Layforce was an ad hoc military formation of the British Army consisting of a number of commando units during the Second World War. Formed in February 1941 under the command of Colonel Robert Laycock, after whom the force was named, it consisted of approximately 2,000 men and served in the Middle Eastern theatre of operations. Initially tasked with conducting raiding operations to disrupt Axis lines of communication in the Mediterranean it was planned that they would take part in operations to capture the Greek island of Rhodes.
As the strategic situation in the theatre turned against the Allies, however, the commandos were largely diverted from their original role and were used primarily to reinforce regular troops throughout the Mediterranean theatre. Elements of the force saw action in Bardia, Crete, Syria and Tobruk before they were disbanded in August 1941. Afterwards its personnel either returned to their former units or went on to serve with other special forces units raised in the Middle East.
Background In February 1941, a force of commandos under Colonel Robert Laycock were sent to the Middle East to carry out raids in the eastern Mediterranean.Chappell 1996, p. 15. This force became known as 'Layforce' after their commander and initially they were drawn from 'A' Troop from No. 3 Commando, No. 7 Commando, No. 8 (Guards) Commando and No. 11 (Scottish) Commando, with additional personnel being drawn from No. 50 Commando and No. 52 Commando upon their arrival in Egypt in March.Saunders 1959, p. 52.
Laycock held the rank of a colonel (rather than brigadier) on the staff, because his command was not formally and organisationally a full brigade, with all its supporting elements; although, with a strength of over 2,000 men, it was equivalent.Moreman 2006, p. 20.On disembarkation the reported All Rank strength of the Battalions was as follows: 'A' Battalion (Colvin): 36 officers and 541 other ranks; 'B' Battalion (Daly): 38 officers and 502 other ranks, 'C' Battalion (Pedder): 35 officers and 498 other ranks; and 'D' Battalion (Young): 36 officers and 532 other ranks. The Folbot Section (Courtney) had 12 folbots, one officer and 18 other ranks. For reasons of security, the commandos were organised into four battalions and were renamed: No. 7 Commando became 'A' Battalion, No. 8 (Guards) became 'B' Battalion, No. 11 (Scottish) became 'C' Battalion, and No. 50 and No. 52 were amalgamated to form 'D' Battalion. Together they were to operate as a brigade of the British 6th Division, part of Middle East Command.Chappell 1996, pp. 15–16. Each battalion was placed under the command of a lieutenant colonel and consisted of: a headquarters; a signals section; a specialist equipment section equipped with a form of collapsible canoe known as a 'folbot'; and two commando companies with five troops, each troop consisting of 50 men.Chappell 1996, p. 7.Moreman 2006, p. 19.
Prelude Although upon Layforce's formation the commando concept was embryonic, when it embarked from the United Kingdom it had been intended that the force would be employed to carry out a campaign of harassment and dislocation against enemy forces in the Mediterranean. At the time that Layforce was raised, the British were largely in the ascendency in the theatre, having defeated the Italians; and it was felt that the commandos could be employed in the capture of the Greek island of Rhodes as part of Operation Cordite. The arrival of the Afrika Korps in Cyrenaica and the invasions of Yugoslavia and Greece greatly changed the strategic outlook and by the time that Layforce arrived in Egypt in March, the situation had deteriorated. There was still a role for commando-style operations; and, arguably, a series of successful small-scale raids at vital points in the German rear areas might have forced Rommel to divert some of his offensive capability to defend his lines of communications.Saunders 1959, pp. 54–55. Circumstances undermined the Layforce concept almost as soon as it became established.
Following the invasions of the Balkans, a large part of the British forces in North Africa were deployed to Greece in an attempt to turn back the German advance. Layforce was not sent, although the three infantry assault ships brought with them from the United Kingdom and which were invaluable in carrying out amphibious operations were taken from them due to a lack of resources in the theatre. This robbed the commandos of one of their most important capabilities; and, although later the Glengyle was released to Laycock's force, the other two ships were not, which severely constrained the forces that he could deploy.Saunders 1959, p. 55. The British loss of air superiority severely hampered their ability to carry out landing operations, while the deployment of forces to Greece meant that the commandos became the only troops in general reserve; and as the strategic situation worsened it became increasingly difficult to employ them in the manner for which it had been intended, as they were called upon to reinforce the rest of the army elsewhere.
Operations Bardia In early April Laycock received orders to begin carrying out raids on the Afrika Korps' lines of communication along the North African coast. On 12 April they carried out a preliminary move to Alexandria, and three days later they received orders to carry out the Bardia raid and another on Bomba. 'A' and 'C' Battalions were dispatched to attack Bardia, while four Troops from 'B' Battalion embarked on a destroyer and headed for Bomba. The attacks had to be abandoned, however, due to high seas which would have made disembarking and re-embarking too dangerous.
