Bravo Two Zero was the call sign of an eight-man British Army Special Air Service (SAS) patrol deployed into Iraq during the First Gulf War in January 1991. Three members of the patrol died during the mission, and a further four were captured by Iraqi forces and eventually released. The patrol has been the subject of several books, with conflicting descriptions of the events of the patrol.
Patrol members
Sergeant Steven Billy Mitchell, DCM, MM, patrol commander former Royal Green Jackets. Captured by the enemy, later released. Author of Bravo Two Zero and referred to as "Andy McNab" in the books. Sergeant Vincent David Phillips, patrol 2IC former Royal Army Ordnance Corps. Died of hypothermia during action, 25 January 1991. Corporal Colin Armstrong, MM former 23(R) SAS. The only member of the patrol to escape capture. Author of The One That Got Away and better known under his pseudonym as "Chris Ryan". Lance Corporal Ian Robert "Dinger" Pring MBE VR. former Parachute Regiment. Captured by the enemy, later released. Trooper Robert Gaspare Consiglio, MM (posthumous) former Royal Marine 42 Cdo RM. Killed in action, 27 January 1991. Trooper Steven John "Legs" Lane, MM (posthumous) former Lance Corporal of 9 Parachute Squadron, Royal Engineers and former Parachute Regiment. Died of hypothermia during action, 27 January 1991. Trooper Malcolm Graham MacGown, BDS (Univ. Syd) former Australian 1st Commando Regiment. Captured by the enemy, later released. Referred to as "Stan" in the books. Trooper Mike "Kiwi" Coburn (pseudonym) former New Zealand Special Air Service. Captured by the enemy, later released. Author of Soldier Five. Referred to as "Mark the Kiwi" in the books.
The patrol
Background In January 1991, during the prelude to the Coalition ground invasion of Iraq, B Squadron 22 SAS were stationed at a forward operating base in Saudi Arabia. The squadron provided a number of long-range, similarly tasked teams deep into Iraq including three eight-man patrols: "Bravo One Zero", "Bravo Two Zero" and "Bravo Three Zero". Asher lists one of the three patrols as "Bravo One Niner", though it is not clear whether this is one of the same three listed by Ryan.
Insertion On the night of 22/23 January, the patrol were transported into Iraqi airspace by an RAF Chinook helicopter, along with Bravo Three Zero and their Land Rover 110 vehicles. Unlike Bravo Three Zero, the patrol had decided not to take vehicles. According to McNab's account, the patrol walked during the first night to the proposed location of the observation post. However, both Ryan's and Coburn's accounts put the distance at . Eyewitness accounts of Bedouin tribesmen and Asher's re-creation support the Ryan/Coburn estimate of . Ryan states the patrol was intentionally dropped only from the observation post because of heavy pack weights.
According to both Ryan and McNab, the weight of their equipment required the patrol to "shuttle" the equipment to the observation post. Four members would walk approximately , then drop their bergens and wait. The next four would move up and drop their bergens, then the first four would return for their jerry cans of water and bring them back to the group, followed by the second four doing the same. In this manner, each member of the patrol covered three times the distance from the drop off to the observation post.
Soon after the patrol landed on Iraqi soil, Lane discovered that they had communication problems and could not receive messages on the patrol's radio. McNab later claimed that the patrol had been issued incorrect radio frequencies; however, a 2002 BBC report discovered that there was no error with the frequencies because the patrol's transmissions had been noted in the SAS daily record log. Ratcliffe lays the blame for the faulty radios on McNab as the patrol commander; it was his job to make sure the patrol's equipment was working.
Compromise In late afternoon of 24 January, the patrol was discovered by a young shepherd herding sheep. Believing themselves compromised, the patrol decided to withdraw, leaving behind excess equipment. As they were preparing to leave, they heard what they thought to be a tank approaching their position. The patrol took up defensive positions, prepared their LAW rockets, and waited for it to come into sight. However, the vehicle turned out to be a bulldozer, which reversed rapidly after seeing the patrol. Realising that they had now definitely been compromised, the patrol withdrew from their position. Shortly afterwards, as they were exfiltrating (according to McNab's account), a firefight with Iraqi armoured personnel carriers and soldiers began.
In 2001, Asher interviewed the Bedouin family that discovered the patrol. The family stated the patrol had been spotted by the driver of the bulldozer, not the young shepherd. According to the family, they were not sure who the men were and followed them a short distance, eventually firing several warning shots, whereupon the patrol returned fire and moved away. Asher's investigation into the events, the terrain, and position of the Iraqi Army did not support McNab's version of events, and excludes an attack by Iraqi soldiers and armoured personnel carriers. Coburn's version, Soldier Five, partially supports McNab's version of events (specifically the presence of one armoured personnel carrier) and describes being fired upon by a 12.7mm DShK heavy machine gun and numerous Iraqi soldiers. In Ryan's version, "[MacGown] also saw an armoured car carrying a .50 caliber machine gun pull up. Somehow, I never saw that." Ryan later estimated that he fired 70 rounds during the incident.
