The Battle of Blood River,; , or Voortrekker–Zulu War, (16 December 1838) was fought on the bank of the Ncome River, in what is today KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa between 464 Voortrekkers ("Pioneers"), led by Andries Pretorius, and an estimated 25,000 to 30,000A. J. P. Opperman, The Battle of Blood River. CUM Books, Roodepoort, 1982. First edition, First impression. . Page 27. Zulu. Estimations of casualties amounted to over 3,000 of King Dingane's soldiers dead, including two Zulu princes competing with Prince Mpande for the Zulu throne. Three Voortrekker commando members were lightly wounded, including Pretorius.
The year 1838 was the most difficult period for the Voortrekkers from when they left the Cape Colony, till the end of the Great Trek. They faced many difficulties and much bloodshed before they found freedom and a safe homeland in their Republic of Natalia. This was only achieved after defeating the Zulu Kingdom, at the Battle of Blood River, which took place on Sunday 16 December 1838. This battle would not have taken place if the Zulu King had honoured the agreement that he had made with the Voortrekkers to live together peacefully. The Zulu king knew that they outnumbered the Voortrekkers and decided to overthrow them and that led to the Battle of Blood River.A. J. P. Opperman, The Battle of Blood River. CUM Books, Roodepoort, 1982. First edition, First impression. . Page 1.
After these two battles, Dingane's prime minister and commander in the Battle of Blood River, General Ndlela, who had also been Mpande’s personal protector, was strangled to death by Dingane for high treason.
Background
The trekkers—called Voortrekkers after 1880Bailey (2003).—chose to retaliate after the betrayal murder of chief Trekker leader Piet Retief and his entire entourage, and ten days later the Weenen/Bloukrans massacre where "not a soul was spared."A. J. P. Opperman, The Battle of Blood River. CUM Books, Roodepoort, 1982. First edition, First impression. . Page 4
Dingane had agreed that, if Retief could recover approximately 700 head of cattle stolen from the Zulus by the Tlokwa, he would let them have land upon which to establish farms.
On 6 February 1838, two days after the signing of a negotiated land settlement deal between Retief and Dingane at UmGungundlovu, written by Jan Gerritze Bantjes (1817–1887) which included Trekker access to Port Natal, which the British also had interest in, Dingane invited Retief and his party into his royal residence for a beer-drinking farewell. The accompanying request for the surrender of Trekker muskets at the entrance was taken as normal protocol when appearing before the king. While the Trekkers were being entertained by Dingane's dancing warriors/soldiers, Dingane suddenly accused the visiting party of witchcraft and ordered his men: "Bulalani abathakathi" (Kill the sorcerers...). Dingane's soldiers bludgeoned Retief's party to death.Kotzé, D. J. (1950). Letters of the American Missionaries, 1835–1838. Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society. p. 235.
Immediately after the UmGungundlovu massacre, Dingane sent out his impis (regiments) to attack several Trekker encampments at night time, killing an estimated 500 men, women, children, and servants, most notably at Blaukraans.
Help arrived from farmers in the Cape Colony, and the Trekkers in Natal subsequently requested the pro-independence Andries Pretorius to leave the Cape Colony, in order to defend the Voortrekkers who had settled in Natal.
After the Battle of Blood River, the Dingane-Retief treaty written by Jan Gerritze Bantjes was found on Retief's bodily remains, providing a driving force for an overt alliance against Dingane between Prince Mpande and Pretorius.
Prelude
War strategies of the generals On 26 November 1838, Andries Pretorius (1798–1853) was appointed as Commander of 64 wagons and 464+ heavily armed Boer combatants directed against Dingane at UmGungundlovu with Jan Gerritze Bantjes (1817–1882) as his war secretary. By December 1838, Prince Mpande and 17,000 followers had already fled from Dingane, who was seeking to assassinate Mpande. In support of Prince Mpande as Dingane's replacement, Pretorius' strategy was to target Dingane only. To allow Prince Mpande to oust King Dingane through military might, Pretorius had first to weaken Dingane's personal military power base in UmGungundlovu. Dingane's royal residence at UmGungundlovu was naturally protected against attack by hilly and rocky terrain all around, as well as an access route via Italeni passing through a narrow defile.
Earlier on 9 April 1838, a Trekker horse commando without ox wagons, thereafter called the "Flight Commando", had unsuccessfully attempted to penetrate the UmGungundlovu defense at nearby Italeni valley, resulting in the loss of several Trekker lives. Trekker leader Hendrik Potgieter had abandoned all hope of engaging Dingane in UmGungundlovu after losing the battle of Italeni, and subsequently had migrated with his group out of Natal. To approach UmGungundlovu via the Italeni defile with ox wagons would force the wagons into an open column, instead of an enclosed laager as successfully employed defensively at Veglaer on 12 August 1838.
The military commander during Dingane's attack on Veglaer was Ndlela kaSompisi. The highly experienced general Ndlela had served under Shaka, and was also prime minister and chief advisor under Dingane. Ndlela with his 10,000 troops had retreated from Veglaer, after three days and nights of fruitless attempts to penetrate the enclosed Trekker wagon laager.
