of the British Empire and China was ruled by the Qing dynasty. By 1942, Canada sent an ambassador to the Republic of China (ROC). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s victory in the Chinese Civil War and subsequent proclamation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 did not break the relations with the Republic of China until 1970, when Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau became one of the first Western leaders to recognize the PRC.
Relations between the Canadian and Chinese governments had deteriorated significantly after the detention of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou by Canada in 2018 and the subsequent detention of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig by China. According to Canadian intelligence, China made efforts to interfere in the 2019 and 2021 elections. Relations between Canada and China improved under Prime Minister Mark Carney, subsequent to the deterioration of Canada–United States relations. In 2024, China was Canada's second largest export and import partner after the United States.
History
Prior to 1949
As part of the British Empire and later the Commonwealth of Nations, Canada did not establish a foreign ministry (External Affairs) until 1909 and developed an independent foreign policy only after passage of the Statute of Westminster 1931. Canada posted one third of six battalions to Hong Kong before the Battle of Hong Kong, which was lost to the Japanese Imperial Army, from 25 December 1941 to 16 September 1945, more than a month after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Canada established embassies overseas only in the 1940s, and in 1942, Canada posted its first ambassador in the ROC's wartime capital of Chongqing. The embassy was moved to Nanjing in 1946.
Establishment of the People's Republic of China Canada faced a dilemma following the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949. On many issues, Canada followed the lead of British and the United States, but those two governments followed different policies on China. The United Kingdom, under the control of a socialist government, extended diplomatic recognition to the Communist Chinese, but the United States refused to recognize the Communist government. After the Liberal victory in the Canadian federal election of 1949 and more discussion, Canada followed the British approach. The Canadian embassy in Nanjing was kept open, and Canada posted a chargé d'affaires. By 23 June 1950, the Canadian Department of External Affairs had prepared instructions for the chargé to open negotiations with the Chinese government for an exchange of ambassadors.
Korean War
However, the Korean War began two days later, on 25 June 1950. With Canadian troops fighting for the United Nations forces, which opposed Communist Chinese troops, the continuation of diplomatic relations became untenable. After Canada voted in favour of a UN resolution that branded PRC an aggressor, the Chinese government asked the Canadian chargé d'affaires to leave. The Canadian embassy in Nanjing was closed on 26 February 1951. Thereafter, Canada maintained diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, whose government had evacuated to Taiwan after losing to the Communists. However, Canada did not send an ambassador to the new capital of Taipei. Instead, relations were maintained through the ROC ambassador to Canada.
Early Cultural Revolution (1966-1968) Canada's inclination to establish relations with the PRC was motivated by the intent to end China's isolation, which Prime Minister Lester Pearson saw as a threat to "world peace and the integrity of the post-war collective security system embodied in the UN."St Amour, Norman (1991). Sino-Canadian relations, 1963-1968: The American factor. In Evans, Paul M. & Frolic, B. Michael (eds.), Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1970 (pp. 106-129). University of Toronto Press. pp. 107, 121, 123. During Pearson's prime ministership, a multilateral approach was taken, intending to see the PRC recognized in the United Nations under a possible two-China policy.Page, Don (1991). The Representations of China in the United Nations: Canadian Perspectives and Initiatives, 1949-1971. In Evans, Paul M. & Frolic, B. Michael (eds.), Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1970 (pp. 73-105). University of Toronto Press, pp. 94-100. Still, Pearson and his cabinet were sensitive to U.S. and with Republic of China (ROC) officials' opinions, not intending to antagonize either state needlessly. Pearson saw Canada as reaping most of the benefits of PRC relations without recognition, as trade continued between the two states unhindered. The Liberal Party of Canada, however, in October 1966 internally approved a resolution "calling for immediate recognition of Peking and its admission to the United Nations."
In November 1966, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin Sr., voted "absention" on the annual Albanian Resolution to change the "China seat" from the present ROC government in Taiwan to the PRC, breaking with their U.S. ally. A milder than expected U.S. reaction shocked Canadian officials and the object rejection of an interim solution of dual representation for the ROC in Taiwan and the PRC in the UN, proposed by Paul Martin Sr., pushed him to pursue a bilateral approach. The outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, however, resulted in foreign officials working in China to be attacked and stalled efforts towards recognition.