Emergency pickup British standard operating procedure (SOP) states that in the case of an emergency or no radio contact, a patrol should return to their original infiltration point, where a helicopter will land briefly every 24 hours. This plan was complicated by the incorrect location of the initial landing site; the patrol reached the designated emergency pickup point, but the helicopter never appeared. Ratcliffe later revealed that this was due to an illness suffered by the pilot while en route, necessitating his abandoning his mission on this occasion.
Because of a malfunctioning emergency radio that allowed them only to send messages and not receive them, the patrol did not realise that while trying to reach overhead allied jets, they had in fact been heard by a US jet pilot. The jet pilots were aware of the patrol's problems but were unable to raise them. Many sorties were flown to the team's last known position and their expected exfiltration route in an attempt to locate them and to hinder attempts by Iraqi troops trying to capture them.
Exfiltration route Standard operating procedure mandates that before an infiltration of any team behind enemy lines, an exfiltration route should be planned so that members of the patrol know where to go if they get separated or something goes wrong. The plans of the patrol indicated a southern exfiltration route towards Saudi Arabia. According to the SAS daily record log kept during that time, a TACBE (Tactical Beacon) transmission from the patrol was received on 24 January. The log read "Bravo Two Zero made TACBE contact again, it was reasonable to assume that they were moving south", though in fact the patrol headed north-west towards the Syrian border. Coburn's account suggests that during the planning phase of the mission, Syria had been the agreed-upon destination should an escape plan need to be implemented. He also suggests that this was on the advice of the officer commanding B Squadron at that time.
According to Ratcliffe, the change in plan nullified all efforts over the following days by allied forces to locate and rescue the team. McNab has been criticised for refusing advice from superiors to include vehicles in the mission (to be left at an emergency pickup point) which would have facilitated an easier exfiltration. Another SAS team used Land Rovers in this role when they also had to abandon a similar mission. However, it is also suggested that the patrol jointly agreed not to take vehicles because they felt they were too few in number and the vehicles too small (only short-wheelbase Land Rovers were available) to be of use and were ill-suited to a mission that was intended to be conducted from a fixed observation post.
Separation During the night of 24/25 January, while McNab was trying to contact a passing Coalition aircraft using a TACBE communicator, the patrol inadvertently became separated into two groups. Whilst the others waited for a response on the TACBE, Phillips, Ryan and MacGown continued to move through the darkness. Neither of the two resultant groups followed the standard emergency rendezvous (ERV) procedure they had been trained to follow, and had followed the night before. Instead, both groups independently continued north towards the Syrian border.
After the separation, Phillips, Ryan and MacGown had two M16/M203 assault rifles and a Browning Hi-Power pistol among them, as well as at least one TACBE, and the night sight around Ryan's neck. McNab, Pring, Lane, Consiglio, and Coburn had their original weapons (three Minimis and two M16/M203s among them), as well as MacGown's Minimi (which McNab was carrying, but soon discarded). The larger group carried at least one TACBE, and the Magellan GPS.
According to Ryan, he was also carrying a 66 mm LAW rocket which he had struggled to free from his Bergen during the initial contact. According to McNab, however, the only item removed by Ryan from his Bergen was a silver hipflask, and it was McNab who was the only one carrying a 66 after this contact; he stated he left the 66 in the Bergen and was the only one to do so. Despite conflicting accounts, it is possible that Ryan may have in fact eventually ended up with McNab's LAW rocket, an item that Ryan later claimed to have used against an Iraqi "Land-Rover type" vehicle; this event is discounted by Ratcliffe who states that, at the Regimental debrief, "[Ryan] made no mention at all of encountering enemy troops on his trek."
Death of Phillips On the evening of 25 January, Ryan, MacGown and Phillips left the tank berm they had stayed in during the day and headed north. Phillips was already suffering from hypothermia, and could no longer hold his M16/M203, which was handed to MacGown. As they continued, Phillips' condition worsened to the point where he mistook his black gloves for the colour of his own hands, and began yelling out loud. Eventually, Phillips lost contact with the other two somewhere around 2000 hrs, and died a short time later. According to Ryan and MacGown, they both searched for Phillips for about twenty minutes before deciding to continue without him, while according to General Sir Peter de la Billière, only Ryan searched while MacGown waited. Ryan also indicated that he didn't know Phillips was necessarily dead when he wrote "I hoped to God that [Phillips] was doing the same. That he would find his way down" and later "there were still five to account for", though MacGown admitted he knew Phillips was dead at the time. According to the SAS regimental roll of honour, it states that Phillips died of exposure while evading capture in Iraq on 22 January 1991 at the age of 36.
Capture of MacGown