General Ndlela personally protected Prince Mpande from Dingane's repeated assassination plans. King Dingane desired to have his half brother Mpande, the only prince with children, eliminated as a threat to his throne. Prince Mpande was married to Msukilethe, a daughter of general Ndlela. General Ndlela, like Pretorius the promoter of Prince Mpande, was responsible for Dingane's UmGungundlovu defense during the Trekkers' second attack attempt under Pretorius in December 1838. Given general Ndlela's previous defense and attack experience at Italeni and Veglaer during April 1838 and August 1838 respectively, Ndlela's tactical options were limited. Proven UmGungundlovu defense tactics were to attack Trekker commandos in the rocky and hilly terrain on the narrowing access route at Italeni, thereby neutralising the advantages mounted riflemen had over spear-carrying foot soldiers. Ndlela had to let Pretorius come close to UmGungundlovu at Italeni and lure the Trekkers into attack. Ndlela was not to attack the Trekkers when they were in a defensive wagon laager position, especially not during the day. The problem for Pretorius was that he had somehow to find a way to make Dingane's soldiers attack him in a defensive laager position at a place of his choice, far away from UmGungundlovu and Italeni.
On 6 December 1838, 10 days before the Battle of Blood River, Pretorius and his commando including Alexander Biggar as translator had a meeting with friendly Zulu chiefs at Danskraal, so named for the Zulu dancing that took place in the Zulu kraal that the Trekker commando visited. With the intelligence received at Danskraal, Pretorius became confident enough to propose a vow to God, which demanded the celebration, by the commando and their posterity, of the coming victory over Dingane. The covenant included that a church would be built in honour of God, should the commando be successful and reach UmGungundlovu alive in order to diminish the power of Dingane. Building a church in Trekker emigrant context was symbolic for establishing a settled state.
After the meeting with friendly Zulu chiefs at Danskraal, Pretorius let the commando relax and do their washing for a few days at Wasbank till 9 December 1838. From Wasbank they slowly and daily moved closer to the site of the Battle of Blood River, practicing laager defence tactics every evening for a week long. Then, by halting his advance towards UmGungundlovu on 15 December 1838, 40 km before reaching the defile at Italeni, Pretorius had eliminated the Italeni terrain trap.
Location and preparation On Saturday, 15 December 1838, after the Trekker wagons crossed the Buffalo River 10 km SW of the actual battle site and still from their target UmGungundlovu, an advance scouting party - including Pretorius - got news of a large Zulu force in rugged terrain to the east trying to lure the Boers into a trap, as had been the case in April the same year with fatal consequences. While Cilliers wanted to ride out and attack, Pretorius declined the opportunity to engage Dingane's soldiers away from their base as had been the trap at Italeni valley. Instead, Pretorius decided on a fortified laager on the terrain of his own choosing, in the hope that general Ndlela would attack Pretorius on his terms rather than the other way around.
As the site for the defensive wagon laager, Pretorius chose a defensible position close to a vertical 8m descent into a deep hippo pool in the Ncombe River, providing excellent protection on two sides. The wide-open area to the front of the laager provided absolutely no cover for an attacking force. The battle was set with the laager protected on two flanks. As usual, the ox-wagons were drawn into the typical protective laager. Movable wooden barriers and ladders which could be quickly opened for cavalry were fastened between the wagon wheels to prevent intruders, with two smoothbore, short barrel artillery pieces positioned at the corners. Andries Pretorius had brought a 6-pound naval carronade with him from the Cape, mounted on a gun carriage improvised from a wagon axle, and named Grietjie. The other ordnance piece is unknown, but is currently depicted as a 4-pound smoothbore cannon, by then obsolete in most European armies. Both were used to fire devastating grapeshot.
As evening approached, a thick mist settled over the wagon site, above which the sky was clear. According to Afrikaner traditions, the Zulu were afraid to attack at the night due to superstitions and the eerie glow of lamps which the Boers hung on sjamboks [whip-stocks] around the laager. Whether or not there is any truth in this, historian S.P. Mackenzie has speculated that the Zulu held back until what they perceived as the necessary numbers had arrived. Some of the Zulus only arrived near sunrise by following the tracks of the wagons. Due to some recent heavy rains the Ncombe River was swollen making crossing the river difficult.
During the night of 15 December, six Zulu regiments - an estimated 20,000 (or more) Zulu soldiers led by Ndlela kaSompisi commander-in-chief of the Zulu armed forces,Shalo Mbatha, Zulu Empire Decolonised: The Epic Story of the Zulu form Pre-Colonial Times to the 21st Century, published by iZigi publishing, South Africa, 2021 - crossed the Ncome River and started massing around the encampment, while the elite forces of senior general Ndlela did not cross, thereby splitting the army in two.
Battle On 16 December, dawn broke on a clear day, revealing that "all of Zululand sat there", according to one Trekker eyewitness. General Ndlela and his crack troops, the Black and White Shields, remained on the other side of the river, observing Dambuza's men at the laager from a safe position across the hippo pool. According to the South African Department of Art and Culture: In ceremonies that lasted about three days, izinyanga zempi, specialist war doctors, prepared izinteleze medicines which made warriors invincible in the face of their opponents.
This could partly help explain why Dambuza's forces were sitting on the ground close to the wagon laager when the Trekkers first saw them.