VC and PAVN battle tactics comprised a flexible mix of guerrilla and conventional warfare battle tactics used by Viet Cong (VC) and the North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) to defeat their U.S. and South Vietnamese (GVN/ARVN) opponents during the Vietnam War.Arnold R. Isaacs. 1998. Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia

The VC was supposedly an umbrella of front groups to conduct the insurgency in South Vietnam affiliated with independent groups and sympathizers, but was in fact entirely controlled by the North Vietnamese communist party and the PAVN. The armed wing of the VC was regional and local guerrillas, and the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF). The PLAF was the "Main Force" – the Chu Luc full-time soldiers of the VC's military muscle. Many histories lump both the VC and the armed wing under the term "Viet Cong" in common usage. Both were tightly interwoven and were in turn controlled by the North.Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, (Viking Press: 1983) Others consider the VC to primarily refer to the armed elements. The PAVN was the regular army of North Vietnam. Collectively, both forces – the southern armed wing and the regulars from the north were part of PAVN,Douglas Pike, PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam, (Presidio: 1996) pp. 37–169 and are treated as such in official communist histories of the war.Merle Pribbenow (transl). 2002 "Victory in Vietnam. The official history of the people's army of Vietnam". University Press of Kansas, pp. 18–211,

VC/PAVN tactics in battle

Seizing the initiative: metering losses and controlling tempo The PAVN and VC conducted numerous attacks and defensive maneuvers, generally having the advantage of choosing the time and place for such operations. Such initiative was sometimes blunted by ARVN countermeasures, or the aggressive "search and destroy" tactics of US forces under General William Westmoreland and the improved pacification measures of his successor General Creighton Abrams. Nevertheless, over the vast area that was South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, PAVN forces typically held the initiative in a conflict extending over a decade. One US military study for example found that 88 percent of all engagements against US forces were initiated by the enemy.Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Army and Vietnam [Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986]

There were generally two approaches to metering losses. The first was attritional – operations were conducted to inflict maximum losses on ARVN/US forces. This meant expending lives and resources in attacks (ambushes, raids etc.) or in defensive operations (digging in to fight, bleeding opponents and then withdrawing when enemy forces grew too strong). Attacks were scaled up or down depending on a myriad of factors including the political situation in a particular area.Gen W. C. Westmoreland, "Report on Operations in South Vietnam, January 1964 – June 1968," in Report on the War in Vietnam [As of 30 June 1968], by United States Pacific Command [Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969], appendix L, 284. The second approach was avoidance of battle unless numerical superiority and chances of success were good. In the Vietnam War, most PAVN/VC units (including mobile PAVN regulars using guerrilla tactics) spent only a limited number of days a year fighting. While they might be forced into an unwanted battle by an ARVN/US action, most of the time was spent in population control, training, intelligence gathering, propaganda indoctrination or construction of fortifications, with PAVN/VC troops typically only fighting an average of 1 day in 30. In essence, the VC/PAVN largely fought on the ground only when they wanted to fight.

Mastery of the initiative made the US attrition strategy of seeking big battles problematic, and also undermined South Vietnamese Government/ARVN attempts at pacification. Manpower losses could always be made up with more infiltration of regulars from the North and additional recruitment of VC within the South. The arrival of US forces in 1965 saw a shift back to small unit and guerrilla warfare. The average of battalion sized attacks for example dropped from 9.7 per month to 1.3, while small-scale actions climbed by 150 percent. While US troops were being lured to remote regions in pursuit of base areas, big battles and large casualty ratios, 90% of all attacks were consistently occurring in the 10 percent of the country that held over 80 percent of the population according to one American study covering 1966 and 1967. The US strategy thus not only failed to fully come to grips with an elusive enemy on the outer edges, but also failed to consistently keep them away from the inner populated areas as well.

Learning and adaptability

The VC/PAVN battle philosophy placed great stress on learning and adaptability, and systematically strived to improve battle techniques at the lowest levels. Units and individuals were expected to be problem solvers, making creative use out of what might be fleeting opportunities and scarce resources. After engagements, detailed after-action reports were conducted, and detailed analyses of various problems in the field were carried out. After an action, both individuals and units examined their performance through widespread "criticism and self-criticism" sessions, and even commanders were taken to task at the appropriate levels. The lessons learned were continually incorporated into NVA/VC operations. Experiments were also carried out by different units and the results were disseminated via conferences, field manuals, memoranda and new procedures.

