Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer Gould Hunter-Weston, (23 September 1864 – 18 March 1940) was a British Army officer who served in the First World War on the Western Front, at Gallipoli in 1915, and in the very early stages of the Somme Offensive in 1916. He was also a Scottish Unionist MP.
Nicknamed "Hunter-Bunter", Hunter-Weston has been seen as a classic example of a "donkey" general; he was described by his superior, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, as a "rank amateur", and has been referred to by one modern writer as "one of the Great War's spectacular incompetents".Les Carlyon, 'The Great War', p. 27, However, another historian writes that although his poor performance at Krithia earned his reputation "as one of the most brutal and incompetent commanders of the First World War"Robin Prior, 'Gallipoli: The End of the Myth', p. 80, "in his later battles (at Gallipoli) he seemed to hit upon a formula for success ...(but) these small achievements were largely forgotten".Robin Prior, 'Gallipoli: The End of the Myth', Photo 10 Caption,
Early life Hunter-Weston was born at Hunterston, West Kilbride, on 23 September 1864, the son of Lieutenant Colonel John Gould Read Hunter-Weston (1823–1904) and his second wife, who was the daughter and heir of the 25th Laird of Hunterston.Matthew 2004, p283 He was educated at Wellington College 1875–82Travers 1987, pp. 287–8Matthew 2004, p283 and Royal Military Academy at Woolwich in 1882,Matthew 2004, p283 then was commissioned as a lieutenant into the Royal Engineers in February 1884.Gordon Corrigan, 'Mud, Blood and Poppycock', pp.198–9, Matthew 2004, p283
Early military career He was promoted captain in May 1892.Matthew 2004, p283Travers 1987, pp. 287–8 He served on the Indian North West Frontier and took part in the Miranzai Expedition of 1891 and was wounded during the Waziristan Expedition of 1894–95.Gordon Corrigan, 'Mud, Blood and Poppycock', pp. 198–9, He was promoted to brevet major in August 1895.
Egypt and Boer War He was on Major General Horatio Kitchener, 1st Earl Kitchener's staff on the Nile Expedition of 1896.That year's expedition up the Nile reached Dongola, laying the groundwork for the more famous expedition to Omdurman in 1898.Gordon Corrigan, 'Mud, Blood and Poppycock', pp.198–9, He attended the Staff College, Camberley (where he was master of the Staff College hounds) 1898–99.Travers 1987, pp. 287–8Matthew 2004, p283
He later took part in the Second Boer War in South Africa between 1899 and 1902 as a staff officer, then as commander of the mounted engineers, then of the Royal Engineer Cavalry Division. He then became deputy assistant adjutant general (DAAG), then chief of staff, to Major General Sir John French's Cavalry Division, before going on to command a cavalry column.Travers 1987, pp. 287–8 His mounted engineers cut Boer-controlled roads and railways, and cut the railway near Bloemfontein to prevent the Boers from reinforcing it. In 1900 he was promoted to brevet lieutenant-colonel and awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO).Matthew 2004, p283 He was described as having "reckless courage combined with technical skill and great coolness in emergency",Gordon Corrigan, 'Mud, Blood and Poppycock', pp. 198–9, was mentioned in dispatches (including 31 March 1900) and received the Queen's South Africa Medal.
After returning to Britain, Hunter-Weston endured six months of convalescence before taking command of the 11th Field Company, Royal Engineers, then serving in Shorncliffe Camp, Kent. He then served on the Royal Engineers staff in London in late 1902, when he was appointed for duty at Shorncliffe Army Camp. He then succeeded Lieutenant Colonel Walter Doran as deputy assistant adjutant general of the IVth Army Corps in September 1904 before being made a general staff officer with Eastern Command (formerly the IVth Army Corps) from 1904 to 1908.Travers 1987, pp. 287–8 He married Grace Strang-Steel in 1905.Matthew 2004, p283 He was promoted to brevet colonel in November 1906, and to full colonel in June 1908,Matthew 2004, p283 and served as a general staff officer, grade 1 (GSO1) with Scottish Command from then until 1911.Travers 1987, pp. 287–8
In 1911 he succeeded his mother as the 27th Laird of Hunterston and was made a Companion of the Order of the Bath (CB) in the 1911 Coronation Honours. He was assistant director of military training 1908–11 and his motto was "teach the trainers how to teach before they try to teach the Tommies".Matthew 2004, p283
In March 1911 he succeeded Colonel John Du Cane as a GSO1 at the War Office in London. He held this position until February 1914 when he was promoted to temporary brigadier general and made general officer commanding of the 11th Infantry Brigade at Colchester, taking over from Major General Henry Heath.Matthew 2004, p283
First World War A few weeks after the outbreak of the war in 1914, he led his brigade to France as part of 4th Division on the Western Front, including at the battles of Le Cateau and the Aisne, where he supervised his command from a motorbike (at a time when senior generals used cars and most other officers used horses). He "often appeared in the most surprising places" and his handling of the brigade was "skilful".Gordon Corrigan, 'Mud, Blood and Poppycock', pp. 199, His was the first British unit to cross the Aisne, on a damaged bridge.Matthew 2004, p283 His bravery and determination marked him out for promotion.Steel & Hart 1994, p. 40 Hunter-Weston was one of the senior officers commanded to write regularly to the King to keep His Majesty informed of military developments.Robbins 2005, p. 4 In October 1914, "for distinguished conduct in the Field", he was promoted to the rank of major-general.Matthew 2004, p283