On the outbreak of the revolution, all but one of the PRC’s ambassadors would be recalled in order to participate in the Cultural Revolution.Chi-kwan, Mark (2025). China and the world since 1945: An international history (2nd ed.). Routledge Press. DOI:10.4324/9781032713434-6. pp. 62-67. In October 1966, PRC embassies would be instructed by the CCP that "the dissemination of Mao Zedong Thought was the first and foremost task," ultimately causing tensions between the PRC and numerous countries, including formerly friendly states Nepal, Burma and Cambodia.Ma, Jisen (2004). The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China. Chinese University Press. pp. 152, 163, 174. In February 1967, The PRC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) would fall under the control of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, as it became the main centre of decision-making. In August 1967, "MFA radical rebels in cooperation with the Red Guards from Beijing’s Foreign Languages Institute seized power in the Department of Political Affairs of the [MFA]." An attack on a British mission a week later, in response to the suppression of left-wing agitators in Hong Kong, would shock PRC leaders Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, who would be eager "to restore normality to the MFA and China’s diplomacy."
Pierre Trudeau Era and the Late Cultural Revolution (1968-1976)
The PRC's eagerness to end its isolation opened doors for newly elected Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to push for a more committed PRC recognition policy. Pierre Trudeau, who campaigned on recognizing the PRC "as soon as possible," saw Canadian politics as underemphasizing its Pacific connections.Bothwell, Robert and Granatstein, J. L. (1990). Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy. University of Toronto Press. pp. 180.Donaghy, Greg (2019). Pierre Trudeau and Canada's Pacific tilt, 1945–1984. International Journal 74(1), pp. 143. https://doi/10.1177/0020702019834883. His own experience visiting Mainland China on two occasions, once in 1949 and again in 1960, made him the first Canadian prime minister to have meaningful experiences within China prior to entering office. Trudeau's efforts to recognize the PRC were possible as Canada "had no strategic commitment to Taiwan or Vietnam, no anti-PRC lobby, and no urgent pressure to contain the Chinese communism."
Still, opposition arose from critics who accused Trudeau "of being soft on socialism and communism and holding leftist sympathies for Cuba, China, and the Soviet Union." Additionally, the Catholic Church in Quebec "adamantly opposed opening relations with China." Chinese officials had paid attention to Trudeau's positive stance on PRC recognition and saw Canada as a useful partner to reengaging in international relations, primarily as the country was "close to the United States, "somewhat independent" of the United States, and interested in more than commercial relations."
Chinese and Canadian officials discussed the technicalities of formal recognition at the Stockholm Conference, which pushed into 1970. The confounding factor was the ROC government in Taiwan, which the two states held opposing views on. Canada formally recognized the PRC as representatives of China on 13 October 1970 and established formal diplomatic ties, leaving the question of the ROC government unresolved. U.S. officials reacted with less concern as the transition to a more sympathetic Nixon administration occurred in 1968. In 1971, following the PRC's establishment of diplomatic ties with 10 other nations, the Albanian resolution was passed with Canadian support, passing the 'China seat' from the ROC government to the PRC.
During the remainder of the Cultural Revolution, the two countries continued to increase favourable relations. An official Canadian trade exhibition opened in Beijing in 1972 produced a windfall for Canadian business and for bilateral relations. Additionally, Canadian wheat markets continued to be supported by Chinese demand. The two nations also agreed "to exchange engineers and scientists as part of a foreign exchange programme."Rawcliffe, Dalton (2025). Containment and Engagement: Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand's Cold War Relations with the People's Republic of China, 1949–1980s. The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 32(1), pp. 14, 17-18. https://doi=10.1080/03086534.2025.2585137. In October 1973, Pierre Trudeau became the first Canadian Prime Minister to pay an official visit to the PRC, meeting Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong. In that year, the trade balance was heavily weighted in Canada's favour. Upon Trudeau's return, he remarked on "his own empathy for China's revolution and some of the accomplishments of its Communist leaders."
Another development came in 1973, when Canada and China agreed on a bilateral "family reunification agreement" which sought to allow multinational families split between Canada and China to reunify. The agreement followed a 1972 change in PRC policy, by which authorities would "assist, rather than deter, people who desired to emigrate." Both governments were highly conducive towards the agreement, demonstrated by "Beijing's surprising initiative in pursuing the accord" and Canadian officials willingness to accept PRC migrants.Madokoro, Laura (2016). Elusive refuge: Chinese migrants during the cold war. Harvard University Press. pp. 176-179.
The Canadian government was optimistic about the PRC's market-oriented reforms of the 1970s and 1980s, but it was difficult to see much substantial improvement as the Cultural Revolution raged.
Late Pierre Trudeau and Brian Mulroney Era
In October 1983, the Foreign Minister of the PRC Wu Xueqian visited Canada and signed the Agreement on Developing Cooperation between China and Canada.
In 1984, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang visited the second Trudeau government six months before it fell, and became the first Chinese Communist Party senior leader to address Parliament of Canada. Zhao signed the Agreement on the Protection of Investment between China and Canada. Zhao would later be subject to 15 years of house arrest until his death, because he opposed the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989.