A few days later it was decided to implement the attack on Bardia. This time, the raiders were drawn from 'A' Battalion (No. 7 Commando), and embarked upon Glengyle. A number of naval support elements were attached, including three Royal Australian Navy destroyers (, , and ) and the anti-aircraft cruiser .Saunders 1959, p. 53. Due to concerns about the force being attacked from the air, it was decided that the raid would take place under the cover of darkness; and, as a result, additional assets in the form of the submarine and a detachment from the Folboat Troop (later known as the Special Boat Section) under Roger Courtney were tasked with providing navigational assistance by marking both the anchorage and landing beach.
The raid was carried out on the night of 19/20 April 1941, but things went awry from the beginning. The submarine missed its rendezvous with the landing ship, having been strafed by an Allied aircraft shortly before. Problems with the release gear for the assault craft meant that some of the commando parties were late getting ashore, and another landed at the wrong beach.
The landings went ahead unopposed and the commandos moved to the various objectives that had been identified by intelligence. Little damage was done as a number of the targets proved not to exist or were not where they were thought to be. One party was able to damage a bridge, while another set a tyre dump on fire and blew up the breeches of a number of naval guns. Due to the delays during the landings and the need to depart while it was still dark, time ran out and the commandos were forced to withdraw. On the way back, an officer was shot when he failed to respond correctly when challenged by a sentry; while 67 men, not knowing that there were no assault craft at their beach due to the earlier error, were left behind and later captured.Saunders 1959, pp. 53–54.
Despite the lack of tangible success, the appearance of the commandos forced the Germans to divert the main part of an armoured brigade from Sollum in order to defend against further raids.Saunders 1959, p. 54. Although there were still some elements of operational art that had to be refined, the raid demonstrated the strategic value that the commandos might have had within the theatre, if strategic imperatives and resource constraints had not served to derail the concept.
Crete
On 6 April 1941 the Germans invaded Greece; less than a month later, on 28 April, the last Allied troops evacuated, having been unable to stop the German advance. On 20 May a German airborne assault on Crete began.Clark 2000. The island fell to the Germans on 1 June; however, about a week before that there was still some hope that the tide could be turned. A decision was made to deploy the commandos from Layforce to the island to carry out raids on the German lines of communications with a view to either turning back the invasion or enabling an evacuation to take place.
On 25 May Layforce, consisting mainly of 'A' and 'D' Battalions with a detachment from 'B' Battalion ('C' Battalion (No. 11 (Scottish) Commando) had been sent to reinforce the garrison on Cyprus in case of a German invasion there), departed Alexandria and attempted to land on Crete.Parker 2000, p. 50. They were turned back by bad weather, however, and forced to return to Alexandria where they re-embarked upon the Abdiel to make another attempt. On the night of 26/27 May they landed in Suda Bay. Almost as soon as they landed, it was decided that they could not be employed in an offensive role and would instead be used to cover the withdrawal route towards Sphakia to the south.Clark 2000, p. 165. As such, upon landing they were ordered to leave all their heavy equipment, including radios and transport, behind.Clark 2000, p. 166. This was a role that they were poorly equipped for, though, as they were lacking in the indirect-fire-support weapons such as mortars or artillery and were armed only very lightly, mainly with rifles and a few Bren light machine guns.
Nevertheless, by sunrise on 27 May they had taken up a defensive position along the main road that led inland from Sphakia. From then until 31 May, they were engaged in carrying out a number of rearguard actions to enable the main body of troops to be taken off the beaches by the navy.Saunders 1959, p. 56. Throughout the entire time they were almost constantly under aerial attack.Saunders 1959, pp. 55–56.
On 28 May the defenders began disengaging from the enemy and withdrawing along the pass through the central mountains that separated them from the port of Sphakia in the south.Clark 2000, p. 167. The defence of the pass fell to the Commandos along with two Australian infantry battalions (the 2/7th and 2/8th Battalions) and the 5th New Zealand Brigade.Clark 2000, p. 168.Parker 2000, p. 51. In the first two nights of the evacuation approximately 8,000 men were taken off, while on the third night, 30 May, covered by the Australians and Laycock's commandos, the New Zealanders were able to get off too.Clark 2000, p. 170.
For the commandos, the fighting was heaviest on that first day. During the height of the German attack on the pass, G Troop from 'A' Battalion (No. 7 Commando), under Lieutenant F. Nicholls, carried out a bayonet assault after a force of Germans took up a position on a hill on the Commando's left flank, from where they began to enfilade the entire position. Twice the Germans came at them and each time the attack was turned back by stubborn defence. Elsewhere that same day, however, Laycock's headquarters was ambushed; and in a rather confused action he and his brigade major, Freddie Graham, commandeered a tank in which they returned to the main body.