Gallipoli campaign Planning When the Gallipoli campaign commenced in March 1915, Hunter-Weston was promoted to the command of the 29th Division, which was to make the landing at Cape Helles near the entrance to the Dardanelles.Robin Prior, 'Gallipoli: The End of the Myth', p. 81,
When asked for his advice before the landings, Hunter-Weston cautioned General Sir Ian Hamilton that the Turks had had ample time to turn the peninsula into "an entrenched camp", that Helles was less vulnerable to Turkish attack than Suvla Bay but conversely offered little room for manoeuvre and given Britain's lack of high explosive shells needed to cover attacks risked an Allied bridgehead being tied up in front of Kilitbahir Plateau and becoming "a second Crimea" which would damage Britain's standing with neutral Greece and Romania. He suggested that given the loss of surprise (because of the unsuccessful naval attack on 18 March) it might be better to call off the expedition.Carlyon 2001, pp. 120–1Robin Prior, 'Gallipoli: The End of the Myth', p. 81,
Hunter-Weston wrote to his wife (7 April) "the odds against us are heavy. However, nothing is impossible". Major General William Birdwood also privately wrote the same, and Travers suggests that, as British officers of the era were expected to remain cheerful and optimistic in public, this may have been "a safety outlet" to be pointed to if the operation went wrong.Travers 2001, p. 46
Hunter-Weston, supported by Admiral de Robeck, preferred a daylight landing at Helles (Hamilton and Birdwood preferred an attack just before first light – this was used for the ANZAC landing further north, which had been intended to land on the beach at Gaba Tepe).Steel & Hart 1994, p. 47
Landings
Hunter-Weston concentrated on V, W and X Beaches at the tip on the peninsula, less on S and Y beaches (on the right and left flanks respectively), which were intended merely to threaten the Turkish retreat.Travers 2001, pp. 56–7, 59, 61–4, 224 No contingency plan had been made for S or Y beach forces to push ahead if the main forces at V, W and X were held up.Steel & Hart 1994, p. 80 Admiral Wemyss and Hunter-Weston spent 25 April, the day of the landings, on board HMS Euryalus, the attendant ship at W beach, so were unable to inspect elsewhere – Hunter-Weston and his chief of staff Brigadier-General H. E. Street were on the bridge, where their papers were scattered every five minutes when the ship's 9.2-inch gun was fired. An angry Roger Keyes recorded that they "were in complete ignorance of what was going on anywhere except at W and possibly at X Beach" and was furious at Hamilton for adhering to Staff College doctrine by not interfering with "the man on the spot" (Hamilton claimed he was dissuaded by Braithwaite, even though he could see that V Beach was in trouble).Travers 2001, pp. 56–7, 59, 61–4, 224
He diverted the Essex Regiment (part of 88th Brigade) from V to W Beach at 0830 hrs.Steel & Hart 1994, pp. 98–9 Hunter-Weston's diary records that "V Beach is still hung up", suggesting that he thought the problems there temporary, although he was dissuaded from landing to take personal command at that beach.Travers 2001, pp. 56–7, 59, 61–4, 224
For ten hours on 25 April Lt-Col Godfrey Matthews signalled to Hunter-Weston, demanding reinforcements of men and ammunition at Y Beach, but received no reply. Hunter-Weston did not reply to Hamilton's first offer (9.21am) to make more trawlers available to land more troops at Y Beach, where they had surprise and lack of opposition. After being ordered to reply to the second message (10:00 am) he only did so at 10.35 am after consulting Admiral Wemyss. He was still awaiting reports from V Beach at the time. At 6:00 pm Marshall, the commander at X Beach, asked permission to advance to assist Y Beach, but after a delay of two hours Hunter-Weston ordered him to stay put and advance the following day.Steel & Hart 1994, pp. 100–1, 106, 108–9, 111Carlyon 2001, pp. 236–7Travers 2001, pp. 56–7, 59, 61–4, 224
On the evening of 25 April Hunter-Weston boarded HMS Queen Elizabeth to confer with Hamilton, who recorded that he was "cheery, stout-hearted, quite a good tonic and – on the whole – his news is good".Carlyon 2001, p. 241 After 25 April landings Hunter-Weston thought the bravery of the men at W Beach "a most marvellous feat".Travers 2001, p. 104
Hunter-Weston appears to have little interest in Y Beach during the night of 25–26 April. He did not mention Y Beach in his diary, and later concealed the evidence about it from Hamilton until July 1915.Steel & Hart 1994, pp. 100–1, 106, 108–9, 111Carlyon 2001, pp. 236–7Travers 2001, pp. 56–7, 59, 61–4, 224 When the force at Y Beach had to be evacuated on the morning of 26 April – a decision taken at the local level – Hamilton assumed that Hunter-Weston had ordered this without consulting him.Steel & Hart 1994, p. 112
Robin Prior writes that Hunter-Weston "remained anchored off W beach.. He was out of contact with S and Y, neglected X and seemed determined to avoid any knowledge of V... (he) took no steps to gather information for himself. His one positive move (to shift troops from V to W beach) had nothing to do with the situation at V and only succeeded because the Turkish defence was stretched too thinly."Robin Prior, 'Gallipoli: The End of the Myth', p. 109, Gordon Corrigan claims – without giving further detail – that his command of the division was "one of the more competent aspects" of the Helles landings and that "his handling of the division, once ashore, was thoroughly competent".Gordon Corrigan, 'Mud, Blood and Poppycock', pp. 199,
First Krithia