This capability to adapt was crucial when facing new technology, such as US helicopters. Several studies were conducted on how to combat the menace from above, and aiming and firing procedures were worked out for a variety of weapons, such as heavy machine guns. In one VC publication, shooting lengths ahead of the aircraft was deemed satisfactory for striking vital engine parts. Firing tables were also constructed and disseminated for different types of US aircraft. Countermeasures, including use of trenches and mines were also published for such armored vehicles as the M113 armored personnel carrier, which was often devastating to VC formations when first introduced.

The PAVN/VC forces did not only study the technology of their enemies but their operations as well, looking for weaknesses to exploit. American activities were sometimes left unmolested so vulnerable patterns could be identified and analyzed. American "surround and pound" tactics for example could sometimes be predictable. At the Battle of Ong Thanh for example, heavy American airstrikes were called in to hit a bunker complex, which was then predictably followed by US "mop up" operations the next day. The American "mop up" forces fell into a deadly prepared ambush, with VC fighters inflicting heavy casualties.MacGarrigle, George L. (1998). Combat Operations: Taking the Offensive: October 1966 to October 1067. Washington D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. p. 350-357 Excessively hovering helicopters were also a tip-off as to possible landing zones. Taking predictable routes and trails also opened up ARVN/American opponents to casualties via booby traps, mines and ambushes. American air strikes were sometimes ground-marked several minutes in advance, giving PAVN/VC units enough time to evacuate an area or prepare for ambushes. American smoke marking practices were also studied and PAVN/VC troops sometimes became adept at imitating the color-coded smoke grenades the Americans used to signal air strikes or helicopter landings.James E. Westheider. 2007. The Vietnam War. pp 146–152 This intensive study and exploitation never ceased, and lessons learned were disseminated to other PAVN/VC formations.

Mobility and movement

Movement and area control

The PAVN/VC were constantly on the move, seldom staying more than 2–4 days in one place. Integral to mobility was elaborate camouflage and information denial procedures, such as restricting civilian movements prior to, or during an operation. Frequent rotation involved bivouacking in a series of fortified camps. These fortified sites could also be within villages or their subsidiary hamlets.

Constant shuttling between camps or "nomading," allowed the VC and PAVN to evade detection and defend themselves. Just as important however, it allowed them to control an area's people, food and other material.UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND – VIETNAM, Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned No 60, (San Francisco, JUNE 1966), pp. 1–24 As noted above, Main Force VC and PAVN typically spent only a small number of days a year fighting. Most of the time was spent in area control, which provided recruits, food and other resources. Control of an area was achieved because the moving VC/PAVN formations generally kept within striking distance of the civilian population and were thus in a position to harvest intelligence, liquidate opposition, intimidate the reluctant, and enforce demands for taxes, labor and other resources.

Movement procedures varied with enemy locations, terrain etc., but generally recon elements from battalions or companies met with local guerrillas or operatives to gain intelligence, map out the terrain ahead, and obtain guides as needed. Security was on a tight basis with soldiers only being informed at the last minute. A movement order was accompanied by a thorough cleanup of the area to hide traces of the unit. Trenches, foxholes and other fortifications were generally camouflaged for later reuse.

Once on the move, an advanced reconnaissance team preceded the main body. Behind the advance troops, came the combat units, headquarters, heavy weapons, combat support soldiers and another combat element. Trailing the formation was a rearguard detachment. The distance between individual men was generally 5–10 meters – less during night movements. Complete radio silence was maintained during a movement, and strict camouflage and concealment procedures applied during day movement.

Recon elements scouted the flanks and rear extensively, especially while crossing obstacles or in enemy-held areas. Most movement was at night. Integral to any movement into a camp was the use of multiple avenues of approach, avoiding predictable patterns that could be exploited by opposing forces. When making an approach march for a planned battle, a long, roundabout route was generally taken, often criss-crossing earlier movements to fool enemy surveillance.

Signaling and communications Communications relied heavily on field telephone and runner until the latter stages of the war when mostly conventional forces took the field. A simple signaling system via a series of gunshots was also used to communicate while moving in the forests, with the pattern and sequence of the shots conveying meaning to other PAVN troops. When VC or PAVN did acquire modern equipment via capture or supply, they made numerous attempts at communications deception, imitating US radio transmissions and call signs to lure US/ARVN helicopters and troops into ambushes, or redirecting artillery fire from themselves on to US/ARVN positions via bogus requests for artillery adjustment and support.UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM, "Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned No. 64: Imitative Communications Deception," (APO San Francisco), MAC J343 15 September 1967

Fortified camps Camp construction