(Operation Knight's Move) was a plan for an attack on Convoy PQ 17, the next Arctic Convoy to the northern Soviet Union. The big ships of the (German Navy) were to join the combined arms operations of (Air Fleet 5) and the (U-boat arm). It was to be the largest surface ship operation by the thus far.
British decoding of German wireless messages by the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park, that the ships had sailed, led the First Sea Lord, Admiral Dudley Pound, to order Convoy PQ 17 to scatter, a sensible tactic when under attack by ships but 24 ships were sunk by U-boats and aircraft. The ships sailed at on 5 July, but the operation was cancelled at by the head of , Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, because the success of the aircraft and U-boats made a naval sortie unnecessary.
The heavy cruiser had grounded earlier in thick fog as did three of the destroyer escorts, needing three months of repairs. The success of the and the U-boat arm left them jubilant but the anti-climax was a severe blow to the morale of the ship crews. Adolf Hitler was blamed for his reluctance to avoid defeats at sea. The (Naval War Command) thought that the only alternative would be to revert to a policy of a fleet in being.
Background Hitler Directive 37
On 10 October 1941, Hitler issued Directive 37, that required the to protect northern Norway and Finland, defend Axis sea lanes and to attack Allied Arctic convoys. The was also charged with the defence of the Petsamo nickel mines, conducting reconnaissance of areas where operations were to take place and to attack Murmansk and its rail connexions; preparations were to be made for the accommodation of reinforcements. The was to attack Arctic convoys and to protect Axis shipping in the Arctic as far as was possible. More ships were to operate from Norway and Kirkenes was to be made suitable as a forward base. More artillery was to be brought to Norway for coastal defence and co-operation between the army, navy and air force was to be enhanced, to protect against offensive action by the Allies on land and sea.
German intelligence
The (Observation Service) was a Department of the German Naval Intelligence Service (, MND III) of the (OKM) was the naval signals intelligence service that was reading much Allied naval signals traffic in 1942 but this did not give much insight into Arctic convoys. B-Dienst had broken Naval Cypher No. 3 in March and could also read the Merchant Navy Code just at the time when the German Shark cypher had cut off the British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park from Atlantic U-boat transmissions. B-Dienst had a partial and intermittent view of Naval Cypher No. 4 with a considerable delay and this code would have been far more valuable for Arctic convoys. Abwehr, German military intelligence managed at times to get agents into Iceland but this was unreliable and prone to British penetration and deception operations. The Germans gained far more intelligence in the Arctic through air reconnaissance and U-boat observation.
Command The was beset by a complicated and overlapping command system. At Berlin, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder the (Commander-in-Chief of the Navy) was head of OKM. At Sengwarden, near Wilhelmshaven, General Admiral Rolf Carls was (Commander-in-chief, Northern Fleet Command [MGK ]). German naval forces in Norway were commanded from Oslo by Hermann Böhm, the (Commanding Admiral Norway). Narvik was the headquarters of Oskar Kummetz the (Admiral Commanding cruisers) and Hubert Schmundt was the (Admiral Arctic) commander of the U-boats. Otto Schniewind, the (Fleet Commander) was based at Trondheim in . On 8 June, SKL ruled on the command arrangements for operations. MGK (Carls) had strategic command, with tactical command held by Schniewind, the (Fleet Commander). Schmundt, the and commander of the U-boats, had strategic command of the Narvik group, tactical command being held by Kummetz.
The "fractured and hierarchical" (Boyd 2024) naval command system was mirrored by the Luftwaffe command structure and liaison between the two services led SKL to express doubt that the communications between MGK at Wilhelmshaven and 5 at Oslo were effective. MGK claimed that the system was adequate, even for an operation as complicated as , when prompt transmission of information to the front-line commanders was vital. As well as internal communication between both forces being fractured and rigid, requests to 5 for air reconnaissance had to go to MGK , thence to 5 headquarters at Oslo and replies back by the same route. The wireless and land lines between Wilhemshaven and Oslo were of dubious quality and links to the Arctic and northern Norway suffered because of geography and changeable atmospheric conditions. The reluctance of 5 to divert aircraft from attack to reconnaissance added to the ordinary difficulties in communication.
U-boats
Two U-boats were based in Norway in July 1941, four in September, five in December and two in January 1942, seven in February, nine in March and one in April, 23 boats in all, a number maintained for the rest of the year. Hitler contemplated establishing a unified command but decided against it. The German battleship arrived at Trondheim on 16 January, the first ship of a general move of surface ships to Norway. British convoys to Russia had received little attention in 1941, since they averaged only eight ships each and the long Arctic winter nights negated even the limited reconnaissance effort that was available.
