United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, better known as NSC68, was a 66-page top secret U.S. National Security Council (NSC) policy paper drafted by the Department of State and Department of Defense and presented to President Harry S. Truman on 7 April 1950. It was one of the most important American policy statements of the Cold War. In the words of scholar Ernest R. May, NSC68 "provided the blueprint for the militarization of the Cold War from 1950 to the collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s." NSC68 and its subsequent amplifications advocated a large expansion in the military budget of the United States, the development of a hydrogen bomb, and increased military aid to allies of the United States. It made the rollback of global Communist expansion a high priority and rejected the alternative policies of détente and containment of the Soviet Union.Walter L. Hixson, "What Was the Cold War and How Did We Win It?" Reviews in American History (1994) 22#3 pp. 507-511 in JSTOR
Historical background
By 1950, U.S. national security policies required reexamination due to a series of events: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was operational, military assistance for European allies had begun, the Soviet Union had detonated an atomic bomb, and the communists had solidified their control of China. In addition, a British sterling-dollar crisis in the summer of 1949 had brought home to U.S. officials that the Marshall Plan would not suffice to cure Western European economic ills by 1952, the Plan's scheduled end year, with the prospect that Western Europe would have no choice but to pursue autarky, as it had in the 1930s, with all the attendant difficulties that would pose for the world economy generally and the U.S. economy particularly.Curt Cardwell, NSC 68 and the Political Economy of the Early Cold War (Cambridge, 2011). Similar problems were also plaguing Japan.William S. Borden, The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade policy, 1947–1955 (Wisconsin, 1984) With these threats to the U.S. and its allies expanding, on 31 January 1950 President Truman directed the Department of State and Department of Defense "to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans." A State-Defense Policy Review Group was set up under the chairmanship of Paul Nitze of the State Department.Paul H Nitze, S Nelson Drew, Ed., NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment, Brief Chronology, pp. 17–9.
Nitze, an advocate of rollback, ensured that only the most severe claims about the Soviet Union were cited in the document. The analysis of top Kremlin experts like George Kennan, Llewellyn Thompson, and Charles Bohlen, were categorically omitted. The Kennan–Thompson–Bohlen group maintained that Stalin's principal goal was to secure tight control of the USSR and its satellites, but that he had no plan to seek global domination (an assessment shared by most historians today). Nitze however, contended that the Soviets were determined to conquer the whole of Europe and most of Asia and Africa. Dean Acheson, another hawkish adviser to Truman, wrote that the purpose of NSC 68 was to "bludgeon the mind of top government that not only could the president make a decision, but that the decision could be carried out."
The Defense Department representatives on the committee initially resisted proposals that would exceed the existing $12.5 billion ceiling on defense spending.Block, Fred L. " The Origins of International..." Google Books. 28 April 2010. Web. 29 April 2010.
The report, designated NSC68, was presented to President Truman on 7 April 1950, who passed it on to the NSC for further consideration on 12 April 1950.Paul H Nitze, S Nelson Drew, Ed., NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment, Brief Chronology, pp. 17–9.
NSC Study Group: Paul Nitze, Chair John P. Davis Robert Tufts Robert Hooker Dean Acheson Charles E. Bohlen Major General Truman Landon, Joint Chiefs Representative Samuel S. Butano Robert Lovett, Deputy Secretary of Defense Originally, President Truman did not support NSC68 when it was brought to him in 1950. He believed that it was not specific about which programs would be affected or changed and it also did not go well with his previous defense spending limits. Truman sent it back for further review until he finally approved it in 1951.Paul H. Nitze, S. Nelson Drew, Ed., NCS-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment, p. 6, National Defense University, Washington DC: 1994.
The document outlined the de facto national security strategy of the United States for that time (although it was not an official National Security Strategy in the form known today) and analyzed the capabilities of the Soviet Union and of the United States of America from military, economic, political, and psychological standpoints.
NSC 68 described the challenges facing the United States in cataclysmic terms. "The issues that face us are momentous," the document stated, "involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself."
The document was declassified in 1975.
Content and meaning NSC68 saw the goals and aims of the United States as sound, yet poorly implemented, calling "present programs and plans... dangerously inadequate"."United States Objectives and Programs for National Security - NSC 68", 14 April 1950. President's Secretary's File, Truman Papers. Although George F. Kennan's theory of containment articulated a multifaceted approach for U.S. foreign policy in response to the perceived Soviet threat, the report recommended policies that emphasized military over diplomatic action. Kennan's influential 1947 X Article advocated a policy of containment towards the Soviet Union. It described containment as "a policy of calculated and gradual coercion" and called for significant peacetime military spending, in which the U.S. possessed "superior overall power ... in dependable combination with other like-minded nations." In particular, it called for a military capable of Defending the Western Hemisphere and essential allied areas so that their war-making capabilities could be developed; Providing and protecting a mobilization base while the offensive forces required for victory were being built up; Conducting offensive operations to destroy vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity, and to keep the enemy off balance until the full offensive strength of the United States and its allies could be brought to bear; Defending and maintaining the lines of communication and base areas necessary to the execution of the above tasks; and Providing such aid to allies as would be essential to the execution of their role in the above tasks.
NSC68 itself did not contain any specific cost estimates at a time when the United States was committing six to seven percent of its GNP to defense. It was evident that the limits the President had previously set on defense spending were too low. The report called for tripling defense spending to $40 or $50 billion per year from the original $13 billion set for 1950. It specified an increase of taxes and a "reduction of Federal expenditures for purposes other than defense and foreign assistance, if necessary by the deferment of certain desirable programs", as a means for paying for it. However, several officials involved in the preparation of the study, including the future chairman of the president's Council of Economic Advisers Leon Keyserling, suggested that the massive increase in military spending could be afforded by deliberate acceptance of government deficits, which would have the added benefit of energising and stimulating parts of the American economy, as it did after 1930.Craig, Campbell., Logevall, F. (2012). America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, pp.113–114 Indeed, the document did note that achieving a high gross national product "might itself be aided by a build-up of the economic and military strength of the United States," and the Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett also suggested that the American economy "might benefit from the kind of build-up we are suggesting".Craig, Campbell., Logevall, F. (2012). America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, p.114 The memorandum saw that the United States would grow exponentially with the added funding towards the military. The added funding would strengthen the current military, causing the Soviet Union to strengthen its military as well. However, since both superpowers had different economies, outcomes from this would differ greatly. They understood that the Soviet Union's output was nearly half of the United States' current output, so they assumed it was only a matter of time before the Soviet Union could not keep up. Understanding communism, they knew that the USSR was already producing at full capacity. There are four variables that determine output: consumption, investment, government expenditure, and exports. In order to increase military strength, the USSR would be forced to allocate resources from other avenues such as investment or consumption. Deprive investments and the country's economic growth would become stagnant. Deprive consumption and that would cause further civil unrest and lower the quality of life of its citizens. On the other hand, the United States did not run into the problem the Soviets did. What came from NSC-68 was an economic ideology that dominated the United States economy for the majority of the Cold War, Military Keynesianism. Economists assumed that the United States normally operated below production capacity. This assumption proved essential to the United States victory of military strength since the increase of government expenditure would place the nation at capacity. However, unlike the USSR, the United States economy would grow since it would be increasing its production.Fusfeld, Daniel R. (1998). "Economics and the Cold War: An Inquiry into the Relationship between Ideology and Theory." Journal of Economic Issues, vol. 32, no. 2, 1998, pp. 505–511. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4227328. Accessed 12 April 2021.
Relation to U.S. foreign policy The argument is made that if the Soviet sphere of influence continues to grow, it may become such a powerful force, that no coalition of nations could band together and defeat it. The implication was that militarization is needed for American self-preservation. In other words, the aggressive nature of Soviet expansion required a strong response from the U.S. to prevent the destruction of America. This was phrased in a context of military exploits (referring to the military victory in World War I and World War II), and therefore emphasized military expansion.
Also crucial in understanding this document is the language. Primary sources must be read carefully to recognize themes or motifs. Adjectives provide valuable insight into the motives of this document's authors, and the impression it had on its intended audience. An example is the description of the international situation, as provoked by the Soviet Union, as endemic. By using this language, it is clear that the authors wished to portray the Soviet Union as a sickness, and the U.S. as the cure. This message was received loud and clear, and dominated many foreign policy decisions throughout the Cold War.
Internal debate