Ships
On 23 February, the cruisers and joined at Trondheim, that had arrived on 16 January, followed on 21 March by the cruiser and on 26 May by . The transfer of more U-boats to Norway in 1942 along with the ships allowed the to contemplate more ambitious operations against Arctic convoys. In May, despite the increased number of aircraft available to 5, (MGK ) was sceptical of the ability to find the British distant escorts, despite the better weather at this time of year, because of the area of sea to be covered. Knowledge of the British dispositions was necessary if the big German ships were to be risked against a convoy.
Altafjord
Altafjord was a safe anchorage for big ships about inside a circle of mountains and with islands at the mouth, with several routes out of the fjord. Fighters were close by at Banak and Kirkenes. The fjord was about to the north-east of Narvik and about to the south-west of the North Cape. Altafjord faced north, was closer to the Arctic route than Narvik, where the exit was to the south-west and it was nearly on the same line of longitude as (Bear Island) making it a good jumping-off point for attacks to the east of the line. In March 1942, MGK had sent orders for the construction of berthing facilities for two big ships and a destroyer flotilla. Otto Ciliax the Commander, Battleships () had begun discussions at the end of May between the staffs of MGK , and about the use of Altafjord as an advanced base for big ship attacks against Arctic convoys.
1941
In mid-1941, (Air Fleet 5) had been re-organised for Operation Barbarossa with (Air Region Norway) headquartered in Oslo. (Air Commander Stavanger) the centre and north of Norway, (Fighter Leader Norway) commanded the fighter force and ( [colonel] Andreas Nielsen) in the far north had airfields at Kirkenes and Banak. The Air Fleet had 180 aircraft, sixty of which were reserved for operations on the Karelian Front against the Red Army.
The distance from Banak to Arkhangelsk was and had only ten Junkers Ju 88 bombers of Kampfgeschwader 30, thirty Junkers Ju 87 dive-bombers, ten Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters of Jagdgeschwader 77, five Messerschmitt Bf 110 heavy fighters of Zerstörergeschwader 76, ten reconnaissance aircraft and an anti-aircraft battalion. Sixty aircraft were far from adequate in such a climate and terrain where
1942 The emphasis of air operations changed from army support to anti-shipping operations after March 1942, when Allied Arctic convoys were becoming larger, more frequent and coincided with the German reinforcement of Norway with ships and aircraft, in the less extreme weather conditions of the Arctic summer. At the end of March the had been re-organised into three tactical units, (Colonel Hermann Busch) at Kirkenes, (Colonel Hans Roth) at Bardufoss and (Colonel Alexander Holle) at Sola. held the bulk of the front-line aircraft and responsibility for attacks on land and sea targets. also had responsibility for attacks on Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, when circumstances allowed.
had no front-line formations under his command, they were to be transferred to his control as the tactical situation made it convenient; in March the had two coastal reconnaissance squadrons, 3./ 906 at Trondheim and 1./Küstenfliegergruppe 123 at Tromsø. had responsibility for reconnaissance and operations against convoys south of a notional line between Trondheim westwards the Shetland Isles and Iceland with a of I./ (F) 22, eight Kondors of I./ that had transferred from Bordeaux and 1. and 2. of 406 (1./Kü.Fl.Gr. 406 and 2./Kü.Fl.Gr. 406) plus a weather reconnaissance Staffel.
The strength had increased to 150 front line aircraft in January 1942 and 225 in February, with the transfer of a and a from the Netherlands. 5 now had sixty long-range bombers, thirty dive-bombers, 45 fighters and twenty long-range reconnaissance aircraft, with serviceability around 60 per cent. The of the had about 15 Heinkel He 115 seaplanes capable of torpedo-bombing and a Staffel of Blohm & Voss BV 138 flying boats. Towards the end of April, the torpedo-bombers began to arrive, about half Junkers Ju 88s and half Heinkel He 111s, that had their first success against Convoy PQ 15 on 3 May; by July, the number of torpedo-bombers had risen to 77.
German planning
German thinking about attacks on Arctic convoys was influenced by the limited effect of the U-boats in the Arctic. The (BdU) Karl Dönitz, condemned the performance of the U-boats against Convoy PQ 16 and the declining opportunities for U-boat operations in the Arctic summer. The changeableness of the weather and visibility, unusually powerful escort forces and the intervention of the Soviet air force had forced U-boats to dive at the sight of any aircraft. The shadowing of convoys and the determined attacks by six U-boats against Convoy PQ 16, had sunk one ship and were credited with four probable torpedo hits (actually none). In return the British had damaged five boats with depth charges that would take much time to repair, making worse the lack of facilities in Norway and Germany. If the U-boat effort was maintained, at least half of the Arctic U-boats would be out of action. SKL considered the vital importance of attacks on Arctic convoys meant that at least eight U-boats attack each convoy, despite the adverse tactical conditions and that even occasional sinkings justified the cost to the Atlantic campaign. In May another three U-boats were sent to the Arctic, making 22. Attacks on the reciprocal QP convoys were to stop to save effort, unless it affected the attack on PQ convoys.